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Abstract
The establishment of a legitimate government was a primary concern of the medieval
jurists. Consequently they were obliged to deal with the issue of authority and make it a
regular part of their juristic formulation. It was, however, aI-Mãwardi who dealt with
this issue more systematically and made it a subject of thorough investigation. In this
study we will examine his political ideas with reference to the concept of legitimacy not
only in his contemporary context, but also with regard to the governments of past
Islamic history. The study will also examine various responsibilities of the ruler as well
as his concept of political change in a broad context.
The material has been divided into six chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter
deals with the meanings of the Caliphate in a broader context, its significance and place
in Islamic religious scheme, and various issues related to authority and government as
al-Mawardi dealt with them in the light of the Qur'an, the Sunna and the Rashidtin
period.
The second and the third chapters deal with legitimate accession to authority and
various responsibilities of the ruler in order of priority and importance. Stress has been
laid on the ruler's acknowledgement of the same order in their execution.
The fourth chapter deals with the exercise of authority in a legitimate manner. It
examines why al-Mawardi recognized the 'Abbffsids as legitimate rulers despite
criticizing them for their departure from the standard practices of the Räshidiin period.
In chapter five the attention is focussed on the legitimacy of the weak 'Abbisid
Caliph, the status of the Amir and the rebel provincial dynast and the relations of the
latter two with the Caliph. The Sunnites and the Shfites of this period had different
approaches towards the issue of authority. It will be examined how they still managed to
arrive at a concordat at an official level which lasted for more than a century.
In the sixth chapter, al-Mãwardi's concept of political change has been examined in
a broader context.
In the conclusion various research findings are brought together in consequence of
studying al-Mãwardi's political concepts in relation to the concept of legitimacy.
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1Introduction
The life of the famous Shafi 'fjurist, AbU al-Uasan 'All al-Mawardi, has been surveyed
in many other books. I do not propose to duplicate here what other scholars have done
but it is worth drawing brief attention to the main events in al-Mãwardi's life. Born in
3 67/974, at Bara, he gained his early education in ljadfth and the fiqh under famous
jurists of Bara and later on at Baghdad under the famous Shafi'i jurist Abü Uamid
Isfrã'inl (d.406/1015).' He began his professional career as a judge and served in this
capacity in various towns. In 429/1037 A.H., in recognition of his judicial competence
and erudite scholarship, he was raised to the post of 'Aqçla al-QucfaJ' which he
continued to hold till his death in 450/1058.
His success in various diplomatic missions showed his ability to deal with
contemporary issues in an astute manner. In the year 422/1030, the Caliph Qa'im bi
Amr Allah, on his accession to the throne, sent him to Abü Kãlijär (d.440/1048) and he
was successful in securing the oath of allegiance to the Caliph as well as persuading him
to be content with the title of Malik al-Dawla instead of the title Sulfãn al-Mu 'agam
Mãlik al-Umam2 Similarly, in 428/1036, on Caliph's instructions, he was able to bring
about reconciliation between the prince Jaläl al-Dawla and his nephew AbU Kãlijär.3
The Caliph, Qa'im bi Amr Allah sent him as an emissary in 433/1041, and again in
435/1043 to the Seljuq prince, Tughril Beg, who gave him a warm welcome,4
acknowledged supremacy of the Caliph, and promised to treat the subjects in a kind
manner. In 434/1042, he managed to convince Prince JalLãl al-Dawla not to unjustly
' Sa1aI al-Din Basyilni, al-Fikr a1-Si y sI 'md aI-Mãwardi, PP.1 1-12
2 Ibn al-Jawzl, aI-Muntazam,vol:15, PP.225-226
Ibn Athir, al-Kamil Fi Tärikh, vol:9, P.455
Ibn aI-Jawzl, a1-Muntaam,vo1:15, P.289
2deprive the Caliph of his income from Jawãlf( poll tax). Prince Jalal al-Dawla agreed to
restore it from next year.5
His active engagement in political affairs won him praise from the authorities and
made him a popular figure of his age. But what made him a great figure after his death
was his contribution as a jurist to which we shall now turn in our present study.
al-Mãwardi occupies a prominent place among the medieval jurists due to his
contribution in the field of Islamic politics. As a jurist, he dealt with the problems of
authority at length both to clarify their standard solutions under favourable conditions
and the minimum requirements in existing circumstances. Hence he did not merely
propose an outline for an ideal Islamic state but was very much concerned with
proposing solutions to contemporary issues of politics. Most of the jurists after him
recognized the value of his work as fundamental in the field of Islamic politics. Even
the great Ibn KhaldUn acknowledged the soundness of his opinions and recognized their
validity in his own time.6
In dealing with contemporary issues of politics, al-Mawardi was guided by the
Qur'an, the Sunna, and the practices of the RffshidUn period. He also critically examined
past Islamic history during the Umayyad and the 'Abbasid periods and benefited from
the experiences of his predecessors. In the light of these sources, he proposed a flexible
framework for the Caliphate, which along with incorporating a programme to be
enforced under a strong Caliph offered good prospects for the continuation of the
existing set up under a strong Amir.
Ibn aI-Jawzi, aI-Muntazam,vol:15, PP.285-286
6 Ibn Khaldiln,_Mugaddima,vol:2, P.53
3This study, therefore, instead of looking at al-Mãwardi's theory of the Caliphate in a
traditional way aims to identify both aspects: the study of the al-A1)kam as a proposed
framework for the restored Caliphate as well as a justification for the existing set up in
which the AmIr could exercise his authority in a legitimate manner. In the context of the
Buwayhid era, he found the problem of authority to be a complicated one. First of all, it
was the Caliph whose legitimacy was challenged on the grounds that apart from being
installed and deposed on the will of the Buwayhids he increasingly depended upon them
for the exercise of his authority. Consequently some independent dynasts who had
hitherto avoided adopting the title of the Caliph now had an excuse to claim the
transference of the title to them. In his capacity of a classical SunnIjurist, how and why
did al-Mãwardi still consider such a weak Caliph legitimate? An attempt has been made
to study the Caliph's recognized role in religious and judicial matters as well as his
supervisory role over the AmIr due to the existence of powerful dynasties. Moreover, in
the light of al-Mãwardi's formulation, it is examined that once the allegiance was
rendered to the Caliph as a head of the community, the Caliphate could be a shared
responsibility through delegation provided its responsibilities were shared jointly
between the Caliph, the Amir and the provincial dynast. The roles assigned both to the
Amir and the provincial dynast are examined to determine that although this
formulation was meant to provide a framework for the restored Caliphate, it was also
good for the Buwayhids who could continue to exercise authority on behalf of the
Caliph in a legitimate manner. It is also examined how al-Mãwardi dealt with an
unprecedented situation and showed the possibility of co-existence of the Shfite and the
Sunnite authorities on official level without violating the principles of religion.
al-Mãwardi recognized the necessity and importance of legal means with regard to
acquisition of authority, which he worked out in the light of various developments
4during the Rãshidiin period. Yet he legitimized the ruler who established his authority in
defiance of these principles. Similarly he acknowledged the consolidation of the rule
within a single family and considered the less preferred (MafclUI) as a legitimate ruler
even in the presence of a preferred (afcfal) candidate which seemed to be inconsistent
with the spirit of Rash idUn period. An attempt has been made to study how he justified
both viewpoints by applying religious principles like the law of necessity, the recourse
to expediency in changed circumstances, and the requirement of maintaining just the
bare minimum. Moreover, on the issue of legitimate accession to authority his views
have been critically analyzed and compared with the views of the Ifanbali and the
Ijanaf! scholars. Similarities and differences point towards the different approaches
regarding the problem of legitimate accession by different Sunni schools of
jurisprudence.
Similarly he legitimized the 'Abbãsid rulers who justified their rule on the basis of
their relationship to the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H). They laid down their principles in the
manifesto called the 'Abbãsid Da'wa which has been analyzed to determine whether
there existed common grounds between their claims to authority and al-MAwardi's
account of Islamic politics.
al-MAwardi criticized the Umayyad and the 'Abbffsid rulers as worldly oriented and
highlighted their shortcomings. Yet he considered their rule legitimate because they
submitted to the practice of acquiring authority through legal means and carried out
certain Islamic practices at public level. So the study highlights al-Mawardi's
requirements for the legitimacy of a ruler and how the 'Abbasids fulfilled those
requirements in broad essentials.
In the context of ten duties assigned to the ruler, al-Mãwardl attached great
importance to his religious responsibilities and put them above other responsibilities in
5order of preference. al-Mawardi considered the ruler as the guardian of faith, the leader
in the prayer, the one responsible for combating innovations, and the most important
agent of enjoining virtue and preventing evil. He wrote separate chapters on the
establishment of religious obligations and fully involved the ruler in their proper
fulfillment. His viewpoint is therefore explained in the light of his interpretation of the
verses of the Qur'an and it is explained how the legitimacy of ruler's authority was
primarily linked to the establishment of these obligations. It was in fact in recognition
of retaining his religious status that the weak 'Abbãsid Caliph of the Buwayhid age was
considered legitimate. A considerable amount of space is therefore given to show the
proper significance of religious responsibilities and the ruler's involvement in carrying
them out.
In studying various responsibilities of the ruler, we see aI-Mãwardi's concern for the
manner of carrying them out. The ruler was primarily considered as a religious leader,
then a moral reformer, and finally an executor of law. Consequently we see throughout
the text of al-Mãwardi that the ruler was required to properly acknowledge these
different roles and act accordingly towards apostates, rebels, criminals, and those
evading religious responsibilities. Moreover, this study aims to highlight how al-
Mãwardi made the ruler responsible to deal with the different schools of jurisprudence.
The rights and the duties of both the ruler and the different schools are carefully studied.
al-Mãwardi considered the ruler as the most effective agent of change in society.
Under the sinful (faiq) ruler, al-Mãwardi made the subjects responsible for carrying out
the same obligation to the extent of their ability. Consequently the subjects were
required to deal with the evil of the unjust authorities under the same principle. Within
this context it is possible to remove apparent contradictions in al-Mãwardl' s statements
6in his different books and exegeses with regard to deposition of an unjust ruler 7and to
study his concept of political change properly in a broader context. If the means of
deposition were lacking, al-Mawardi suggested various negative measures of resistance
to the unjust rule along with positive duty of social reform through religious
transformation of society.
From his detailed description of the prophetic method of establishing an Islamic
order, we can appreciate that al-Mãwardl linked the enforcement of Islamic
injunctions to the collective ability of the believers. A careful study of this method
would, therefore, enable us to determine the place of politics in religion and judge the
relevance of the institution of the Caliphate within its proper context.
In this study, the term Caliphate is understood in its broader context and not
confined to its political meanings alone. The study, therefore, seeks to identify in a
unique manner the significance of the Caliphate both in political and non-political
context. Moreover, the study brings into account the relevance of the institution of the
Caliphate within its proper context. The various principles which al-Mäwardi applied
to the Umayyad and the 'Abbãsid governments, such as the lesser of two evils, the
Imain ate of the less preferred (MafçJiil), the preference of tyranny over anarchy,
necessity and benefits of political organization are studied in the light of .-Iadfth
literature from his various books and the exegeses of the Qur'an. In establishment of a
legitimate government he made the precedents of the RashidUn Caliphs as an
important source and drew various principles in the light of the developments during
this period. We shall therefore begin our study with his fundamental concepts that he
It will be seen in the course of dealing with this problem that on the one hand MAwardi
disqualifies the dissolute ruler and authorizes the people of power and influence to depose
him. On the other hand, in the light ofIadfth literature, he quotes Aja'JIh which demands a
complete submission to him even if he is bad and unjust.
7worked out in the light of the Qur'an, Sunna, and the period of the rightly guided
(Rashidtin) Caliphs.
Bibliographical Survey
Primary Sources
This research is based both on primary and the secondary sources. Among the
primary sources al-Mäwardi's own books constitute the bulk of the material. Attention
is focussed both on the al-Alikãm and his other works. Since his political ideas were
greatly influenced by his religious thought, the proper study is considered to naturally
begin with his interpretations of the verses in the Exegeses of Our'an, the study of
AJiaJfth, and the practices of the Prophet (P.B.U.H). His exegeses of the Qur'an, hither
to ignored by the biographers of aI-Mawardi, was found to be a useful source on many
important topics like the limits of obedience and disobedience to a ruler, the concept
of revolt against the unjust ruler, the limits of co-operation and non-co-cooperation
under a dissolute and a non-Muslim ruler, and legitimacy of government service etc.
In the light of his various interpretations in the exegeses, it was possible to analyze the
'Abbäsid Da'wa and 'Abbasid claims to the Caliphate on the bases of their relationship
to the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H). His book Adab al-Din wa al-Dunyã was of
considerable help in clarifying the role and the status of the 'ulamã' in politics, the
necessity of political organization, the importance of religious obligations, and his
concept of political change. Na11iatul al-Muluk, and A'lãm also contained a bulk of
material from AJjädRh literature which helped to clarify several topics like the place of
politics in religion, the legitimacy of the less preferred (MafçJiil) Imãin, the preference
of tyranny over anarchy, the various responsibilities of ruler, al-Mawardi's critical
attitude towards the Umayyads and the 'Abbãids etc. Along with these primary
sources, the Arabic sources from medieval writers related to the same subject were
8consulted for a comparative study. Firstly, the exegeses of al-Tabari, al-Qurtubi, a!-
Zamakhshari, and al-Mawdüdi are used for a comparative study to explore and
understand the right meanings of the term Caliph in a broad perspective. The
chronicles of Jbn Hishäm, Tabaii, Khatib Baghdãdi, Ibn al-Athir, Allama SyUti, and
Ibn Kathir, are frequently used and quoted in support or criticism of a viewpoint as
well as for validating the authenticity of the various statements and events related to
past history of the Muslims. Mawlana Yüsuf's Ha yãt al-Saliãba was found to be of
great help in giving useful details regarding the establishments of the early Caliphates.
Abu Ya'la's work al-Atikäm al-Sultani yya was found to be useful for a comparative
study on various important topics like legitimate accession to authority, the ruler's
religious and administrative responsibilities and the limits of obedience and
disobedience to the ruler. Imam aI-Ash'ari's Maqalat isiamiyyin was a useful source
on the number of issues like legitimate accession to authority, the number of persons
necessary for holding the Caliphate and viewpoints of different schools regarding the
concept of political change. al-Fatãwa al-Hindiyya was found to be useful in providing
details of the ruler's responsibilities for establishing prayer and giving Zakãt. Imm
al-Ghazãli's book lly' 'ulfim al-Din was of great help for comparative study on the
issues like enjoining good and preventing evil, the ruler's responsibility for carrying
out this obligation, and the limits of performing obligations for the subjects and the
'ulamã'. Mawlana 'Umar.s book Ma'rüf wa Munkar was another important source for
comparative study with Mäwardi's views on the subject of enjoining virtue and
preventing evil. Abü Zahra's three volumes on the Imãm al-Shãfi'i, the Imam Mälik,
and the ImAm Almad b. Uanbal supplied useful material for comparison regarding
issues like the attitude of the Imãms towards the political authorities. Abü Ubayd's
Kitäb al-Amw1 contained useful material on the ruler's responsibilities regarding
9collecting and distributing Zakãt. Ibn Taymiyya's book al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya was of
great help in providing details about the ruler's responsibilities. Juwayni's work al-
Ghayathi was of great value in understanding the concept of revolt against authority as
well as providing material with regard to the law of necessity in a collective context.
As for other Arabic books related to our topic, we have mentioned them in the
bibliography. Some important Urdu works related to our study were also consulted
and are included in the bibliography.
As for the English sources, we shall briefly explain the significance of some
important works and how they were found to be useful in relation to our study.
English Sources
Gibb's al-Mawardi's Theory of the Caliphate, (1937) was considered as one of the
most important sources on al-Mawarcli. Refuting the charge of idealism against al-
Mãwardi, Gibb argues that the programme in al-Mawardi's book the al-Alikãm was
composed at the request of a higher authority in response to new developments and
was meant to be an application of classical theory to contemporary circumstances.
Gibb also acknowledged this programme to be an effort of a man who did not hesitate
to express his judgements even against the will of the Caliph. Gibb's above
suggestions were made to serve as the basis of our further study of al-Mãwardi in the
aI-Ahkäm and his other works.
On the deposition of the dissolute ruler, Gibb rightly interprets al-Mãwarcli's
intermediate stand between the subject's right of absolute revolt and his duty of
complete submission. However, his final remarks about al-Mãwardll's vague position
on this issue stimulates us to a further inquiry to ascertain al-Mawardi's exact position
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on this issue from various books including his interpretations of the verses of Qur'n
and the IIadRh literature.
On the Emirate by Seizure (Imãrat Istila), Gibb acknowledged al-Mãwardi's
contribution but criticized him for his failure either to bring it in line with the fiqh
principles or his exposition of the functions of the Caliphate. He argued that al-al-
MAwardi proposed two sets of arrangements according to which the provincial
governor was to be recognized legitimate even if he evaded the responsibility of
enforcing the right order whereas in the case of the AmIr at Central Provinces no such
concession was granted. These views are examined in the light of al-Mãwardi's text to
clarify whether al-Mwardi dealt with both situations according to different standards
or did he adhere to the same principles in proposing arrangements for the Central
Provinces and the outlying provinces. A detailed study is therefore carried out for
arriving at the right conclusions.
Qamaruddin Khan, in his book, al-Mawardi's Theory of the State (1958) dealt with
various aspects of al-Mãwardi's political theory. Like Gibb he judged the value of the
al-Ab.kam as practical and, therefore, interpreted al-Mawardis political concepts in the
context of past and contemporary circumstances. The book provides some useful
themes for further analyses.
Among his interpretations of al-Mãwardi's political concepts few points are
noteworthy for critical analyses. It seems doubtful that the Buwayhids had no legal
bases for their authority because from the time of Mu'izz al-Dawla (the founder of
Buwayhid dynasty) onward they gave allegiance to the Caliph who authorized them to
carry out various responsibilities on his behalf. A detailed discussion was considered
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necessary to clarify the matter in the light of the principle of delegation of power as
stated by al-Mãwardi.
Mr. Khan's statement seems to be exaggerated when he attributes to al-Mãwardi as
giving the subjects a right to rise in revolt against the Imm if he is guilty of wrong
behaviour. Such method contradicted al-Mäwardi's emphasis on obedience to the ruler
even if he was sinful (faiq). Consequently it was considered necessary to fully clarify
al-Mawardi's viewpoint on this subject in our present study.
E.I.J.Rosenthal,s opinions in his book, 'Political Thought In Medieval Islam'
(1958) are very instructive and provide us with the material for analyzing the
relationship between the weak Caliph and the effective Amir. He provides the basic
theme for further analyses with regard to legitimacy of the weak Caliph.
His brief discussion on the significance of recognition of the Caliph by the
provincial dynast highlights the religious necessity of the Caliphate and provides a
theme for detailed treatment of the subject. Moreover, the work outlines al-Mãwardi's
various political concepts and provides groundwork for further research.
Hanna Makhail in his book, 'Politics and Revelation, 'Mãwardi and After, (1995)
analyses aI-Mãwardi's political concepts on the bases of all his extant works except
his exegesis of the Qur'an. The work is very useful because it deals with the political
concepts of al-Mãwardi' without ignoring their past and future context. But it is too
short to do justice with some issues requiring a detailed treatment. For instance, the
study of al-Mãwardi's political concepts from his interpretations of the Qur'an and the
Sunna, the deposition of the Imam, and the functions and responsibilities of the
Caliph, are not explained in a detailed manner.
His emphases on al-Mãwardi' s criticism of the early fuqaha' for neglecting the
constitutional principles seems to be exaggerated because, despite his occasional
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criticism, al-Mãwardi constantly referred back to them on various issues throughout
the text of al-Alikam. Moreover, at the outset of the al-Alikam, al-Mãwardi clearly
acknowledged their contributions and indicated his objectives to bring together the
views of different fuqaha' which were scattered and mixed with otherfiqh rules.
Hanna challenged the soundness of Gibb's conclusions regarding the independent
status of 'U/ama'. He pointed to their extremely limited role in politics and their
dependence on the authorities in codification the fiqh principles. The historical
evidences, however, seem to favour Gibb's conclusions rather those of Hanna. The
arguments have been carefully documented from the original and secondary sources.
Kraemer, in his book 'Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam'(1986) provides
useful analyses for assessing the position of the Sunnites and the Shi'ites, the position
of various religious schools, and their relations with authorities. The study provides
ample evidences for the right assessment of the Caliph's position of the Buwayhid age,
reconciliation of the Sunnites and the Shfites of the age at official level, and the
gradual shift of the Imãmi 'ulamã from orthodox beliefs towards reliance on theology
(Kalãin).
Moreover, he provides us good analyses for determining whether the Caliph and
the Buwayhids could evolve a cordial relationship or did there always exist a
Continuous struggle for power between them.
A.J.Newman's thesis, The Development and Political Significance of the
Rationalist (Usuli) And Traditionist (Akhbãri) schools in Imami History From the
Third/Ninth To The Tenth/Sixteenth Century A.D, (1986) is helpful in understanding
the evolution of Shfite political thought from the age of Kulayni to the age of al -
Murtacã. It is instructive to note on the part of the Imãmi scholars the gradual shift
from hostility to theology (Kalãn) towards increasing reliance on it, the reconciliation
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with Sunniauthorities, the role of the 'ulamã' in the absence of the twelfth Ima,n, and
the formation of the Shfite thought under their influence. He makes careful analyses
by referring to the text of the Irnäniauthors from the age of Kulayni to the age of al-
Murtaa for showing an evolution in their thought on the fundamental issues like, the
Imämate's necessity, occultation, infallibility etc.
MafIzullah Kabir's research thesis The Buwayhid D ynasty of Baghdad(1962) is
very instructive and highlights important religious, military, social, and political
developments of this age, which assist us in analyzing the position of the Caliph, the
Amir, the provincial dynast, and the army. It highlights the mutual relations of the
Caliph and the Amir, the spheres of their influence, and various internal and external
developments which led to the improved status of the Caliph. It gives a good account
of the Sunnite Shfite relations both at the official and the private level.
Wilferd Madelung's article, 'Authority in Twelver Shi'ism in the Absence of the
Imãm (1982) explains the character of the authority in the Twelver Shi'ism and the
problems the Shi'ites faced in the absence of the twelfth Imam during the minor and
the greater occultation. He also describes the status of defacto 'Abbasid Caliph of the
Buwayhid age, the difficulties which the Shfites encountered in reconciling with his
authority, and the way the Shiite 'ulamã' overcame this difficulty by their reliance on
theology (Kalain).
Aziz Azmeh's book Muslim Kingship(1997) contains a useful chapter entitled
Absolutism Sublime' on various issues related to authority in Medieval Islam. Apart
from analyzing the nature of the different rulings on the same issue in the al-Ahkãm,
he studies the relationship between the Caliph and. the Buwayhid Amir. By summing
up the challenges posed to the weak 'Abbãsid Caliph from different parts of the
Islamic world, he provides us with material to critically examine those claims and to
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examine his legitimate status. Moreover, he examines the principle of delegation
very carefully, which provides a useful material for analyzing the position of the
Caliph and the AmIr and their mutual relations.
Jenina Safran in his article entitled; ' The Command of the Faithful In
Andalus'(1999) assists us in understanding what gave rulers a legitimate status in
medieval Muslim society. The article highlights how and by what means 'Abd a!-
Rabman 111 made claims to his legitimacy as a Caliph in the wake of the weak
'Abbäsid Caliphate. This study enables us to analyze that apart from completing the
legal requirements at the installation what necessary functions a Caliph had to perform
to justify his claim to the title. It also analyses a few more arguments by the Umayyads
regarding their legitimacy and provides material for comparison and analyses
regarding the legitimacy of the weak 'Abbffsid Caliph.
D.P.Little in his paper, 'A New Look at al-AbkAm al-Sultäniyya'(1974) provides a
good survey of the opinions of the past writers about the al-Abkäm. He ultimately
verifies Gibb's conclusions that the book was connected with contemporary
circumstances but warns on the authority of various writers that it should not be
treated as a reliable source for the 'Abbäsid institutions. This gives an incentive for
investigating al-Mawardi's accurate estimate of the 'Abbãsids, both his trust for and
critical attitude towards their practices and his acknowledgement of them for
conforming to his scheme in broad essentials.
The author highlights the substantial differences between the works of Abü-Ya'lã
and al-Mawardi which stimulates the researcher to a further inquiry into the
differences between both writers. The differences are found on the issues like,
accession to authority, the responsibilities of the ruler, and the right to rise in revolt
against the authorities which are thoroughly discussed and analyzed.
15
However, the author's interpretation of al-Mäwardi regarding the deposition of the
Iinäin is questionable because al-Mawardi did not say that a dissolute Imain must be
deposed. He just legitimized his deposition under favourable conditions but he neither
made it incumbent upon subjects nor upon the people of power and influence.
Bernard Lewis in his paper, 'On the Quietist And Activist Traditions In Islamic
Political Writing'(1986) provides good analyses for understanding the attitude of the
'ulamã' towards the authorities, the reasons for their legimisation and criticism of the
rulers, their attitude towards the government and the government service. He also
takes into account various developments in the course of Islamic history which
shifted the attention of the 'ulamã' from strict standards of legality to maintaining the
bare minimum. He classified the jurists into the radicals and the quietists and
explained their different approaches towards revolt against the authority in the light
of their interpretations of the Qur'ãn and the Sunna. His admission that the Quietists
remained more predominant than the radicals enables us to interpret the traditional
Sunni theory in the context of the viewpoint of the 'ulama' belonging to that school.
The researcher benefited from the useful analyses of this paper on several places in
thesis.
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Chapter One
The Meanings of the Caliphate: The Evidence of the Qur'an,
Sunna, and the RãshidUn Period
To determine the exact nature of al-Mãwardi's ideas on politics, we may begin to
explore his views from the verses of the Qur'an with political import. Since in
explaining those verses in his exegeses, he also relies upon the Ijadffh literature, the
proper study of those Ajffdfth would also be necessary to derive the right conclusions.
A Study of the Word Caliph:
First of all, al-Mäwardi explains the literal meanings of the word Caliph. It means, as
he goes on to explain, the one who acts in place of another person.' When a person
succeeds another person he is called Caliph. After this literal interpretation of the word,
aI-Mãwardi further clarifies the scope of this term with reference to the descendants of
Adam on earth. In quoting three interpretations of the Caliphate of Adam and his
offspring, he sticks to the theme derived from its literal meaning in two of these
interpretations. The third interpretation takes the word both in a religious and political
sense.
According to the first interpretation, there were jinn on the earth who caused
mischief and shed blood. Consequently they were destroyed and were succeeded by
Adam and his offspring. 2 According to the second interpretation, it was Allah's
intention that a nation should succeed another nation from the offspring of Adam who
'al-Mäwardl, Tafslr aI-Mwardi: al-Nukat Wa al-'U yUn, vol. 1, 2-30.
2Jbjd
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themselves should succeed Adam in the establishment of truth.3
It is obvious from both interpretations that the word Caliph here refers to humanity
as a whole. The first interpretation rather than focussing upon man as the first inheritor
of the earth, attempts to prove that he was made to inherit the land in place of jinn. As
the jinn spread corruption and killed one another they were destroyed and man
succeeded them. This view does not seem to be inconsistent with the other verses of the
Qur'an since it is proved from the Qur'an that the creation of the jinn was prior to the
creation of man. 4 Satan (lb/is) was also from the group of the jinn who did not tolerate
the Caliphate of Adam on the earth. 5 It is also proved by the act of his disobedience that
before man the jinn were also given the freedom of choice, for without it, it would be
impossible on their part to disobey the command of Allah. In other words, the jinn, in
opposition to the Divine scheme, thought themselves more deserving of the Caliphate at
the time of the creation of Adam. Although there are no clear indications that man was
created to succeed some other creation, the theme of the Qur'ãnic verses does not
contradict the concept of human succession to the Jinn. That is why the famous
commentators of the Qur'an considered it as one of the possible interpretations of this
verse. al-Tabari (d. 310/923) has quoted it in the following words: "The first inhabitants
on the earth were jinn. But they spread corruption, shed blood, and killed one another,
so Allah replaced them with Adam and his offspring." 6 But there are no political
meanings attached to this word which could be derived from these interpretations.
Through a second interpretation, however, al-Mãwardi limits the Caliphate to those
who are inheritors of the Caliphate of Adam by virtue of their undertaking to establish
the truth. al-Tabaii, however, applies the word to all the persons of a generation which
Ibid.
"ai-Our'ãn, trans: Marmaduke Pickthall, 15:27.
al-Our'ân, 2:34.
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succeeds the previous generation.
The third interpretation assigns to Adam the status of Caliph because Allah wanted him
in this capacity to establish His commandments among men. 7 In other words, Adam was
appointed to enforce the commandments of Allah in the capacity of a Caliph. The word
can thus be applied to anybody who is able to enforce the commandments of Allah in
this capacity. al-Tabari quoted it as one of the possible interpretations of this verse. He
says: " Allah said to the angels: " I am going to create and place in the earth My
vicegerent who will enforce my orders among my creatures on my behalf. This
vicegerent will be Adam and his progeny which will take his place, obeying Allah and
judging between men with equity." 8 It was thus common to most of the commentators
not to exclude the role of Adam in the capacity of a sovereign ruler. al-Qurtubi, (d.
671/1273) in his famous exegesis, interprets the same verse more emphatically in the
political context. According to him, the verse provides the basis for the appointment of
the Caliph who shall be heard and obeyed. He shall unite the opinions and execute the
commands. al-Qurtubi shows the consensus of the 'ulamif' over the mandatory nature of
the office except Athm who holds that if the people themselves maintain the right order
and establish the truth, they would free themselves from the necessity of the Irnäin. He,
however, refutes AthAm's viewpoint by quoting the verses from three different places in
the Qur'ãn.9 Like al-Mãwardi, the Ijmff' of the companions furnished him a strong basis
for his argument. He says that while dispute arose among the companions of the Prophet
Mubammed (P.B.U.H) as to the appointment of a proper person for the Caliphate, the
issue of the Caliphate itself was never disputed!°
6 
al-Tabarl, Ibn Jarir, Jami' aI-Ba yän 'an ta'wil a-Our'ãn, 2:30.
Ibid.
8 Ibid.
Qurub1, aI-Jami' Ii AbkAm aI-Our'än, 2:30.
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The Caliphate of Adam through this verse is thus interpreted as the beginning of
mankind and a succession to the previous creation on the earth, the beginning of a
continuous series of one generation to the previous one, and finally his role as a trustee
to enforce the Divine commandments. al-Mãwardi, like other famous commentators of
the Qur'an, takes these possibilities into account, but his preference for the
interpretation where the word Caliph is interpreted as the executor of the Divine
commandment can be ascertained from his interpretations of the other verses in the
Qur'an. Another verse also related to the inception of the universe and humanity reveals
the object of the creation thus: " Lo we offered the trust to the heavens and the earth,
and the hill, but they shrank from bearing it and were afraid of it and man assumed it."1'
Here by the word 'trust' al-Mãwardi means the Divine commandments.' 2 Man's
consent to take the trust means his willingness to take the responsibility of their
execution. It can, therefore, be deduced that Adam the first human being, entitled as
Caliph, was a trustee of the Divine commandments in this capacity. His basic
responsibility was the proper execution of these commandments. al-Mãwardl also used
the word 'trust' in the fourth siira in the same sense where the believers are urged to
give the trusts to their right owners.' 3 Here again al-Mãwardi has taken the world 'trust'
(Amäza) in the same meanings of the Divine authority. The word is used on both
occasions in the sense of authority and Divine commandments. Adam was thus a bearer
of trust in the capacity of Caliph.
The word Caliph as singular has been used on one more occasion with reference to
the Prophet David whom Allah addresses as Caliph. It is clear from the text of the verse
that the word is used in a strictly political sense. The verse reads: "0 David, We have
"al-Our'an, 33:72.
12 
aI-Mãwardl, Tafslr, 33:72.
' Ibid.
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made you the Caliph in the earth, so judge between the men with truth and do not
follow thy desire." 4 In explaining this verse, al-Mãwardi says that the Caliphate of
David combined both prophethood and the rule over people.'5
al-Mãwardi subjected the word to a variety of meanings where it is used in plural
form. In each case al-Mawardi has interpreted it according to the context of the verse.
For instance in SUra al-An 'am the word has been used thus: "He it is who has placed
you as Caliphs of the earth and has exalted some of you in rank above others, that He
may try you by (the test of) that which he has given you."16
Again in SUra al-Fãfir the word has been used thus:" 7 He it is Who has made you
the Caliphs in the earth." Here al-Mãwardi meant by the Caliph either humanity as a
whole or some groups thereof. The use of the word in this sense has persisted down to
our own age. al-MawdUdi, (d. 1400/1979) a famous Qur'ãn commentator of the
twentieth century, also quoted the word to denote the vicegerency of every human being
on the earth. Clarifying the theme of the verse in SUra al-An 'sn, he says that all the
human beings on the earth are the Caliphs of Allah in a sense that Allah has given many
things to them as trust and has given them control over those things.18
Writing about man's vicegerency to the previous generations, al-Mãwardi quoted
Qatada as saying that the people of every age are the Caliphs to the previous
generation.' 9 This interpretation of the word Caliph can be verified from the use of the
word in Süa A 'r where the Prophet Hud addressed his people in these words: " and
remember when He made you the Caliphs after the people of Ni1."2°
' 
aI-Qur'än, 38:26.
' al-Mawardl, Tafslr, 38:26.
al-Our'än, 6:165.
al-Our'ãn, 35:39.
18 Mawlãnà Aba A'lã al-MawdUdi, Taflulm aI-Qur'An, 6:165.
al-Mawardi, Tafsir, 35:39.
20 
aI-Qur'an, 8:69.
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A little further in the same SUra the prophet $a1i.i repeats the similar words thus:
and remember when He made you the Caliphs after the people of 'Ad.. "' Here instead
of taking it in any limited sense the word has been used in a broad sense. The
individuals of every succeeding generation are considered as Caliphs to the previous
generation.
In the verse of the SUra al-An 'ifin referred to in the above paragraph, al-Mawardi
also interpreted the word in various other contexts. Every person holding some
responsibility is a Caliph so that the system of the world may be regulated in the right
way. al-Mawdüdi also shares this viewpoint completely. Having recognized the
Caliphate of every human being on the earth, he further clarifies this theme that Allah
has classified all the Caliphs according to different grades. Some of the Caliphs have a
wider sphere of responsibility while the others have a limited sphere of responsibility.22
al-Mãwardi also interpreted this word to prove the necessity of the Caliphate for the
followers of the Prophet Mubammed (P.B.U.H). They are called as the Caliphs to the
previous nations and since there would be no more Prophets after the Prophet
Mulammed (P.B.U.H.) they would occupy this status right to the end. 23 Here al-
Mãwardl was not alone in holding this opinion. al-Zamakhshari (d. 538/1144) also
considered that the word referred to the followers of the Holy Prophet: since he was the
last of the prophets and his community came at the end of all the communities. Al-
Zamakhshari also highlighted another aspect of the same verse by indicating that man's
control over everything in the universe means his Caliphate.24
There is another sense in which the word applies to the followers of the Holy
21 Ibid.
22 
al-Mawdtldl, Taflulni, 6:165.
23 
aI-Mäwardl, Tafslr, 6:165.
24 
aI-Zamakhsharl, MuIammed ibn 'Umar, aI-KashshAf 'an haga'ici aI-TanzIl Wa 'U yUn al-Agawil if
Wujilh aI-tanzll, 4vols, 6-165.
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Prophet (P.B.U.H). Since they succeeded in establishing Islamic society, they were
made responsible in their collective capacity to execute the Divine commandment
through the establishment of the agency of the Caliphate.
In our study so far we have seen that the word has been used in various senses.
The Caliph is a Divinely appointed representative on the earth who has to enforce the
Divine commandments as a trust.
• Mankind succeeded jinn as the representatives on the earth.
Every succeeding generation is Caliph to the previous generation.
In a strictly political sense the word is used twice as a singular. In both cases it is
applied to the Prophets who were made responsible for the execution of the
commandments of Allah.
• Every man trying to revive the religion of Allah is a Caliph whether he has the power
or not.
• Every man holding some responsible post with a limited sphere of responsibility is a
Caliph. In this capacity some of the men are placed above others to run the system of
the world successfully.
It is obvious from the above study that like other commentators of his time, al-
Mãwardi used the word both in the political as well as non-political context. Neither has
it been used merely within a political context nor has he isolated it from political
connotations. In two places it has been used in the Qur'an to indicate the sovereignty of
the Prophet. The Ijadfth literature conforms to the same viewpoint and uses the word
both in the political as well as non-political context. The companions, therefore,
adopted the word Caliph in all these senses and applied the word both to the ruler as
well as to a deputy in any field of life. But the word did not assume the status of a
revealed text for the ruler and al-Mãwardi used it interchangeably with the words Amir
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al-Mu 'minfrz, or Imain.
The Prophetic Way of Establishing an Islamic Order
As mentioned above, the word Caliph is applicable both to a sovereign ruler executing
the commandments of Allah as well as to a person concerned with the revival of
religion of Allah. Adam was a Caliph as a sovereign ruler but not all the succeeding
Prophets were sovereigns. Yet they were Allah's Caliphs because of their concern to
revive the religion. The Prophets laid down a set pattern and linked the enforcement of
Divine injunctions with the ability and strength of the believers. In this process, if a
sufficiently large number of people of a given society accepted the religion and had
ability to enforce the religious injunctions, they were bound to establish an Islamic
government so as to regulate their collective lives in accordance with those religious
injunctions.
The establishment of an Islamic government consequently depends upon the
collective ability of the members of an Islamic society for which it is necessary to
follow the pattern set by the Prophet. 25 The followers of a Prophet had the experience of
a full-fledged Islamic society after going through several stages. They were
subsequently made responsible for implementing the religious commandments at a
collective level for which the government was considered indispensable. From such an
order it follows that the Islamic government is established in consequence of, and not
prior to, the transformation of society as a properly Islamic one. At no stage during their
early Da 'Wa, did the Prophets give a call to the believers to hurry the process of reform
through establishment of government. In A 'lain al-Mãwardi states the proper order of
the scheme of the Islamic injunctions that transformed the society into an Islamic one.
MawlAnã Ameen Absan Ilãhi adhered to the same viewpoint in his book Tafluim Din. He thinks the
revival of religion at social level prior to the establishment of government (Taihim Din, PP.137-139).
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He sets forth the example of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) who set an example in
establishing this pattern.26
The First Stage
After prophethood the work of preaching was initially limited to a close circle of
believers. al-Maward! considered it a right method according to which the prophetic
work is carried Out. No attempt was made to achieve slightly what was beyond the
capacity of the believers in view of time and circumstances. The Prophet (P.B.U.H.),
therefore, merely conveyed the message to his relatives and to those close to him as
prescribed in the Qur'an: "0 thou enveloped in the cloak, arise and warn"27
After winning over a few converts to his religion, he conveyed his message openly in
the light of the following Qur'anic prescriptions: " so proclaim that which you are
commanded, and withdraw from the idolaters"28
At this stage the Divine message was limited only to the unity of Allah as well as to
the reward and punishment of the hereafter. 29 That was another point thought implicit in
the scheme of the religion. It was necessary for the believers to build strong faith in
Allah and in the hereafter before they could be the rightful recipients of other religious
injunctions. Without firm belief in Allah and the hereafter it was considered futile to
expect them to carry out other injunctions in the right manner and at the proper time.
This approach can be supported by the statement attributed to the Companions that they
first learnt faith and then it was easy for them to act upon the injunction of Islam.
26 
al-MAwardi, A'Iãm, PP.282-285.
27 J-Qur'än, 74-1-2.
28 
aI-Our'An 15:94.
29 
aI-Mäwardi, A'làm, P.282.
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The Second Stage
After the unity of Allah, al-Mãwardi describes the manner in which the Islamic
methods of worship and injunctions were introduced; and the methods of worship took
precedence. The angel Gabriel taught the Holy prophet ( P.B.U.H) both ablution and
prayer and both these by virtue of the Divine commandment through the Holy Qur'ãn
were made incumbent on all the Muslims of the umma. In the ninth year the prayer was
made obligatory after the journey of the Prophet (P.B.U.H) from the Masjid iIarain to
the Masjid al-A qcã. No other injunctions related to the worship were made incumbent
until he migrated towards Medina where the residents of the city became his
supporters.3°
The proper order according to which the religious injunctions were imparted was
thus explained. After belief in Allah and the hereafter the foremost priority was given to
the 'Ibäiat', thus indicating the need to fortify the relationship between man and Allah.
On such foundations, the building up of the community of believers was considered
possible. The task of the Prophet (P.B.U.H.) was not only to educate the people but also
to teach them wisdom and purify their morals. 3 ' The community of believers, raised on
these lines, could act upon the religious injunctions pertaining to all aspects of life and
was consequently in a position to establish the government.
Due regard was given to the capacity of the followers in making them follow the
different injunctions in the realm of 'Ibadat'. Prayer was made compulsory before any
other religious injunction because it was comparatively the easiest of all the acts of the
worships. However, prayer remained an individual act as long as Muslims were in
Mecca. Ibn Hishäm says that in the early days the companions used to pray secretly on
° Ibid, P.286.
31 aI-Our'àn, 3-164.
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the outskirts of Mecca. 32 The holy Prophet (P.B.U.H), along with his cousin, 'All, used
to pray in a similar manner.33
The Third Stage
In Medina, in the second year of the Hifra, fasting was ordained. Then the change of
Qibla from Jerusalem to the Ka 'ba took place. Following that the zakat and the 'Id
prayer were made compulsory. The Friday prayer was substituted for the noon prayer.
Zakff.t, -Iajj, and 'Umra were not made compulsory until the Muslims were strong
enough to establish an Islamic community in Medina. 34a1- Tabarl indicates this second
year of hijra in which these commandments were made compulsory one after another as
the most eventful year. 35 Thus a gradual process led to a complete implementation of
all the Islamic injunctions. The Zakãt was made obligatory when it could be
implemented at a collective level. Far from being an individual responsibility depending
on the choice of members of the community, it was from the very start a collective
obligation which was made an official responsibility after the acquisition of strength.
The same principle was at work regarding Ijaj:j and 'Umra. No injunctions were
revealed to make them compulsory until the conquest of Mecca.
As for the al-Ahkãm, some of them related to what al-Mãwardi classified as
common sense like fornication and murder and were made unlawful immediately after
the start of the 'warnings' in Mecca. At this stage the status of these injunctions was
moral and not legal or political owing to the lack of strength for their proper
implementation. As for the things that were difficult to determine by reason, the rulings
concerning their lawfulness or unlawfulness were not laid down as long as the Prophet
32 Ibn HishAm, Seerat. al-Nab!, vol.1, P.297.
Ibid, P.278.
Ibid, P.287
aI-'j'abarl, Tarlkh al-Rusul Wa al-Mulilk, PP.18-19.
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(P.B.U.H) and the Muslims were in Mecca. Only after the Hzjra were such rulings
revealed. As the believers grew in strength and number, they were proportionately
subjected to more laws and commandments. The injunctions that could be carried out in
Medina were not revealed at Mecca. At Medina when they acquired a distinct identity,
the religious injunctions acquired a collective status. Gradually other injunctions
pertaining to all spheres of life were revealed. According to al-Mãwardi, then, before a
man or people are expected or ordered to undertaking an obligation, it must be judged
that they have the ability to undertake that obligation. Where that ability is lacking, they
will be absolved from undertaking the obligation. That was a typical method of the
Prophet (P.B.U.H) according to which the commandments were made compulsory after
judging an individual's capacity both at individual and collective level. A Ijadffh in the
Muslim clarifies the same theme. It is narrated from 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar that the Holy
Prophet (P.B.U.H) used to take the oath of allegiance to listen and obey and used to say
(to us to act upon) such injunctions that we are able to undertake. 36 Since the Muslims
were weak in Mecca and the rulings concerning unlawful (Iarn) and lawful(Ialãl)
could not be implemented there, no attempt was made to achieve the task until they
migrated to Medina where they had a safe abode in which these rulings could be
implemented. So the lawful and the unlawful were made clear, as were the permissible
(Mubali) and prohibited ((Iffzar). al-Mãwardl considered all this to have been carried out
with great wisdom (1EIikma). This was described as an established principle of Prophetic
method and injunctions of sharf a
Prophethood, Sovereignty, and Government
Interpreting the verse of the Qur'ãn where Allah enjoins the Muslims to give the
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'trust' to their rightful owners, 38 al-Mãwardi cites three interpretations, all of which
emphasize the need to adopt a collective and systematic approach to implementing the
Islamic injunctions. In the first interpretation, he stresses the political aspect and
recommends that affairs of leadership should be entrusted to those who are able to
undertake this responsibility.39
The validity of the verse, according to the second interpretation of al-Mawardi, is
with reference to 'Uthmãn b. Talba who was the custodian of the keys of the Ka 'ba. His
status as a custodian of the keys was confirmed through this revelation.40 From this
principle it follows that every man performing a job in a society on the basis of his
ability is confirmed in his status.
In the third interpretation, on the authority of Uasan and Qatada, it has been
considered as a general principle that should govern society as a whole. Every man
should be given what he is best fitted for. 4 ' The proper implementation of this principle
would give authority to those people who are best fitted to exercise it. Individual
appointments should reflect ability so that worthy candidates are chosen for the position
that will make use of their skills. The verse was revealed after the conquest of Mecca
when the Islamic community had been established.
al-Mawardi dealt with the relation of the Prophet to authority in the incident of ralut
(Saul) and Jãlut( Goliath). The children of Israel challenged the right of Talut to
kingship when their prophet gave them the tidings of his appointment as a king. Their
challenge was based on two considerations: (1) he was a man of an obscure origin; (2)
he was not a wealthy person.
38 al-Qur'ãn, 4:58.
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The prophet indicated the legitimacy of his rule on two grounds: (1) he was a strong
man; (2) he was more knowledgeable.42
In narrating this incident al-Mãwardi also deals with the problem of whether it is
legitimate for the prophet to undertake a job under some worldly king. For a proper
answer to this question al-Mãwardi raised a question in the context of the Prophet
David: whether he was a Prophet when he killed Jãlüt. al-Mãwardi quoted two
arguments without indicating his preference for any one of	 both arguments. The
argument that justifies his being a prophet at the time of killing Jälut shows that only
prophets accomplish such unusual things and men other than the prophets cannot
accomplish such things.43
The second argument was that David was not yet elevated to the status of a Prophet
because it is not proper for a Prophet to undertake a job under the supervision of a man
who is not a Prophet.
To know al-Mäwardi's preference for one of the above two arguments we need to
turn to the slira of Joseph where al-Mãwardi deals with the same problem.
Interpreting the verse according to which the Prophet Joseph addressed the king in
these words: "set me over the storehouses of the land," al-Mãwardi quoted two
interpretations. According to the first interpretation, the notion of storehouses here
implies persons, since the sayings and the actions are hidden in those persons. They are
therefor treasures.45
al-Mawardi deals with the second interpretation in a more detailed manner.
According to it the treasures here mean the treasures of wealth. Another possibility
42 Ibid, 2:247.
' Ibid, 2:25 1.
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which he went on to quote was that the prophet Joseph had asked to be appointed as the
food minister.46
From this follows the debate about the legitimacy of man's proposing himself for
some post for which he thinks himself properly qualified. For a satisfactory answer to
this problem al-Mawardi relied upon a saying narrated from Ibn Serin who narrated it
from Abü Hurayra that the Caliph 'Umar disputed with him over his appointment in
Bahrain. The Caliph 'Umar persuaded him to take the employment which he had
refused. The Caliph inquired as to why he refused to undertake a job while the Prophet
Joseph had asked for it. 47 So al-Mãwardi seems to derive the conclusion from this that it
is right to offer oneself as a candidate for a job if one thinks oneself eligible for the post.
In the context of the same incident al-Mãwarcli deals with the problem that if a ruler
is unjust, people have different views over the legitimacy of accepting a government
job. According to one opinion it is right to accept the job provided one takes it in a right
manner, because the Prophet Joseph did by serving under the rule of the Pharaoh of
time. A person will then be judged on the basis of his actions and not on the basis of the
actions of others.48
The second opinion is that it is not legitimate to take such an employment. It is
wrong either to assist such a person in his wrong policies or to become an instrument for
his wrong policies.49
The persons who justify Prophet Joseph's undertaking the job give two arguments.
First, the pharaoh of the time of Prophet Joseph was a just person while the Pharaoh at
the Prophet Moses was an unjust person. Second, instead of looking at his actions,
Prophet Joseph had his eye upon (the management of) pharoa's wealth. Hence he could
46 Ibid.
'' Ibid.
48 Ibid.
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not be held responsible for his acts. al-Mawardi, without completely indicating his
preference for any viewpoint, arrived at a conclusion based on the following three
points:50
(1) It is legitimate for a person to undertake such matters not requiring i:jtihad in their
implementation like alms and zakfft. Undertaking such acts is legitimate under an unjust
ruler because of naon it (everything already clarified according to the rules and he has
just to enforce it).
(2) What is not legitimate is that (unqualified rulers) should undertake (tasks) where
Ijtihãd is necessary-like (issues concerning) fay. So accepting the office from an unjust
ruler is not legitimate because he manages (areas) on which he has no right and
exercises ijtihad for which he is not qualified.
(3) It is legitimate for a qualified man (to perform ijtihad) to undertake (tasks) where
there is a scope for ijtihffd such as in settlements of disputes and provided he is allowed
to follow another mujtahid's opinion; if the ruling is concerning two consenting parties
or mediation between two disputing parties. However, it is not permissible if the issue
falls within the category of compulsory commandments.5'
What is clear from the above three principles is that al-Mãwardi allows employment
under the unjust ruler provided that the employee can execute the policies consistent
with Islam not requiring ljtihad. Every command already exists clearly in written form
and the employee has just to enforce it. But if the ruler unnecessarily interferes in the
rules and exercises ijtihäi which he does not deserve, then carrying out such policies is
not justified and employment in this case is illegitimate. And finally, subject to his
competence the employee can accept the job on the condition that he will accept
' Ibid.
50 Ibid.
' Ibid.
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responsibility for the issues in which there is room for ijtihad; and that he will not be
bound to execute all official commandments.
The Limits of Obedience to the Ruler
In the fifth section of the Qur'an the verse states: "0 you who believe, obey Allah,
and obey his prophet, and those who are in authority among you. And if you dispute
concerning a thing, refer it to Allah and His Prophet if you believe in Allah and the
hereafter" 52 al-Mawardi interprets this verse in the light of A'iadilh and explains his
views regarding the limits of this obedience towards the ruler.
First of all he quotes a .a-Iadffh from A 'mash b. 'All and Sahb bin Abü Hurayra who
narrated that: "who obeys me obeys Allah and who disobeys me disobeys Allah, and
who disobeys my Amir disobeys me."53 Here 'those in authority' are considered to be
the rulers. al-Mãwardi supports this interpretation with the statement of Ibn 'Abbãs (d.
67-8/686-8), Abu-Hurayra, Suddi, and Jbn Zayd (d. 122/740), all of whom agree on this
point. The tradition clearly states the rule that the ultimate objective of every man
should be obedience towards Allah. But this obedience is possible only by obeying the
Prophet Mubammed (P.B.U.H.). In other words the will and plan of Allah are made
known to mankind only via Prophets. There can be no obedience to Allah without
rendering obedience to the Prophet (P.B.U.H).
This theme is also apparent in other parts of the Qur'an. In the third section the verse
reads: " say (0 Prophet) if you love Allah then follow me Allah will love you and
52 
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pardon your sins." 54 In the fifth section of the Qur'an it has been mentioned:
whosoever obeys the Prophet, indeed he has obeyed Allah."55
Obedience to a person is also obligatory whom the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) has
appointed or who is successor to him. Consequently disobedience to him is considered a
disobedience to the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H). There is, however, a difference between
the obedience to Allah and his prophet and obedience to a ruler. The ruler is appointed
to enforce the Divine will which has been revealed to the Holy Prophet ( P.B.U.H). He
has no independence to act contrary to the Divine will in any matter. Obedience to him
is obligatory as long as he remains obedient to Allah and His Prophet. The Caliph AbU-
Bakr clarified the same theme when he asked the people to render obedience to him as
long as he remained obedient to Allah and His Prophet ( P.B.U.H).
al-Mãwardl explains the extent and limits of obedience by quoting a Jjadlh from
Hishn b. 'Urwã from Abu-SaliLi b. Abü Ijurayra. It is narrated that: " you will be
governed after me by the governors. The righteous will govern you righteously and the
wicked ones will govern you wickedly. Listen to them and obey them in all what is in
conformity with the truth and pray behind them. If they are good it is both to your and
to their (advantage). And if they are bad it will be against them and still to your
(advantage)."56
By quoting another Ijadffh al-Mãwardi shows that the ruler has to be followed only
in right actions. He quotes the tradition as follows: " obedience to the ruler becomes
necessary if he obeys Allah. The obedience is not binding if the ruler's orders are not in
conformity with the Shart a. In such a situation disobedience to the ruler is justified.
aI-Our'An, 3:31.
Ibid, 4:80.
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And obedience to the ruler should not be at the expense of the obedience to the prophet
of Allah."57
To further support this viewpoint he quotes another tradition from Nãfi' b. 'Abd
Allah. In the words of the tradition: "obedience to the ruler is obligatory regardless of
individual likes and dislikes with the only exception when orders are contrary to the
Shari'a. In such cases obedience is not binding."58
Both of these traditions just mentioned require the people to render obedience to the
rulers in matters that are lawful, and not to shake off the burden of their authority even
if they commit some acts contrary to the commandments of the sharf a. But the
believers are, at the same time, required not to co-operate with the ruler in his unjust
policies. They have to adopt the course of actions which is consistent with the scheme
of the shari' a. This viewpoint is based on the teachings of the Qur'än and .-Iadfth. The
Qur'an puts emphasis on believers to cooperate with one another over virtue and piety
and not to cooperate over sin and transgression. 59 In the words of a Ijadfth, there is no
obedience to ruler in (matters that involve) disobedience to Allah and His Prophet
(P.B.U.H).
The Necessity and Merits of Authority
According to al-Mãwardl, the absence of authority would lead to mutual strife in
society. The un-organized and lawless people would soon be driven to barbaric
behavior. There would be none to restore the rights of the poor and the weak. Men are,
therefore, inclined to submit to the authority of a leader to prevent mutual injustice and
Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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to settle their disputes. 6° al-Mãwardi finds support for his viewpoint from the Jjadfth
that ' the sultan is the shadow of Allah on the earth with whom every oppressed
individual finds a support.'6'
To further indicate the advantages of his strength and authority al-Mãwardi says:
Allah puts the things right with the ruler more than He puts them right through the
Qur'ãn."62 al-Mawardi's purpose in quoting this fadffh is obvious: that for some people
the guidance of the Qur'an is insufficient and a strong deterrent is required to prevent
them from making mischief and spreading disorder.
According to al-Mãwardi, authority of men over the earth has its origin in the will of
Allah. It is based on the same principles according to which the rest of the universe is
organized. According to the text of the Qur'an, Allah is able to achieve everything by
His power directly without the need to call upon anyone. However, He has preferred to
manage all the affairs through His lieutenants. This principle is at work both in the
heavens and in the earth. While the angels manage the affairs in the heaven, the
management of the earthly affairs is entrusted to the kings. In support of this viewpoint.
al-Mãward! quotes the following tradition: " to Allah belong the guardians in the
heavens and the guardians in the earth. His guardians in the heaven are the angels and
his guardians in the earth are those (kings) who hold their provisions and protect them
from the people ,,63
Indicating the preference of tyranny over anarchy, a theme that is characteristic of
his political thought, he again relies on the Iladfth of the Holy prophet (P.B.U.H.). In
the words of the Ijadh: "the unjust ruler is better than anarchy. In the both there is no
60 
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good. And in some mischief there is an option (an option between the lesser of two
evils)."64
Whilst maintaining a political system based on religion and justice to be his ideal, his
aversion to anarchy led him to regard any kind of authority better than its complete
absence. He quotes a Ijadith to this effect: it is narrated from Abfl Hurayra that the
people of the Ajam were reviled in the presence of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H), so he
forbade this and said: "do not revile them. They have inhabited the cities wherein live
the people."65
After a brief survey and analyses of al-Mãwardi's political concepts as stated in the
Qur'an and sunna, we now turn to the RffshidUn period because of its close proximity
and immediate succession to the era of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.). The methods of the
accession to the power in this period were considered to be the precedents, which
according to al-Mãwardi were models for succeeding generations. al-Mãwarcli
developed a comprehensive theory explaining the nature of these appointments and
deduced a number of important principles.
The Caliphate of Abü-Bakr
After the passing away of the Holy prophet (P.B.U,H),the election of Ahü-Bakr was
completed within a single session at Saqfa Ban! Sa'ida. Referring to the speech of the
Caliph 'Umar, Madelung has thrown light on the fact that the meeting at Saqfa Ban!
Sa 'ida was not representative enough to be made a precedent for the future. 66 The quick
procedure to solve the succession problem was adopted to ward off the outbreak offitna
that could be erupted due to several contending claims to power. 67 The text of the
Ibid, Again missing from famous nine books of Ali&Jith collection
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speech makes it clear that the city of Medina could not be kept for long in a state of
confusion without a head of the community. Had there occurred a slight delay in the
choice of Amfr, the An 1 ãr would have chosen an Amir of their own. As the events of
Saqa Ban! Sa 'ida indicated, the AncIr either considered themselves as the legitimate
claimants of the office or were prepared to share this right with the MuhajirUn. In both
cases the consequences would have been unfavorable. The Caliph 'Umar also alluded to
the fact that it was because of the personality of Abü-Bakr that the election was
ultimately approved universally. 68
 If the same procedure were repeated in case of
someone else it would cause nothing but fitna. The An bcãr and Muhãjirffn unanimously
chose Abü-Bakr for the post of the Caliph. In the light of the developments that took
place at Saqfa Ban! Sa 'ida, al-MãwardI deduced and stressed the importance of the
following principles:
Ijma of the Companions
At first, the application of the word ijmff' does not seem to be appropriate because of
the differences that initially arose between the Companions with regard to the
establishment of the Caliphate. The speeches and exchange of the arguments between
the Ancar and Muhãjiriin at Saqfa Ban! Sa 'ida and the gathering of 'All and some
associates at the house of Fãfiina and their delay in taking of an oath of allegiance69
made it difficult to reach a unanimous decision. However, the differences were resolved
and an agreement was ultimately reached: thus the companions in fact succeeded in
securing zjrnä'. According to al-Mãwardi, the status of Ijrnã' is not affected if the
differences are overcome and reconciliation of the opinions is ultimately secured!° It
however, appears from the account of developments that took place in Saqfa Ban!
68 Ibn Kathir, Ibid, P.429.
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Sa 'ida that after mutual differences, practically all the Companions agreed over the
Caliphate of Abü-Bakr, the one exception being Sa'd b.'Ubada. According to Ibn Kathfr
(d. 774/1372), 'All and Zubayr took the oath of allegiance either on the same day or the
following day after the passing away of the Holy Prophet (P.B.UH). In support of his
claim he said that 'All never stopped praying behind Abfl-Bakr, never remained
isolated, and participated along with the Caliph in the Jihäd campaigns against
apostates. 7 ' In another report Ibn Kathir states that both 'All and Zubayr apologized for
the delay in taking the oath of allegiance and explained their delay as being due to their
exclusion from the election of the Caliph. They felt that they had the right to participate
in the consultation process. 72 Both of them acknowledged that Abfl-Bakr was the most
deserving person for this post. He was 'the second of the two in the cave' and was
directed by the Prophet (P.B.U.H) to lead the Muslims in the prayer.73
Ibn Kathir has related an incident involving Sa'd and Abfl-Bakr in which Abü-Bakr
reminded Sa'd of one occasion when the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) affirmed the right of
the Quraysh to the Caliphate. According to this saying, good people follow their good
people and bad people follow their bad people. Sa'd acknowledged this by saying: "you
have uttered a right thing."74
According to Ibn Kathir all this took place on the same day when the Holy Prophet
(P,B.U.H) passed away. The next morning both the MuhajirThz and the Ancãr assembled
and the oath of allegiance was completed. From these accounts of the developments, it
is clear that the differences were removed within a short period of time. In the light of
these developments Ibn Kathir also maintained it to be an Ijmã' of the companions.
° aI-MAwardl, Adab a1-Qd1 vol. 1, P.479.
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al-Tabari, on the other hand maintains that the Caliphate of Abü-Bakr was not
acknowledged by 'All until six months later.75 Concerning Sa'd he said that he never
took the oath of allegiance at all. He never prayed behind the Caliph and did not
perform the pilgrimage under official patronage. 76
 However, the message of the Caliph
to Sa'd quoted by al-Tabarl confirms that the oath of allegiance of the rest of the people
was by then completed.
According to al-Tabari, Abü-Bakr sent the message to Sa'd : "everybody including
the people of your own tribe have taken the oath of allegiance." The text of this message
supports the arguments against the possibility that some faction from the An,car persisted
in their refusal to take the oath of allegiance. The message then continues: " therefore,
you too should take the oath of allegiance." According to al-Tabari, Sa'd answered in
the negative.77 However, it is clear from the message that everybody by then had agreed
to the Caliphate of AbU-Bakr.
Whatever the differences, between the accounts of both Ibn Kathir and al-TabarI
regarding the timing of the oath of allegiance from different sections of community,
both are agreed that it was a unanimous decision of the Umma. It was the first critical
issue that the Companions were confronted with after the passing away of the Holy
Prophet (P.B.U.H) and they ultimately solved it in a manner acceptable to all.
H.A.R.Gibb rightly calls it the first historic and most decisive exercise of Ijmã'.78
al-Tabarl, Tarlkh, vol. 2, P.236, This is according to a long version of Zuhri quoted by al-Tabari
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on the authority of Uabib b. Thãbit, he narrates that when 'All heard that Abfi-Bakr was in the mosque
and was taking the oath of allegiance, he immediately went out without proper dress to give the oath of
allegiance. Secondly, on the authority of Ibn Jubair, he narrates that 'All refused to accept Abli Suflyan's
support against Abfl-Bakr and said that he gave oath of allegiance to Abfl-Bakr because he thought him
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The ljmã' of the companions was thus considered to give the Caliphate a good start
and solid foundations. However it would be wrong to assume that al-Mãwardi
maintained it to be a legal requirement in the establishment of the Caliphate. The
Caliphate is rightly established if a few prominent members of the community take the
oath of allegiance to a deserving man having necessary qualifications for the office.
Though the required unity between the people of power and influence would be lacking
in absence of ijma' over the choice of the Caliph, it would be still a rightly established
Caliphate if some prominent members agree over it 79 and the people of the city follow
the lead.8°
The Importance of the Nasy
al-Mãwardi did not believe in the right of Abü-Bakr to the Caliphate on the basis of
Naçc as was held by some jurists like Uasan Baii (d. 110/728), Jbn Uazm (d.
456/1064), and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328).81 Like most of the Sunnijurists, he was of
the opinion that the Prophet (P.B.U.H) did not leave any clear-cut instructions over the
issue of succession. The Caliphate of AbU-Bakr, according to him, was established by
the Ahi iIall wa al- 'Aqd. This appears to be a stronger view: the Caliph 'Umar is
reported to have expressed the same views shortly before his death. Moreover had there
been a Nacbc over the Caliphate of Abfl-Bakr, he would have let it known to the people
and would never have suggested the names of 'Umar and Abü 'Ubayda for the
Caliphate. But while there was no Na' over the right of any person to the Caliphate, the
issue was ultimately settled through recourse to the Nay regarding the right of the tribe
of the Quraysh to the Caliphate.82
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al-Mãwardi's account shows that Abfl-Bakr, along with the prominent associates
from Muhiriin, could not settle the issue of the Caliphate before the announcement of
the Nac. 83 A careful study of developments in Saqfa BanI Sa ida validate the
authenticity of this account. To establish their claims to the office, both MuhirUn and
An,sar delivered speeches in support of their candidates. The accounts of those speeches
in al-Tabari and Ibn Kathir throw light on their concern for the office in the light of their
past services. Sa'd whom the Ancãr chose as their leader, attributed the past victories of
the Muslims to their group.84
According to Sa'd, the Muhajiriin were feeble and unable to defend themselves in
the land of their origin, Mecca. After their migration to Medina, it was the Anffr who
subdued the whole of Arabia for them and gave Islam a dominant position.85 He thus
clearly implied that the right of authority, therefore, now legitimately belonged to a
group who was able to put the community of believers in an effective and dominant
position. Abü Bakr, on the other hand, without denying their past services, recounted
some services of MuhirUn86 and then instead of making it only the point of discussion,
called their attention to the future situation to find a solution that should be acceptable
to all sections of the community. He argued that the people would not accept the rule of
anyone except the Quraysh owing to their eloquence of speech, their close terms with
the people, their status among the Arabs.87
As al-Mãwardi puts it, it was following the quoting of a tradition to this effect that
most of the Ansãr hastened to take the oath of allegiance at the hand of Abfl-Bakr.88
 Ibn
Kathir's account also confirms the same version with slightly different wordings.
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According to him Abü Bakr narrated the tradition to Sa'd: "the matter of the Caliphate
belongs to the Quraysh. The good people among them follow the good people of the
Quraysh and bad people follow the bad people of the Quraysh."89 After this the oath of
allegiance was completed in a short time.
According to al-Mãwardi, since the agreement was secured among the companions,
that the right of the Caliphate belonged to men of Qurashite origin, it did not take long
before the choice to fell upon the most senior member of the Quraysh, Abü-Bakr.9°
Because of this Ijmã' no Ancãr is reported ever to have contested this right in the
subsequent course of the Islamic history. It was also due to the observance of the same
principle that the right of the two subsequent Caliphs to the office was immediately
recognized.
Determining the required Number of Persons for electing a Caliph
From the Caliphate of AbU-Bakr al-Mãwardi deduced the principle of the required
number of persons necessary for holding the Caliphate. As stated earlier, the jima' was
the symbol of a strong Caliphate and reflected the unity of the Muslims on this issue;
but it was not a requirement without which the Caliphate could not be legitimately
established. al-Mãwardi stated two aspects of this issue. Firstly, that the 'people of
power and influence' of one city can elect the Imn. Quoting the viewpoint of the
'ulamä' who think it necessary to seek the consent of the people of power and influence
of all the cities, he refuted their position by quoting the Caliphate of Abü- Bakr. 91
Through ijmã'. Abü Bakar's Caliphate was made stronger, but it was rightly
established before the ijma' was secured. The second aspect is related to determining
88 al-MAward!, A.S., P.12.
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the number of persons who must be present to appoint the Caliph. Since five persons
determined the Caliphate of Abfl-Bakr, this was considered to be a standard number for
determining any Caliphate. 92 al-MãwardI even considered the viewpoints of other
schools who maintained the required number to be less than five. al-Mãwardi reinforced
this argument by citing the example of 'Umar's nomination of six persons and
instructing them that five of them should appoint the sixth one as a Caliph. On both
occasions the nominations were acceptable to the umma.93
Appointment of the Best Person as a Caliph
Another principle deduced from the Caliphate of Abfl-Bakr was that people of power
and influence should appoint the best person who should combine all the qualifications
necessary for the position of Caliph. However, under exceptional circumstances he
maintained the Caliphate of the less preferred (maffu1) to be right one and allowed the
people of power and influence to elect such a person. Moreover, it was considered
necessary to elect a person who should be acceptable to the people at large.94
The Caliphate of 'Umar
According to al-MAwardi the Caliphate of 'Umar was a direct consequence of the
nomination of Abü-Bakr. From this nomination al-Mãwardi deduced several principles.
The Imffin 's right to nominate the successor is legitimate because of Caliph 'Umar's
nomination by Abu-Bakr and general recognition of the principle by the Companions.95
Following the example of the Ijmã' that took place in Saqfa Ban! Sa 'ida, the
nomination of 'Umar was widely approved through another ijma' of the Companions.
92 aI-Mward!, A.S., P.13, aI-Mäwardl has given the names of those five persons from MuhirUn. After
their ijma' over the Caliphate of Abfl Bakr, the Anãr followed their lead and took oath of allegiance at
the hands of Abil Baki. Those five names are: 'Umar, Abli 'Ubayda, 'Usayd b. Khwjayr, Bashir b. Sa'd,
and a freed slave of AbU Huzayfa, Salãm.
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There was in fact no serious disagreement against this nomination. According to Abü
Salma b. 'Abd al-Ra1man, during his last illness Abü-Bakr sent for 'Abd al-Ra1mAn b.
'Awf and inquired from him about 'Umar. He replied that 'Umar was better than his
(Abu-Bakr's) opinion about him. 96 He then sent for 'Uthmãn b. 'Aff.n and asked his
opinion about 'Umar. 'Uthman replied that as far as he knew, 'Umar's inward being
was better than his outward behaviour. None of them was like him. 97 Another prominent
member Usayd b. Khuclayr was consulted. He said: " I find him very good after you.
'Umar is pleased with the work that pleases Allah. And he is displeased with the work
that displeases Allah."98
Against these strong approvals, we also find some disapproval regarding the
strictness of the Caliph. For instance Talba b. 'Ubayd Allah is reported to have come to
the Caliph after the Caliph Abu Bakr had his will dictated and said: "I am spokesman
for the people who are behind me. They say you are well aware of 'Umar's strictness
over us during your lifetime. What will happen after your death when affairs would be
handed over to him? Think well before what you do. Allah would definitely question
you about what you are doing." To this Abü-Bakr replied: "sit me up. Do you threaten
me with the fear of Allah? Woe to a man who is not decisive in administering your
affairs. When Allah asks me I will reply that I have appointed such a man over your
people who is good for them. Go and convey this message to the people."99
According to another narrative from 'A'isha, when the death of Abü Bakr
approached, he nominated 'Umar as Caliph. 'All and Taliia came to him and asked him
whom he had chosen as Caliph. Abfl Bakr replied, 'Umar. Both of them said: " what
Ibid, P.18.
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would you answer to Allah." Abu Bakr said: "do you threaten me with Allah. Indeed I
know Allah and 'Umar better than you. I would say that I have appointed the best one as
the Caliph over the people."°°
So there was a mixed response from the people towards the nomination of Abü Bakr.
Some people including the senior companions favoured the nomination while some
others opposed it and complained about the strictness of 'Umar. From different
conversations between the Caliph and different groups of the companions, it is clear that
some of them showed reservation about the strictness of 'Umar. Hence they reminded
the nominating Caliph to be mindful of his duty towards Allah. The nominating Caliph
assured them of his concern for his own accountability to Allah and for looking at the
matter with deliberation. He, however, showed his resolve to continue the nomination.
From this nomination, some of the principles that al-Mãwardi strongly adhered to,
appear to have been deduced in the following manner:
The Caliph has a right to nominate the candidate for the office. This was the most basic
principle that al-Mãwardi deduced from this nomination. That all the influential and the
prominent members came to the Caliph and showed their approval or disapproval for
the nomination virtually amounted to the acknowledgement that he was fully entitled to
make this nomination. While they differed and argued with him, supported or opposed
him and some of them reminded him of his duty towards Allah, none of them
challenged his right to the nomination. None of the prominent members accused him of
despotic exercise of authority that did not exclusively belong to him.
The common people showed the same response. They came to the Caliph to convey
their viewpoint through the elders. Having put forward their views, they considered the
'°° Ibid, P.29.
46
Caliph more eligible to make the final choice and did not criticize the Caliph for
despotic exercise of authority.
From this nomination another principle was confirmed: that the Caliph should choose
the best person as the next Caliph. First it was made clear from the speech and
assurances of Abu Bakr to the people that he did not spare any effort to nominate the
best person for them. Secondly, the different consultations between the prominent
members and Abu Bakr made it clear that everybody was concerned with the choice of
the best person. Apart from strictness, 'Umar's character was not blamed in any respect.
al-Mawardi therefore considered it a responsibility of the Caliph to take this principle
into account. From the election of Abu Bakr he was led to the same consideration that
the people of power and influence should nominate the best person, but he was flexible
in allowing them to nominate the less preferred candidate as a Caliph in view of time
and circumstances)°' However he does not seem to be willing to grant the same
concession to the nominating Caliph.
From the way the opposing opinions were reconciled within a short time and agreement
secured over the nomination of 'Umar, the principle was confirmed that the Caliph had
precedence in exercising the right to nominate a successor and the right of nomination
belonged to the Caliph more than anybody else.'°2 Secondly, it was also confirmed that
if the Caliph was thoroughly credible in his lifetime regarding every matter and policy
for the people, he should also be trusted to take a decision regarding the affairs of the
Uinma after his lifetime.
People's right to be consulted was established because the Caliph listened to their
suggestion regarding the nomination of the person of their choice. They were equally
'°' aI-Mãwardl, A.S., P.15.
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eligible to criticize the Caliph's decision of nomination. Yet they could not hold the
Caliph ultimately responsible to them. They could just remind him of his duty towards
Allah but were bound to trust him once they were heard and listened. It was necessary
for the Caliph to see that the choice of his candidate on the whole was acceptable to the
people so that when the decision was submitted to the people for their final approval
there should be no hurdle in the way of securing their oath of allegiance.
Three steps were taken in a specific order: (1) the Caliph's initiative in making a
nomination; (2) consultation with the prominent members and making the choice final;
(3) adherence of the people through Bay'a. The people were asked to assemble in al-
Masjid al-Nabvi According to al-Tabari, AbU-Bakr asked for a written statement issued
to this effect. People were asked: " do you agree upon the person whom I am
nominating as my successor. By Allah, in concluding this matter I did not spare any
effort to fully exert myself. I am not appointing any of my relatives as my successor but
'Umar Färuq. So you listen to him and obey him."103
People with one voice replied in the affirmative and endorsed the proposal. At all the
stages of seeking approval of the associates or the people at large the Caliph thus took
every section of community into his confidence in a systematic manner.
The Caliphate of 'Uthmãn
As noted above this Caliphate was held in direct consequence of the principle of
nomination. By this time the Caliph's right to the nomination was almost established.
Following the exercise of the right by the Caliph AbU Bakr and the Caliph 'Umar, the
senior companions and the community as a whole agreed to the principle of nomination
by the reigning Caliph.
'° al-Tabarl, Tárlkh, vol. 2, PP.352-353.
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First of all, it was the Caliph himself who considered it his right to nominate the
succeeding Caliph. al-Mãwardi alluded to this right of the Caliph in many places in his
1Abkam. al-Mäwardi cites an incident on the authority of Zuhri that Ibn 'Abbãs found
the Caliph 'Umar restless on account of not being able to find a suitable candidate for
the Caliphate. When his attention was drawn to the ablest persons of the time, he
pointed out some serious drawbacks in all of them that did not render them completely
capable of fulfilling the conditions of the Caliphate.' 04 Here the Caliph's concern,
anxiety and exertion to find a proper candidate for the community showed that he
considered himself responsible to nominate the Caliph.
Further support for this can be found in another incident, which leads to the same
conclusion. The Caliph's anxiety about the lack of a suitable candidate was again
apparent. The Caliph said that if Abü 'Ubayda or S1im b. MawlA had been alive, he
would have nominated one of them as the Caliph.' 05 This again attests to his belief in
his right of nomination. His nomination of the group of six persons was solely his own
decision. 'Umar alone determined their number and the choice. al-Mawardi deduced
from this the principle that the choice and the nomination of the Shiirabelonged to the
Caliph. He has authority to choose and nominate the members of the sh Urã who could
then choose the Caliph from among themselves.'°6
By carrying out the will of the Caliph exactly as he wished, the people of power and
influence confirmed the Caliph's right to the nomination. Accordingly no alterations
were proposed or made in the committee. The only difference of opinion is reported to
have come from 'Abbãs, the Prophet's (P.B.U.H) uncle, who criticized 'All for
'°' al-MAwardi, A.S., P.2 1.
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participation in the shth-ã but 'All ignored this criticism and the will of the Caliph was
carried out completely as he wished.'°7
After a careful study of the Caliph 'Umar's exercise of his choice in determining a
nomination, al-Mãwardl stated the rights of the people to be consulted but also set the
limits to this consultation. In each case the Caliph listened to everybody, gave
arguments for not accepting their proposals and made a decision of his own, which he
considered best for the community.'° 8 From this, al-Mãwardl deduced the principle that
it was the right of the people to be heard and listened if they proposed a candidate but
the choice of appointing a nominee for the post of the Caliph ultimately rested with the
Caliph.
It is the Caliph's right to appoint the shifrã and authorize it to decide the issue. Here
again the Caliph's will, though a final one, indicated the importance of consultation. A
period of three days was allowed to make a consultation and to decide the matter. The
members of the sh iirã were required to consult the masses and to give weight to their
opinion.
The principle that al-Mäwarcli deduced from the Caliphate of Abu Bakr was again
confirmed: that the Imn was bound to nominate the best person. AbU Bakr made it
clear before the people, in his speech, and held himself responsible before Allah for
making the best choice. He repeated the same viewpoint before the prominent members
of the community when they reminded him about his accountability regarding the
choice of the best person. His assurance to them regarding the choice of the best person
was in fact his agreement with them over this principle. In the case of the Caliph 'Umar,
the nomination of the best person was the main concern. 'Umar's overriding concern for
107 Ibid, P.18.
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the choice of the best person for the job can be seen from number of events: his restless
attitude over the want of a proper man for the office,'° 9 his estimate of all the available
candidates to be falling short of the required qualities of the Caliph, and his refusal to
nominate someone among the six existing candidates of almost equal stature.110
'Umar took care not to make the office of the Caliphate hereditary. He did not
nominate his son for the office nor did he allow him to become a shiirã member. His
criterion for the choice of six candidates was that the Prophet (P.B.U.H) was happy with
them in his lifetime." The seventh man Sa'eed fell in the same category. But he was
excluded because he belonged to the tribe of the Caliph." 2 Strict care was taken to
eliminate the possibility of making the Caliphate hereditary. The Caliph's concern
regarding this matter was so grave that he is said to have admonished both 'Uthmãn and
'Al! that if one of them were raised to the office, he should avoid imposing his relatives
upon the people. al-Mãward! did not go as far as to give it the status of precedent and he
allowed hereditary succession with several restrictions.
The Caliph's deliberate omission of Sa'eed of his own tribe, though a scrupulous
regard for the Islamic norms, could not be accepted later on as a legal requirement
regarding the nomination of succeeding Caliphs. al-Mawardi, therefore, quite frankly
admitted that if a relative of a Caliph was not his son or father, he could nominate him
as a Caliph as he could nominate any one else." 3 In the case of a son or father, instead
of outrightly excluding them from the post, as the Caliph 'Umar did in his lifetime, he
recommended their nomination provided the people of power and influence ratify this
109 Ibid, P.21.
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nomination)' 4 Regarding the shUrff, its role in the election of the Caliph, and its
relations with the Caliph, the following important principles were laid down:
(1) The nomination of the shiirffby the Imifin is legitimate.
(2) The legitimacy of the Caliphate through this shffrã is in fact the legitimacy of the
right of the previous Caliph to nominate this shUrff.
(3) The right of the Caliphate would remain within that sh&ã."5
(5) As soon as the Caliph is appointed, the shUrãwould cease to exist. It is then subject
to the will of the appointed Imff,n whether to continue with the shth-ãor not.116
(6) The Shüra is not authorized to appoint any new Imifin in the lifetime of the living
Jrnän or to appoint someone after him. It is acceptable if the Caliph allows the
nomination of someone else with his own consent. Otherwise, the nomination of a
successor belongs to the Caliph. Even in the interest of the Umma, the prior approval of
the Imãn is necessary so as to avoid any schism. Mãwarcli supports this principle with
the precedent of the Caliph 'Umar: after receiving the fatal injury but whilst still being
conscious, he settled the issue of the Caliphate by appointing people to elect a Caliph.117
Everybody endorsed that decision and affirmed the Caliph's entitlement to this right.
The Caliphate of 'Ali
The Caliph 'Umar imposed a restriction on the migration and settlement of the
Companions in the conquered lands." 8 This restriction was lifted during the reign of the
Caliph 'UthmAn." 9 With the spreading of the Companions throughout the Islamic lands
the question was now raised whether the Caliphate would be rightly established with the
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consent of people of power and influence residing in Medina. Alternatively if they
consisted of all the companions throughout the Islamic lands, how would it influence
the establishment of the Caliphate?
al-Mãwardi took into account two viewpoints and ultimately concluded that the
Caliphate is rightly established with the agreement of the people of the capital city.
Consequently he does not attach any significance to the viewpoint according to which
the participation of the people of all the cities is necessary. Five prominent members of
the capital city or even fewer can legitimately establish the Caliphate.' 20
 But the
precedents he relied upon clearly reflected the fact that the persons who thus established
the Caliphate were the most influential members of the society. This raises the issue of
the position of the Caliphate of 'All. The majority of the people of Medina took the oath
of allegiance at his hand. Both Tall.ia and Zubayr, members of the shiirãin the election
of 'Uthmãn, took the oath of allegiance at his hand.' 2 ' According to Ibn Kathir all the
people who participated in the battle of Badr took the oath of allegiance at the hands of
'All.'22
As noted before one of the conditions for the establishment of the Caliphate was that
the choice of the people of power and influence must fall upon the best person.
Although under exceptional circumstances the election of the less preferred (mafJi7[)
was also justified, it was allowed to the people of power and influence under the special
contingency. At the time of the establishment of the Caliphate of 'Uthman, it was a
unanimous opinion of the Muslim world that the most eligible persons for the Caliphate
were either 'UthmAn or 'All. Consequently after the martyrdom of 'Uthmãn, the most
120 al-Mãwardl, A.S., P.13.
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eligible person was now 'AlL' 23
 Moreover 'All had combined all the required
qualifications of the Caliphate in his character.
The situation that prevailed after the martyrdom of the Caliph 'Uthmãn had some
common characteristics with the situation after the passing away of the Holy Prophet
(P.B.U.H). The Islamic lands were without a Caliph. There was a need to immediately
bring the situation under control and this could not be achieved without installing a
Caliph who could give continuity to the enforcement of the laws of sharf a, punish the
criminals, protect the highways, and patronize religious obligations. Just as in the case
of the Caliph Abü Bakr, the prominent members of the society including Ta11a and
Zubayr assembled and requested him to assume the office. After showing reluctance,
'All ultimately took charge when all the prominent members insisted to take the office.
All the requirements necessary for the office were thus fulfilled. Most of the prominent
members offered the post to 'All although he did not request it. According to a!-
Mãwardl, this was the right order of the establishment of the Caliphate of any person
deemed fit to hold the office.'24
Two broad categories that al-Mãwardi deduced from the Caliphate of the previous
three Caliphs were either the election by the people of power and influence or the
designation by the previous Caliph. The Caliphate of 'All fell within the former
category. The establishment of this Caliphate was therefore like the Caliphate of Abü
Bakr and was installed by the people of power and influence.
According to the Kharjites, 'All turned apostate by accepting the arbitration proposal
from Mu'ãwiah's side for the settlement of their dispute. They believed in the
legitimacy of 'All's rule before the battle of Siffz but not afterwards when the parties
123 Ibid, P.146.
124 aI-Mãwardi, AS., P14.
54
sued for peace through the appointment of the arbitrators. al-Mãwardi took 'All's
decision as a sound one, which consequently did not affect the legitimate character of
his rule. He regarded the Kharjites as rebels and maintained 'All's mode of behavior
towards them as the standard one.125
He also believed in the legitimacy of 'All's Caliphate on the basis of a tradition from
the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H). According to the tradition: "if you appoint 'All, you will
find him rightly guided."26
In al-Mawardl's view the Caliph should ideally be the best person from the
community and should combine all the qualifications in his character. At the time of
appointment, Caliph 'All was unanimously considered to be the best person. Both Talba
and Zubayr, acknowledged him to be the best one among the companions who lived to
that time.
In the foregoing discussions we were concerned with al-Mäwardl's treatment of the
choice of the Caliph in the Rash idlin period. The methods associated with the choice of
the Caliph during this period became standard precedents during the subsequent course
of Islamic history. In our next chapter we shall examine them in more detail to see how
they guided al-Mawardi in determining the legitimacy of the Umayyad and the 'Abbãsid
rule. We shall examine al-Mawardi's treatment of some changed modes of acquiring
authority during this period. We shall also see whether they conformed to the standard
precedents or just met the minimum requirements of legitimacy to regulate the system
in a smooth manner.
125 Ibid P.88.
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Chapter Two
Legitimate Means of Acquiring the Imamate
No Fixed Rule for the Choice of the Caliph
The absence of any definite procedure to choose a Caliph in Islam reflected the
inherent flexibility of its scheme to accommodate various solutions to this problem
provided those solutions were not inconsistent with the basic teachings of the Qur'an
and the Sunna. Simultaneously, it pointed to a great responsibility on the Companions to
solve this problem by choosing a Caliph capable of holding society together, which had
just assimilated in its ranks people with different cultures and backgrounds. Hence, in
employing different procedures with regard to the choice of the Caliph, due weight was
accorded to different factors; but posterity was never bound to the strict observance of
any definite procedure. This was deliberate and quite in consonance with the changing,
elastic and dynamic spirit of Islam.1
Islam, which claims to be a universal and lasting religion, could hardly have
incorporated any static and rigid method, which would have eventually outlived its
utility among the people with different background and culture. 2 However in the choice
of the early Caliphs, the underlying consultative spirit which manifested itself through
consensus among the people of power and influence, ratified by the general approval of
the masses, was the basic criterion which gave legitimacy to the rule of the Caliph. The
process thus adhered to was, however, a partial fulfillment of the whole process in
determining the legitimacy of a Caliph. Since the Caliphate had succeeded the
Prophethood, it owed its legitimate existence to the task of perpetuating the pattern set
S.M.YUsuf, The Choice of a Caliph in Islam, P.3.
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up by the Prophet (P.B.U.H) in his lifetime. So, while the importance was attached to
the manner in which the authority was acquired, a much more important criterion for the
legitimacy of the authority was exercising it in a right way.
An overview of above paragraphs may serve as a necessary background to the study
of the detailed methods of acquiring authority as dealt by al-Mãwardi. A survey of his
writings very soon reveals that in the spirit of a true Islamic jurist, he derived his
conclusions regarding politics from the Qur'an and the Sunna as two primary sources.
Where direct guidance from these two primary sources was not possible, he took the
period of the Rash idiin Caliphate as a model for the later generation. 3 He fully brought
into focus the various developments connected with the accession of the Caliphs to
authority in this period and considered them as the standard precedents for later times.
But in the same chapter he also legitimized the accession of the Umayyads and the
'Abbäsids whose accessions to power did not seem to conform to the spirit of the
Rãshidiin period. His legitimizing of somewhat divergent practices can be understood in
his recognition of the wide realm within which those different methods of accession to
authority were accommodated. The establishment of the Caliphate, a religious act, was
incumbent on the Muslims as far kfaya.4 Like all religious acts it could also be
subjected to two varying standards, an ideal standard, and a legitimate standard.
According to former, it was required to be established both according to the legal
requirements as well as the religious spirit. The second merely required the fulfillment
of the minimum legal requirements which entitled it to be recognized in the law. In
Adab, al-Mawardi explained the spirit and character of religious injunctions by
describing these two standards of an act. According to him, for every religious act Allah
2lbid.
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has made two states: (1) an ideal state, (2) a legitimate state. The first state provides
opportunities for the best person to excel according to its requirements. But the man
falling short of performing the best was entitled to practise the minimum required so as
not to be deprived of the reward and this latter state is considered to be blessing in form
of dispensation from Allah. 5 From his writings we can judge that al-Mawardi also saw
the relevance of this principle in the context of different modes of acquisition of
authority, as they prevailed during different periods in course of Islamic history. On the
one hand, he maintained the patterns of the RashidUn Caliphate as the model practices.
But on the other hand, the exercise of the right of nomination by the ruler within his
own family was also maintained to be a legitimate one. In the Rashidiin period the
standards of legality were very strict. Due to their scrupulous regard for ethical norms
the early companions were driven to set such high standards. Thus we see that none of
the RffshidUn Caliphs appointed a Caliph from within his own family. Although they
were not legally restricted to do so, they did not think it commensurate with the
religious spirit of Islam. Against such background it is understandable that during this
period the different methods of acquisition of authority met legal requirements and were
strictly in line with the religious requirements in their ideal form.
I
The Umayyads and the 'Abbãids were content to fulfil the minimum legal
requirements. But sometimes these minimum requirements were ignored, and the issue
of the Caliphate was decided on the battlefield. Although the conquest or use of force
did not acquire a legitimate means of acquiring authority, the government established in
consequence of this method was conditionally recognized as legitimate; so as to regulate
the collective life in accordance with the requirements of sharf a. Conquest or use of
al-Mäwardl, Adab, P.96.
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force, as a means of acquisition of authority was thus tolerated reluctantly. With the
development of this situation the main emphasis of the jurists was consequently shifted
to the acts of the ruler. Bernard Lewis explains this situation in these words: "With the
passage of time, the question of legitimate accession seems to have lost its importance,
and the attention of the jurists was shifted from the manner in which authority was
acquired to the manner in which it was exercised. The hard lesson of a time of upheaval
brought what was in fact a new principle- that any authority, however acquired, was
legally valid as long as it preserved a basic minimum of legality, i.e., of respect for
Islamic legal norm."6
Since al-Mãwardi was an eminent jurist of his time who profited a great deal from
the experience of his predecessors,7 he knew well the evolution and importance of this
principle up to politics of his own time. Throughout the al-Ahkam al-Suläniyya, al-
Mãwardi, following the pattern of his predecessor put great emphasis on the
enforcement of Islamic practices as the main responsibility of the ruler. He subordinated
all other considerations to the achievement of this end. He brought together the views of
the jurists of different schools of jurisprudence and gave systematic exposition to the
theory of the Caliphate. Nevertheless conformity to the sharf a remained his most basic
criterion that would accord legitimacy to the ruler; and the different modes of the choice
of the Caliph were only means for the achievement of this end. In other words, the ruler
does not become legitimate through prescribed methods of election if he did not enforce
shar! a.
A usurper, on the contrary, capturing power by illegal means became legitimate in
due course of time if he enforced sharf a. Hanna Mikhail in his book Politics and
6 Bernard Lewis, "On the quietist and activist traditions in Islamic political writing"; Bulletin of the
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Revelation gave expression to a similar idea when he said, "the Imifin, by entering into
contract with even a single representative of the religious Law pledges himself to
uphold this Law, which is the ideal constitution of the Muslim community. if the
essence of contract is pledge by one who already has power, to act in accordance with
the Law, then discussion of legitimacy would have to shift to the acts of the ruler.
According to al-Mawardi, a ruler would attain legitimacy, i.e. rendering obedience to
him becomes obligatory, only when he canies out his duties in accordance with God's
Law."8
An Inquiry into Motives of the aI-Abkãm
al-Ahkãm is al-Mãwardi's book, which deals at length with the problems and issues
related to the institution of the Caliphate. In it al-MAwardi has centralized the matters of
social, religious, and political life of his period upon this institution. 9 In running the
affairs of the Muslims the role of the Caliph has been enhanced; the institutions
previously independent of his control are suggested to be incorporated within its
jurisdictions. 10 Yet one is amazed to see the actual position of the Caliph who was not
in a commanding position to enforce all that was required of him through the al-Ahkam.
So the question arises: was the composition of al-Ahkãm an exercise in futility, i.e.,
making demands on the Caliph that he was actually incapable of translating into practice
or did some deeper motives prompt al-Mãwardi to compose the book? H.A.R.Gibb has
stated three reasons, which led al-Mãwardi to compile the book. Through the second
and the third reasons he refutes emphatically the objections raised by those who regard
it a mere speculative study or an Islamic counterpart to Plato's Republic or More's
Hanna Mikhail, Politics and Revelation, P.22.
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Utopia." In first place he calls our attention to the fact that al-MAwardi's interest in
political issues might rightly have been regarded as a sufficient inducement, had he
himself not stated otherwise at the outset of the al-Ahkm. 12 The introduction begins
with these words: "As the laws of governance are more applicable to those in authority
but because these latter, being occupied with politics and management, are prevented
from examining these laws as they are mixed with all the other laws, I have devoted a
special book to them. Thus in response to the person to whom my obedience is due in
this affair, I have made known to him the Madhhabs of the fuqaha' so that he sees both
that his rights are respected and that his duties are fulfilled and that he honors the
dictates of justice in their execution and aspires to equity in establishing his claims and
in the fulfillment of other's claims."3
While it is clear from above text that the book was written in response to the
directives of the authority, the exact person to whom these words are addressed is still
unidentified. Gibb therefore suggests exploring the person by seeing the context in
which the book was written. Gibb rightly perceived, and it is confirmed by the
chronicles of the period,' 4 that by this time the Buwayhids had lost their firm grip over
the affairs. Internal fighting and the civil wars among the Buwayhids led to their gradual
weakening and it gave the Caliph the opportunities to recover some of his lost powers.
During this phase not only did the Caliph's position improve significantly, but owing to
the overall situation of the Muslim world another factor contributed to its strength still
further. Malimüd of Ghazna(d. 421/1030), who had risen to power, constantly professed
H.A.R.Gibb, "MAwardi's theory of the Caliphate", Studies on the Civilization of Islam, P.153.
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loyalty to the Caliph.' 5 al-Mãwardi, therefore, in response to request by a higher
authority clarified the rights and duties of this institution.
Gibb has refuted the charge that it was an empty speculation on two grounds: (1)
being a jurist and a man of affairs he could not involve himself in such speculations.'6
Gibb makes it clear that in the capacity of a jurist he was responsible for bringing the
theory into line with the practices of the time. But the second part of the argument
brings an added stress that in the case of al-Mawardi it was all the more necessary
because apart from being a jurist he was actually involved in practical politics of his
days.
Consequently in the capacity of a jurist he is to be seen drawing a lot upon the
opinions of his predecessors. He straightaway repeated some of the legal material
evolved by the jurists of the previous generations. But he was not content with a mere
repetition of the views of the jurists, and applied the underlying principles of their views
to the actual problems of the day. He expanded their views to make them fit into the
circumstances of his days.' 7 In this process apart from repeating the main legal stuff of
the jurists of the previous generations he had to see the validity and its relevance with
regard to the circumstances of his time. The composition of the al-Abkam has therefore
to be judged not only in terms of bringing together the divergent fiqh views of the
previous jurists, but also in terms of working out the new principles to suit the
circumstances of his days.
The above reasons explaining, to a large extent, the compilation of the al-Abkäm
may well be augmented by a few more reasons:
H.A.R.Gibb, "al-Mäwardl's Theory of the Caliphate"; Studies on the Civilization of Islam, P.152.
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At the time of composition of the al-Ahkam, the Caliph was not so powerful to make
such an ideal program a living reality. The Buwayhid Amir had shared many powers and
exercised them on his behalf. Yet as a jurist al-Mãwardi believed that the juristic
exposition of any program must be made in an ideal and most standard form. According
to him neglect of any law in actual practice should not lead to its neglect in juristic
exposition.' 8 He, therefore, went on to state not only the full details of all the institutions
as they should ideally exist but criticized other jurists for their partial treatment of the
same subject or neglecting it completely) 9 Consequently through the al-Alkãm. al-
Mãwardi makes an exposition of fiqh injunctions in their standard form and considers it
as the responsibility of a jurist so that Muslims should not lose sight of their proper
place in their scheme of collective life.
Along with the statement of the fiqh rules in their ideal form, al-Mãwardi in many
places also stated the bare minimum. He gave due regard to the capacity of the
individuals in any given situation and described the least required of them according to
sharf a. For example, we see that he argues that ideally it is best to appoint the most
excellent man as Irnän, nevertheless he concedes that inferior person is to be recognized
as a right Imän provided that he possesses the basic qualifications. 20 For the
establishment of congregational prayer he has devoted a separate chapter explaining the
responsibilities of the ruler and the fiqh requirements for the fulfillment of this
obligation in its ideal form. Yet he maintained it to be quite legitimate for the Muslims
to pray singly at home if the authorities prevent the congregational prayer. 2 ' It would
appear that absence of favourable conditions for the congregational prayer would never
reduce all the relevant details to unimportance. Similarly we see that he gave the Caliph
18 
al-MAwardi, AS., P.362.
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20 Ibid, P.15.
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extensive authority in directing the affairs of the Muslim Empire. But the AmIr who was
exercising the powers on his behalf was to be accommodated within the set-up provided
this did not upset the real purpose for which the Caliphate was brought into existence.
So al-Ahkam on the one hand was an ideal program stating the ideal requirements of
shart a and all responsibilities of the ruler. At the same time it did not ignore the
situation as it existed and stated the minimum requirements of the shari' a at any given
time. Where a complete set of ideal instruction was given, al-Mãwardi obviously meant
that bringing it into practice depended upon availability of means, resources and
favorable circumstances. If it was realized that the required conditions did not exist at
the moment of its writing then without renouncing to state the ideal solutions the
immediate practicable solutions were worked out and stated for the concerned subjects.
al-Mãwardi saw the hope for the deteriorating masses in complete restoration of the
right order under the leadership of the Caliph. Consequently the legitimacy of the
Buwayhid Amirs was also made conditional with the enforcement of the shari' a. Any
neglect on their part would entitle the Caliph to take full advantage of the newly
emerging Sunni dynasty22 under the leadership of Malmud of Ghazna which could thus
be made as an instrument of bargain: to force the Buwayhids to carry out the right order
in a just manner. The detailed program in the al-Ahkãm was, therefore, considered an
indispensable need of the time for supplying the full details of the rules of politics and
the administration according to an Islamic system of life.
In the light of above study it becomes clear that al-Alikäm dealt with the religious
commandments, as they should exist in their ideal form but at the same time it was not
unrelated with the minimum religious requirements of the contemporary period for
21 Ibid, P.159.
22 
aI-Mãward!, A.S., P.34.
64
regulating the system in a legitimate manner. It dealt not only with the Caliphate as it
ideally ought to have existed but also took into account its constraints during the
Buwayhid period and therefore stated the minimum requirements for its legitimacy.
Right from the beginning of the al-Ahkam al-Mãwardi was concerned with the basic
question of legitimate accession to the authority. al-Mãwardi, therefore, dealt with
various methods at a great length throughout the first chapter of the al-Alikãm. Before
analyzing and examining those methods in detail we should first look into the nature
and character of the institution of the Caliphate as stated at the outset of the al-Alikam.
In the following text of the passage:
"Allah, may His power be radiant, has delegated a leader to the Umma who stands in
as a successor to prophethood, and has encompassed the affair of the nation by him; He
has handed over the affair of political management to him so that management of affairs
may proceed from the legitimate Deen and so that speech may be contained in a
unanimous opinion and is adopted by all people. hnainate is thus a principle on which
the foundations of the nation are established and by which the public interest of the
Umma is maintained: by it the good ordering of matters of public interest ensures the
stability of affairs in general and by it other particular or specialised administrations
arise. It is therefore necessary to first present the rules governing Imainate before any
other rule of governance and to mention what pertains in particular to an examination of
these rules before any other examination of the Deen so that all further rules of
administration may be classified accordingly in their corresponding or analogous
sections."23
From the above passage it is clear that al-Mãwardi maintained the Imã,nate as a
divinely ordained institution in succession to the prophethood, to take care of the
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collective affairs of the Umma. al-Mawardi inherited this concept from the Asharites
and preferred it to the viewpoints of the Mu 'tazilites and philosophers who regarded it
to be an achievement of reason. The difference between both viewpoints was in fact due
to the difference of the arguments on which both schools based their opinions. The
Mu 'tazilites defended the role of reason in establishment of I,nãnate and argued that it
was but natural for a man with sound judgement to submit to the authority of a leader
who thereby prevented the mutual injustices and settled disputes among men. What is
clear from this argument of the Mu 'tazilites is that man instinctively knows the dangers
of anarchy and is naturally endowed with the capacity to overcome it through
appointing a leader. Philosophers went a step further and denied the superiority of
revelation over the reason. Revelation, they said, was a crude way of addressing the
masses whose intellect is limited. 24
 Philosophers, therefore, could not assign revelation
any role beyond rendering to an ordinary man some assistance which intellectually
advanced people already know through their knowledge and experience. Consequently,
according to them, the evolution of laws and political organization must have had their
origins in the will of human beings.
al-Mãwardi, having high regard for the lmänate as next in importance to the
prophethood, believed in the insufficiency of reason for reaching any solution to such a
complicated human problem. al-Mãwardi recognizes the importance of reason in
determining man's path but believes in its insufficiency as a complete guide to lead him
to the ultimate destination. 25 Reason, at best, can achieve the negative establishment,
mere avoidance of discord and strife. Its establishment through religion would at once
23 Ibid, P.8.
24 Hanna Mikhail, Politics and Revelation, P.4.
25 al-MAwardi, Adab, P.133.
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satisfy the positive aspect of man's religious worship as well as a negative way of
avoiding the civil discord and mutual strife.26
Having thus proved the necessity of Imnate, al-Mãwardi thought it equal in
importance to acquisition of knowledge or waging of jihad. If somebody eligible for it
takes the responsibility, all the Muslims are excused; if nobody takes it up, then the
people of ikhtiyãr will constitute an electoral college and choose the ruler by means of
an electoral college. 27 Both the ruler and the electors must fulfill the conditions deemed
necessary for them in their respective capacities. Ahi Ikhtiyãr must possess three
conditions.
Justice with all its requirements.
Knowledge, which should enable them to chose the right persons according to the needs
of the time.
Insight and wisdom to distinguish the fittest person.28
Some important principles can thus be derived: Regarding the choice of the Caliph
the Muslim community has been divided into three classes: namely the rulers, ahi Ikhtiy
ãr and the general masses. While the upper two classes are instrumental in making this
choice, the masses have just to confirm the choice of Ahi Ifal Wa al 'Aqd through their
oath of allegiance.
The theory clearly denies the claims to this office through Divine nomination.29
In principle, the residents of the capital city do not have advantage over the people of
the rest of the cities. Nevertheless al-Mãwardi accommodated this convention which
had been in vogue since old times on two grounds. One, because the residents of capital
city come to know about the death of the Imam earlier than the people in other cities.
26 E.I.J.Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, P.29.
27 
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Second, the person deserving the office is usually found in the city of Imãn. al-Mãwardi
recognized what had generally happened throughout the course of Islamic history.
People of power and influence were normally those who formed the shUrff of the Caliph
or stayed with him in the capital city. As they acted swiftly to choose the Caliph or to
give practical shape to the will of the deceased Caliph the capital city acquired
importance as compared to the other cities.30
The Qualifications of the Imãin
al-Mawardi describes seven conditions necessary for the Imifin.
1. Justice together with all its conditions;
2. Knowledge which equips them for Jjtihäi in unforeseen matters and for arriving at
relevant judgements. al-Mawardi made the acquisition of the fiqh knowledge a
necessary condition for the of the Caliph because it was through ijtihad that he could
deal with the newly arising problems of the society.
3. Good health in their faculties of hearing, sight and speech such that they may arrive
at a sound assessment of whatever they perceive. Since the whole machinery of the
government revolved round the central figure of the Caliph, he was naturally expected
to be extraordinary in fitness of bodily organs so as to carry out the multiple functions
associated with his person in efficient manner.
4. Sound in limb, free of any deficiency which might prevent them from normal
movement. The stress again on the health and physical fitness indicates the importance
so necessary for the successful conduct of the affairs by the rulers. From this emphasis
it follows that the role of the Caliph was not confined to the matters of the court. The
Caliph was required to lead the military expedition to the battlefield. People could not
29	 Qamaruddin Khan, aI-Mwardi's Theor y Of The State, P.28
30 1b1d, PP.11-12.
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obviously look for the leadership to such persons wanting in qualities of good health
and free movement.
5. A judgement capable of organizing the people and managing the offices of
administration. This essential condition makes it necessary for him to possess a sharp
and vigilant eye over the affairs of the administration and ability to select the right
persons for the right job.
6. Courage and bravery enabling them to defend the territory of Islam and to mount the
jihä'J against the enemy;
7. The Imäns are of Quraysh, because of the text (of a prophetic Iladfth) on the matter
and by virtue of consensus. al-Mãwardi strictly opposes any objection against this
condition on account of the prophetic tradition and the consensus of the companions.
He refers to the event of Thaqfa BaniSa'da where Abü Bakr quoted the saying of the
prophet: "the Imãins are of the Quraysh" in consequence of this declaration the Anãr
renounced their claims and submitted to the rule of the Quraysh.3'
The Two Main Methods Regarding the Choice of Imn
The Imän could be appointed in one of the two ways: (1) by means of election; (2)
by means of designation.
According to the first method, the people of power and influence were required to
constitute an Electoral College that in turn would choose the Caliph.
The second method that was often in vogue rested simply on the choice of the Caliph
by the previous Caliph.32
' Ibid, P.12.
32 Ibid.
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Election
How numerous should be the people of power and influence for the establishment of
the Imnate in a right manner? al-Mãwardi first quotes a school adhering to the view
that the greater part of people of power and influence throughout the country are entitled
to the Imänate through consensus. Imn al-Ash'aii (d.93511528) attributes the same
opinion to Athäm-a Mu'tazilite jurist.33 Ima,n al-Ash'ari considered this matter in a
wider context and also quoted the opinion of the school who did not attach importance
to the number of persons necessary for the establishment of the Caliphate. According to
them, whatever the number of these people it is necessary that, in principle they should
neither unite under falsehood nor should there be any imputation on their characters.34
However, al-MAwardi refutes this opinion by quoting the example of Abü Bakr whose
Caliphate was held only after five persons present on the occasion took the oath of
allegiance and the rest of the people followed suit.35
But here al-Mawardi does not give the matter a thorough consideration omitting a
discussion on the special circumstances which justified this election, as later on
explained by 'Umar.
al-MAwardi then quotes the opinion of the KUJI 'Ulama' who regard the presence of
three persons enough to carry out this function on the analogy of a contract of marriage.
One person was to take charge by virtue of the acceptance of the other two such that
there one who decides the matter supported by other two who acted as witnesses. al-
Mãwardi goes a step further when he states the principle enunciated by Imam al-Ash'ari
that a single person was enough to make this election valid. The example he quotes
again goes back to Räthidiz period when the Prophet's (P.B.U.H.) uncle 'Abbãs is said
!mff,n aI-Ash'arl, Magalat aI-Islamiyyln, vol. 2, P.133.
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to have persuaded 'All to stretch out his hand for the oath of allegiance. 36 If we study al-
Mãwardl's viewpoint as a whole we will come to recognize that the minimum or
maximum limit for the number which he stated was not considered to be absolutely
binding in all circumstances. When al-Mawardi starts from the Caliphate of Abü-Bakr
he maintains the strength of five persons quite eligible to elect the Caliph in a right
manner. Upon closer analyses it would seem that more important than their number was
the place and the influence they had acquired among the people. This is verified by the
manner in which al-Mãwardi quotes the opinion of Prophet's (P.B.U.H) uncle 'Abbas
who said to 'All: 'stretch out the hand for the oath of allegiance. When people will
come to know that Prophet's (P.B.U.H) uncle had given the oath of allegiance to the
Prophet's cousin they would acknowledge this bay'a. So in this case, the consent of just
a single person was deemed enough to hold the Caliphate. The reason can be seen from
the words of the text: that people would accept this contract because the persons
involved in the oath of allegiance were influential enough to be accepted by the masses.
Hence we can safely deduce that it is not the number that is important according to a!-
Mãwardl but the influence that they might exert over the people in making their choice
acceptable. This explains why he put so much emphasis on the qualities and
qualifications of the persons responsible for the choice of the Imän. In this respect he
followed the viewpoint of al-Ash'arl who quoted the required number in somewhat
similar manner. With him too the number of persons was not as important as the
influence they had amongst people and the extent to which they could make their choice
acceptable to them. But he was more emphatic than al-Mãwardi in regarding the
condition of knowledge and piety as highly necessary for the people responsible for the
36 Ibid.
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choice of Imãin. 37 This is evident when he gives importance to the viewpoint according
to which only such a group is eligible to choose the Imain whose members cannot unite
over falsehood nor can they be blamed (on any account of sinfulness). 38 In essence he
seemed quite agreed that more important than the number was the good character and
their influence over the people to make their choice acceptable.
The Choice between Equally Qualified Candidates
In the case of choosing between two equally qualified candidates al-Mãwardi in the
first instance shows his preference for the aged one but then reverts to allowing the Ahi
11a1 Wa al- 'Aqd to choose anyone, provided the age of puberty has been reached by
both candidates.39
Although it was up to the people of power and influence to decide ultimately
between equally qualified candidates, they were to be guided by the requirements of the
time and circumstances. The general principle that al-Mãwardl lays down was that the
choice between the different candidates with varying capabilities should depend upon
the time and circumstances. If the choice was to be made between a man with wider
learning and a man with greater courage, the choice was to be made for the one who
was better fitted to lead the people according to requirements of particular situation. If
the country was at war with some other country or there was a fear of external danger,
the one with more courage was to be preferred. If there was a danger of heresy or the
object was the tranquility of the masses, the man with wider learning was to be given
preference.4°
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Striving for the Caliphate not a Cause of Disqualification
If two candidates dispute with each other concerning their right to the Imainate, they
will not be deprived of the office on this account. To find precedents for this ruling he
quoted the examples of some companions whose striving for the office did not deprive
them of the right to the Caliphate. There are two opposite viewpoints regarding this
issue. According to one, the person aspiring for the public office automatically becomes
disqualified from holding it. This is based on the tradition of the Holy Prophet
(P.B.U.H) according to which the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) refused to allot the office to
its aspirants. On the other hand, al-Mawardi also quoted the saying of the Caliph 'Umar
who did not think it wrong on account of the Prophet Joseph demanding it.41
Consequently, a person who honestly judging himself qualified for the office of the
Caliphate contests for its acquisition would not be deprived of it. The apparent
contradiction between both viewpoints can be removed by holding that aspirants must
be judged by their actions and competence. A well-intentioned man eligible to hold the
office should not be deprived of it merely on account of aspiring for the office. On the
other hand, the one seeking it desperately without enough competence and excellent
character should not be allowed to assume it.
The Caliphate of the Preferred (afçkxl) and less Preferred (mafçlfi):
A person having the basic qualifications for the Caliphate cannot be substituted by
someone who comes after his appointment to the Caliphate even if the latter is better
one. Even in the presence of a more qualified person the less qualified can hold the
office provided he has basic qualifications for the Caliphate. 42 al-Mãwardi was led to
this conclusion due to his aversion to tyranny and schism. This was the viewpoint that
41 For detailed discussion the reader is referred to the chapter six.
42 al-Mäwardl, A.S., P.15.
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found equal favor among all the four schools of jurisprudence. Writing about the same
period, the great Uanfi scholar Abu Yusr al-Bayäwi (d.493/1099) completely al-
Mawardi' viewpoint in this respect. According to him, it is necessary in first place that
the Imn be a man of (unsurpassed) excellence among all men in knowledge, piety,
courage and lineage. Yet if the preferred candidate is passed over in favor of the less-
preferred one, the Imainate of the less preferred would be quite legitimate provided he
has the basic qualifications for becoming the Imain and adjudicating the cases. 43 Both
al-MAwardi and Bayãwi were led to the same conclusion for construing the main
khilafa on the Imämate of prayer. Like al-Mãwardi Bayawi also thought it necessary to
select the best and the most excellent person for the Imainate of the prayer. But if some
less preferred (Mafçful) is selected to lead the prayer, it is legitimate to offer the prayer
behind him in accordance with the saying of the holy Prophet (P.B.U.H): " offer your
prayer behind every man good or bad." al-Mawardi has alluded to the opposite
viewpoint maintained by Jä1ii (d.255/868) and others. According to them the Imainate
of the less preferred would be legitimate if the preferred was absent at the time of
election. If he was present and was ignored, then the Irnänate of less preferred would
not be legitimate. al-Mãwardl maintained this viewpoint against the opinion of
majority of 'ulama'. His preference for the latter viewpoint can be understood in the
light of the arguments quoted above.
At the same time he also refuted the Shi'ite claim in the light of this principle who
always believed in the Imäinate of the best candidate. According to the Shfites, since
'Al! was the best person after the Holy prophet (P.B.U.H), all those who assumed the
office afterwards were usurpers. al-Mãwardi's emphasis on the necessity of the election
Abtl-Yusr, aI-BayawI, Usfil al-Din, P.188.
"i' al-Mawardl, A.S., P.15.
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also refutes the Shi'ite claim regarding the appointment of the ruler through Divine will.
According to him a man alone fulfilling the requirement of becoming the Caliph still
needs to go through the process of the election. This would accord him the legal status,
which he cannot possess otherwise. 45 To justify his claim he says: a man qualified to
become judge does not automatically become so unless duly supported by someone.
The same criterion would be much more applicable in case of the Caliph.46
Refutation of Two Simultaneous Imäins
al-Mawardi altogether excludes the possibility of two Imäns contemporaneously. a!-
Baghdãdi (d.429/1037) and al-Ash'ari had agreed to the existence of two Imäins
provided the respective areas under their rule were separated by the sea. But al-Mãwardi
did not consider the existence of two simultaneous Imns as legitimate under any
circumstances. In Adab al-Mawardi explained the viewpoint of the minority school who
legitimized the existence of two or more Imns at one time on both religious and
worldly grounds. According to them, every Imifin within the area of his control would
be stronger for managing the affairs in a right and efficient manner. The religious
justification they advanced was that if simultaneous existence of two Prophets in one
time was legitimate and did not lead to the forfeiture of Prophethood, it should be truer
about Imifinate and should not lead to its forfeiture as well. 47 In refutation of this
viewpoint, a!-MwardI quotes the opinion of the majority school who did not consider
the existence of the two Irnains legitimate at one time from religious viewpoint. They
based their viewpoint on the tradition from the Holy Prophet ( P.B.U.H). In the words of
Ibid, P.16.
46 Ibid.
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tradition: "when the oath of allegiance is given to two Amirs, appoint one of them and
kill the second of them."48
Who was more eligible to the office if both of them claim it simultaneously? After
giving the careful thought to the opinions of the fuqaha' on this matter, al-MAwardi
concludes that the legitimate Caliph would be the one who first received the oath of
allegiance. If both of them claim to have received it first the Imifinate of both would be
annulled. A new election would determine to whom the Caliphate belongs. The obvious
motive in making such proposition was to reject the Imainate of the Fãpnids. Although
the doctrine equally went against the Caliph in Spain, it was the Fãpnid who posed the
real threat and the argument was really directed against them. 49 Other schools of Sunni
jurisprudence equally favoured the viewpoint. The nfischolar BayäwI who regarded
the existence of the two contemporaneous Imãins as illegitimate advanced the similar
viewpoint. According to him, the one who established his Imifinate earlier deserved to
command the allegiance of the people. Unless the one who came later overwhelms him
by force, the Irnainate of the former shall be valid. 50 The Zaydis, a moderate Shfite sect,
initially maintained the simultaneous existence of two Imns as illegitimate, but they
ultimately reconciled to the legitimacy of the existence of two Caliphs in the same
period.5'
The Im an's Right of Nomination
The Jmän can nominate his successor without prior consent of the people of power
and influence except his father or son. However, in allowing him to do so al-Mãwardi
makes the Caliph bound to nominate the best person having all the qualifications of the
Ibid.
A.K.S.Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, P. 90.
° Abfi-Yusr Bayw1, UflI al-DIn, PP.189-90.
SI A.K.S.Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, P.30.
76
Caliph. If the nominating Caliph fulfills this legal requirement, the people of power and
influence cannot alter his nomination. 52 But the right of nominating the less preferred
(mafçi'Ul), which al-Mawardl allowed to the people of power and influence, was not
acknowledged in the case of nominating the Imain. Thus if the nominating Imãin
appoints the less preferred candidate against the will of the people of power and
influence, they were entitled to ratify his nomination. So in this case the Imifin's right of
nomination could not be an absolute one. al-Mãwardj's openly sanctioned the Imffin's
right to nominate any of his relatives except his father or son. 53 It indicates that he
favored both the Umayyad and the 'Abbãsid accession to the power. At first, it does not
seem to be justified because though the Caliph is allowed to nominate his relative, he is
at the same time responsible to appoint the best person who may not necessarily be
always from his relatives. But if the Imn ignores this legal requirement and nominates
the less preferred candidate ( MafçIUl), the people of power and influence could alter his
nomination, If the Umayyads or the 'Abbffsid Caliphs sometimes nominated the less
preferred candidates, they took care to get their nomination ratified from the people of
power and influence. Hence the nomination of less preferred acquired a legitimate
status. It was not in accordance with the true spirit of the practice of the Rffshid fin period
because both the Caliph Abü-Bakr and Caliph 'Umar showed an aversion to establish
the rule in their own family. When the Caliph 'All was asked about the nomination of
his son, Uasan, he neither supported the idea nor opposed it but left it to the judgement
of the people. 54 It could thus be derived that, subject to eligibility, the son of the Caliph
could be chosen as a Caliph if the people of power and influence agreed.
52 al-MAwardi, A.S., P.18.
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al-Mäwardi's principles of nomination and election regarding the choice of the
Caliph seem to be mutually inconsistent in some respects. He allowed the Caliph to
exercise some unlimited powers. His nomination was considered to be so absolute that
even the people of power and influence could not alter it. They were bound to ratify it
and could not alter it in view of some constraints or circumstances. Abu Ya'la
(d.455/1063) rightly differed from this viewpoint and maintained the confirmation of
the people of power and influence as necessary. With him the nomination by the lmain
was nothing more than a suggestion which in order to be binding needs the approval of
people of power and influence. Indicating the necessity of their confirmation he says:
it is legitimate for the Caliph to appoint the heir-apparent and the presence of the people
of power and influence is not necessary."55
Up to this point there is no difference of opinion between him and al-MAwardL Both
men reached identical conclusions from the precedents of the Rffshidiin period. AbU-
Bakr and 'Umar exercised their right of nomination without making themselves bound
by the opinion of the people of power and influence. But Abü-Ya'lã does not give the
heir apparent the status of the Caliph because the existence of two Caliphs in one time is
illegitimate. The Caliphate of the heir apparent can be established only after the death of
the nominating Caliph on the approval of the people of power and influence. While the
nomination of the heir apparent is the right of the Caliph for which it is not necessary to
consult the people of power and influence, the right of the heir-apparent to become
Caliph is subject to the will of the people of power and influence.56
The historical precedents on which aI-Mãwardi relied for his viewpoint seem more to
favour AbU-Ya'la. To vindicate his viewpoint al-Mawardi referred to the nomination of
Aba Ya'Iã, A.S., P.10.
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the Caliph 'Umar by Abu-Bakr. But if we examine the inaugural speech of the Caliph
'Umar we come to know about his indifference to the office. He showed his willingness
to give it to the person who was eligible for the office. Another saying quoted from his
speech also has the same meaning that the Caliphate cannot be held except with the
consent of the Muslims.57
It seems also necessary to analyze another argument on which al-Mawardi based his
viewpoint. A six member committee chose the Caliph 'Uthman. al-MAwardi says that
the Caliph 'Umar directly chose all the members of the committee and did not make
himself bound by the people of power and influence. From this al-Mawardi derived the
principle that the will of the Caliph is binding on the subsequent generation because all
the companions unanimously agreed to carry out the will of the Caliph. No alteration
was subsequently made in the formation of the committee.
From this it can be deduced, according to al-Mãwardi, that the will of the Caliph is
absolutely binding on the people in case of appointing the Caliph. But this is open to
objection. All the six person chosen by 'Umar were men of a great integrity and all the
prominent members agreed with the decision of the Caliph. So the exercise of the right
was not an absolute one but was confirmed by the people of power and influence.
Secondly during the Umayyad period 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz ( d.1O1/720) was raised to
the office of the Caliphate by the will of Caliph Sulaymän who had nominated him
during his lifetime. But after the assumption of the office the latter left it to the people to
choose the Caliph according to their will. It was on the insistence of the people that he
accepted and resumed the office.58
Ibn Kathir, al-Bidãya, vol. 5, P.187.
58Ibid, vol. 9, P.157.
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The reigning Imain cannot dismiss his successor until there is a visible change in
him.59 Here al-Mãwardi's view looks to be too rigid to keep pace with changing
circumstances. Previously we saw that al-Mawardi made the Imãn so powerful as to
allow him to exercise this right exclusively. But in this case he has reduced his powers
so much that he is not allowed to exercise his right of changing the nominee in changed
circumstances. Such a limitation also seems to be inconsistent with al-Mãwardi's
principle that the Caliph should give due regard to the circumstances and appoint a
person who can lead the people in particular situation corresponding to his abilities.
Now owing to the legal restriction preventing a change of candidate in changed
circumstances, the Caliph cannot carry out both orders at one time. Abü-Ya'la on the
other hand gives the Caliph a free hand to make this change. AbU-Ya'la justified it on
the ground that just as a man can change his will in favour of some person, he can also
change his will for his successor. 6° al-Mãwardi on the other hand maintains it to be quite
invalid on the part of the ruler. He is very strict in this regard and does not even allow
the successor to resign once he has been nominated in this capacity. 61 AbU- Ya'la again
gives the ruler a free hand to make alterations according to the will of the Imn during
his lifetime. The reason for the difference between both jurists is that Abü-Ya'lã does
not take the designation of the heir apparent too seriously. He maintains him merely as a
designate and not as an Imain during the lifetime of the reigning Imain. The will of the
Imn is consequently no more important than his will in other matters. He is eligible to
change the nominee and bring a different person of his choice in the same way as he can
change his will in other matters. 62
 al-MAwardi on the other hand is occupied with the
nomination of the best person. Upon the fulfillment of this condition no further change
al-MAwardi, AS., P.20.
60 Ab Ya'lã, AS., P.10.
aI-Mäwardl, A.S., P.20.
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is justified to substitute the heir apparent with another one unless there is a visible
change in his character. al-Mãwardi strictly adhered to this principle and did not even
permit the heir apparent to forego his right to become the Caliph. Initially he could
decline the offer but after his acceptance, he was bound to carry out the will of the
Caliph and continue his present status. Only under one condition could the Caliph
accept his resignation, i.e, if a substitute with equal qualification could be found. In
brief neither is the Caliph empowered to remove him from his status without
satisfactory reason nor can he surrender his right in case there is no satisfactory
substitute for him.63 aI-Mawardi is to some extent flexible when he allows the Caliph to
change the nomination of the previous Imn. The right to change the candidate who is
second or third in order of nomination is allowed though the Caliph's nomination is
absolute in the case of an immediate successor. This right of the Caliph to change the
second and the third candidate was probably recognized in view of time and
circumstances. It was necessary to recognize the validity of the same principle in respect
of immediate successor subject to the ratification by the people of power and influence.
If the reigning Imn appoints someone absent and it is not known whether he is
living or dead, his Imainate is invalid.M Abu-Ya'la holds his Imamate to be quite valid
but defers the enforcement of Imn 's will until the nominated person made his
appearance. During the period of his absence Ahi Ijall Wa al- 'Aqd can appoint someone
as a deputy who will have to relinquish the office on the appearance of appointed
person.65
62 AbU Ya'Iã, AS., P.10.
63 aI-Mäwardl, A.S., P.20.
64 Ibid, PP.20-21.
65 AbU Ya'1A, A.S., P.10.
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A successor is not allowed to appoint anyone while the Caliph is still alive. 66 al-
MAwardi's prohibition is understandable if we judge it in relation to some other
principles. Had the successor been allowed to appoint someone during the lifetime of
the reigning Caliph, it would have been inconsistent with the Caliph's right of
nominating more than one successor and determining the order of their succession. The
successor's will to appoint his own successor would have necessitated removing the
Imän 's appointee or limiting his choice to the appointment of one successor. Moreover
during his lifetime it is alone his right to exercise the authority to the exclusion of
others. If the orders of both the Caliph and the successor were allowed to prevail it
would amount to two Caliphs at one time. Consequently the successor cannot be
allowed to exercise his authority in any respect prematurely during the lifetime of the
Caliph.
If the Caliph resigns of his own accord then his Caliphate is delegated to the
successor and his resignation has the same affects as his death. 67 al-Mãwardi adhered to
the mainstream of Sunnf political thought. AbU-Ya'la shared the same viewpoint.
According to him, on the resignation of the Caliph the Caliphate shall be transferred to
the heir apparent. The process shall be irreversible and is not subject to the will of the
Caliph to withdraw the resignation. The resigning person cannot change his mind nor
can the heir-apparent give up his right in favour of resigning Caliph. 68 Both al-Mãwardi
and Abü-Ya'lä used the word voluntary to indicate that the forced abdication cannot be
considered along the same line as voluntary abdication. Consequently it will have no
responsibility on the incumbent.
al-MAward!, AS., P.21.
67 al-Mäwardl, AS., P.21.
68 AbU Ya'IA, A.S.,P.1O.
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The reigning Iinn can appoint more than one successor and decide the order of the
succession in accordance with his preference. This is justified by the analogy of the
Prophet's (P.B.U.H.) appointment of Zayd b. Uarith as a commander of the faithful
when dispatching a military compaign to the battle of Mutã. The instructions were
imparted from the Prophet (P.B.U.H) that if Zayd is assassinated, Ja'far b. Talba shall
replace him; in case he is assassinated too then 'Abd Allah b. Raw1a will take charge;
if he too meets a similar fate, then Muslims after consulting each other can choose their
ruler. al-Mãwardi says that if the Prophet did this with regard to the Amirate, the like is
true with regard to the Caliphate.69
Such a proposal was made because if during the lifetime of the reigning Imifin the
heir apparent died or became ineligible due to a disqualifying incapacity, there should
be some replacement to give continuity to the office. H.A.R.Gibb considered it a weak
analogy supported by a weaker legal argument, so that al-MAwardi himself finds it
necessary to cite the historical precedents as constituting the proof of Ijma'.7°
al-Mawardi himself realized that this analogy was open to objection. Leading a
military compaign to the battlefield requires vastly different qualities than those
required of a ruler to deal with variety of administrative problems. In al-Mãwardi's own
words: "if it is argued that it is the contract of authority with a particular character and
condition and that contract with a particular condition and authority are not based on
such specific conditions and characteristics, then it must be replied that it is a general
matter of public interest which should be addressed with more largesse than in the case
of private contracts between individuals."7'
69 al-MAwardi, A.S., PP.22-23.
70 H.A.R.Gibb, "Mãwardi's theory of the Caliphate"; Studies on the Civilization of Islam, PP.157-158.
' al-Mäwardi, A.S., P.23.
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If we examine this analogy carefully it would seem that it was the logical outcome of
al-Mãwardi's previous mistake where he regards the nomination by the Itnain as only
the condition of establishment of the Caliphate and ignores the confirmation by the
people of power and influence in this process. As a result of this, al-Mãwardi took the
appointment of the Caliph just like other appointments of various kinds. Indeed the
Caliph's right in other appointments is decisive. But the appointment of the Caliph, as
we have seen previously, should be subject to the approval of the people of power and
influence. The appointment of the commanders by the Prophet (P.B.U.H) was absolute
in its own right while the appointment by the lmän has to go through several stages
before it is binding.
Rosenthal quotes the principle of public welfare as the basis of this analogy.
However, he also looks at this analogy from another point of view. He says that the title
of the Caliph as Amir al-Mu 'minfli is due to the Caliph's being a military commander of
the Muslims. Since waging jihäd was one of the essential duties of the Caliph, what
was decreed for the emirate could be transferred to the Imffinate. 72 al-Mãwardi
reinforces his argument by citing two more examples from the Umayyad and the
'Abbãsid dynasties. In both cases 'ulamã' gave their unqualified recognition to this
principle of succession. In the first place al-Mãwardi quotes the example of Sulaymãn b.
'Abd al-Malik (d.991717) who pledged succession to 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'AzIz and after
him Yazid b. 'Abd al-Malik ( d. 105/724). Even though Sulayman's judgement was not
accepted as a proof, his acceptance of judgement by those amongst the 'ulamã' of
followers (who had seen the time of Companions) and who were his contemporaries and
among those who do not fear the censor of those who censure in the matters regarding
72 E.I.J.Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam. P.35.
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truth constitute proof. Similarly Härün al-Rashid (d. 193/809) is said to have consulted
the most excellent of the 'u/ama' before nominating his three sons in successive order.73
On the authority of most of contemporary jurists, aI-Mawardi made the subjects
responsible just to recognize the Caliph and not to see or know him. However, the
people of power and influence were bound to see and know the Caliph. Having
recognized him, the whole Umma was obliged to entrust their affairs with unquestioning
obedience to him so that he could carry out all the affairs in a smooth way. 74 However,
this unquestioning obedience was compulsory for the subjects if the ruler carried out his
responsibilities properly. Neglect of these responsibilities on his part would lead to
aversion and hatred of the subjects resulting ultimately in his downfall.75
Deposition of the Imãn
According to al-Mawardi two main defects disqualified him from office: lack of
decency and physical deficiency.76
al-Mãwardi laid down certain conditions regarding the deposition of the Imifin
through lack of decency. Firstly, the people of power and influence could depose an
unscrupulous ruler who fell prey to ambitions. Secondly, the people of power and
influence could depose the Imifin for lack of decency if they were able to do it. Thirdly,
it was legitimate for the people of power and influence to carry it out the deposition of
the Imän and was not incumbent on them. According to the text of al-Mawardi: "the
people of power and influence cannot change him until his state has changed." 77 The
electors cannot dismiss someone they have made the contract of allegiance to as long as
his condition has not changed". al-Mawardi represented the viewpoint of Sh7'iSchool.
al-MAwardi, A.S., P.24.
Ibid, P.26.
al-Mawardi, Adab, P.139.
76 Ibid, P.29.
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By comparison, the Ijanbil scholar Abü Ya'la was opposed to deposition on moral
grounds. He only limited it to the physical incapacity.78
Physical Disability:
In order to undertake various responsibilities and to lead campaigns obviously
required the ruler to be a very fit person and free from physical deficiencies. al-
Mãwardi, therefore, dealt with various disabilities that render the Imain unfit in the
capacity of a ruler.
Physical disability was considered to be of three kinds:
Loss of senses
Loss of limbs
Loss of ability to supervise and direct79
Like Baqillani (d.403/1013)and Juwayni (d.478/1085), al-Mãwardi considered the
loss of senses as a disqualification. al-Mãwardi dealt with the matter more thoroughly
by dividing this loss into temporary and permanent one. He ultimately concluded that if
the period of disease was shorter than the period of health, it would not prevent the
J,nn from continuing the office. But if the period of health was shorter than the period
of disease then there was a difference of opinion among the fuqaha'.
A group offuqaha' says that since such a man is prevented from assuming the office,
he should also be prevented from continuing it. 80His mental disorderliness would
adversely effect the affairs of government. The other group however argued that Imãin
" al-Mãwardl, A.S., P.20.
78 Abil Ya'1A, A.S., PP.20-2 1.
Ibid, P.30.
80 Ibid, PP.30-31.
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could be disqualified only if he had permanent disorderliness, just as at the time of
installation he was required to be of perfect health.8'
Loss of eyesight would exclude a man from becoming Imifin or continuing it. This
was an agreed point among the jurists. However examples could be found where the
ruler, without the quality of eyesight, was not deprived of the office in Iran and in
*Iamnid Mesopotamia.82
 al-MAwardi strongly insisted on this qualification and argued
that if such defect disqualified the Qfffi from holding the post, how could the Imän
continue the office.83
The defect of eyesight that renders the person unable to see during the nighttime does
not disqualify him from Imifinate, since such a defect is often temporary. The weakness
of the eyesight is of two kinds:
1. The inability to differentiate between two persons justifies the exclusion from
lmnate.
2. Despite weak eyesight if he can differentiate between persons, he continues to be
eligible for the office.84
I,näm Juwayni adhered to the same viewpoint. According to him the loss of vision
rendered the man disqualified in the same manner as the loss of senses. But if the Imain
was able to perform his work with difficulty, he was not to be excluded from the
Imänate.85
An impotent person could not be precluded from assuming the office since there was
nothing in this inability to hinder the good judgement and running the administration in
SI a1-Mwad!, AS., P.3 1.
82 Aziz aI-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, P.176.
Ibid,P.31.
Ibid.
85 Juwaynl, al-Ghi yäthl, P.58.
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a good manner. 86 Imain al-Juwayni did not disqualify the eunuchs from becoming the
Caliph. 87 By the same logic the loss of smell could not deprive a man from becoming
Caliph. al-Mãwardi disqualified the person without hands or feet to become Imifin. This
defect would incapacitate the ability to fulfil his responsibilities in a good manner.88
Imän al-Juwayni, however, differed from him and regarded him quite capable of
assuming the office.89
Deafness dumbness precluded the man from becoming Imain. al-Mawardi, however,
quoted some fuqaha' who thought if such defects occurred after the assumption of the
office, the Imn should not be prevented from continuing the office. They argued that
he might smoothly carry out the business through gestures or through writing. 90 Imãin
al-Juwayni, however, altogether excluded such persons from Imainate. He was of
opinion that just as these defects rendered them ineligible from becoming Imain, they
would exclude them from the Imainate in the same way if they occurred during the
Imnate.9'
Loss of Limbs
Regarding the loss of some limbs al-Mawardi went into great details, some of which
are purely of theoretical interest. The essence of all details amounts to this: if such a loss
does not prevent him from performing his official responsibilities, it is not of any
significance. A deaf or impotent person otherwise well qualified to carry out the affairs
of the government effectively is perfectly eligible to become Imn. If the loss of the
limbs prevents him from carrying out his job efficiently, he would be ineligible to
86 Ibid, P.32.
87 AzJz al-Azmeh,Muslim Kingship, P.176.
88 
al-MAwardi, AS., P.33.
89 Az!z al-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, P.176.
9° al-MAwardl,AS., P.32.
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assume the office. For example, a person without a leg or arm or without arms and legs
become ineligible to become Imff,n.92
Loss of Ability to supervise and direct
According to al-Mãwardi, the Imãinate could not cease to exist if the Imain lost his
control to direct the affairs in accordance with his will. Someone seizing this control but
continuing to act in his name and without showing any clear opposition was legally
entitled to carry out the business of government. He was only required to rule and
govern according to the commands of religion and justice. 93 For a detailed discussion,
we shall turn to this topic later on.
If the heir to the lmain fell prisoner to the enemy, he could not continue as a ruler if
there were no prospects of his release. Similarly the Imain falling prisoner to the enemy
could not continue his office if there were no prospects of his release. 94 aI-Mawardi
attached more importance to the office and the figure of the Imifin than to his heir. In the
case of Imn the whole Umma was made responsible to seek his liberation from the
enemy and he was to continue to remain as Imifin until they accomplished it. 95 In the
case of heir, no such provision was laid.
If the Irnãn fell prisoner to rebel Muslims who installed an Imifin of their own, the
subjects were required not to break the oath of allegiance with their own Imain if there
were some prospects of his release. If there were no prospects of release, then they were
required to install an Imãn of their own but not to give allegiance to the Imifins of the
rebel. 96 al-Mãwardi thus stuck to the principle of refusing to acknowledge the existence
of two simultaneous Imãins. The rebel Muslims at this time were various seditional
92 Mãwardl, A.S., P.33.
Ibid, P.34.
Ibid.
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groups in different fraqi provinces supported by the Fãpnids. 97 al-Mãwardi did not
recognize their right to install the Caliph. Of course, in recognition of overwhelming
position of rebel Amir, he legitimized his rule subject to his oath of allegiance to the
Caliph. But he did not legitimize the rebel Caliph installed in place of the 'Abbffsid
Caliph. The people of power and influence were required to install their own Caliph.
Summary & Conclusion
The lack of any fixed principle regarding the choice of the Caliph gave the jurists a
broad framework within which certain methods came to be acknowledged as legitimate.
The will of the nominating Caliph, the importance of the opinion of the people of power
and influence, and confirmation of the people through the oath of allegiance were
always taken into account as the necessary ingredients of the election of the Caliph. His
legitimacy in fact depended more on the way he exercised the power and the legal
requirements for the acquisition of the authority had the secondary importance.
The al-Alikam was written with a view to covering both the aspects, i.e., the mode of
the acquisition of the authority as well as the manner of exercising it. The ideal solution
proposed to the different problems raised objections from the critics that the book
ignored the hard realities of the time and stated what was beyond the capacity of the
rulers and the ruled.
H.A.R.Gibb has refuted this charge on the ground that in capacity of a jurist al-
Mãwardi could hardly afford to be a philosopher- idealist to make an empty speculation.
On the persuasion of an eminent personality al-Mawardi composed the book as a
proposed constitution for the Caliphate that was fastly recovering its lost vigor. On this
96 Ibid, P.35.
al-Baghdadl, A study of al-Mãwardl's Political Thought, P. 175.
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question al-Mãwardi himself was convinced that any juristic exposition must be set in
its most standard and ideal form. The mere thought of any fiqh rule as being too good
for immediate future should not deter a jurist from stating the standard JIqh nature of
that rule.
He criticized some other jurist for this omission. However, apart from stating the
ideal he also gave due regard to the time, circumstances, the subjects and the rulers for
whom he was writing. He also stated the minimum legal requirements for the rulers and
the ruled. The Imänate of the less preferred (Mafçful) both at state level and for prayer,
emphases on establishment of congregational prayer and yet allowing it to be said
singly under unfavorable conditions furnish the examples of both idealism and realism.
al-Alikãm, therefore, states both the ideal requirements of the khila as well as its
minimum legal requirements so as to regulate the system in a legitimate manner.
The methods of acquiring the Caliphate during the Umayyad and the 'Abbasids were
acknowledged as legally valid as long as other legal requirements were fulfilled. The
tendency to avoid family rule during the RãshidUn period was regarded as the mark of
high piety. Hence the Umayyad's consolidation of the rule within their family was not
considered illegitimate. Accordingly the will of the Caliph in form of legal document,
securing the approval of Ahi Ijall Wa a!- 'Aqd and finally the approval of the masses in
form of the oath of allegiance gave the new Caliph the right to rule.
We have seen that the acquisition of authority through legal means was the first
requirement of legitimacy. Even the Usurper's right to rule, under the law of necessity,
was recognized when he submitted to the lawful authority of the Caliph and undertook
the fulfillment of those legal requirements. Having met this basic requirement, his right
to continue as a legitimate ruler rested upon carrying out the business of administration
according to requirements of religion and justice. al-Mäward! deals with details in
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respect of those requirements at great length and assigns the ruler certain duties and
responsibilities which we shall study in our next chapter.
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Chapter Three
The Functions and Responsibilities of the Caliph
The Qur'anic Injunctions
What criteria does the Qur'an lay down regarding the responsibilities of the ruler? Can
we infer from the Sharf a injunctions that the rulers are required to carry out certain
obligations and responsibilities?
A number of the Qur'anic injunctions are addressed to the Muslims as a whole.'
Consequently the Muslims are responsible to appoint a ruler for their enforcement. For
instance, enforcement of i3udi7d, establishment of the congregational and the '1 prayers,
guarding of frontiers, protection of the wealth of orphans and mad persons are collective
responsibilities which cannot be carried out except through appointment of a ruler.2
Since Islam was concerned both with the individual and the community, it was meant to be
regulated both at a private and a public level. Consequently the ruler's sphere of authority
was defined and his responsibilities were fully explained. It was virtually the nature and
character of these responsibilities which largely determined the type of ruler required for
their proper enforcement. Hence Rosenthal sees a link between the qualities and
qualifications of the ruler and the duties he was expected to perform, as stated by al-
Mawardi.3
The most basic responsibilities of the ruler were religious in nature. However, before
facilitating the practice of religion for the subjects, the ruler was himself required to be a
Through various injunctions, Muslims are addressed as a whole. That is why the verses containing some
commandments begin with: '0 you who believe'.
2	 al-Baghdad!, Usfil al-DIn, P.272.
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practising Muslim.4Having met the elementary requirement of its fulfilment, where he was
just an equal among equals, he was made responsible to establish the religion among the
Muslims. Among ten responsibilities assigned to a ruler, al-Mawardi put his religious
responsibilities above all other responsibilities in order of preference. The reason for this
preference seems to be based on the following verse of the Qur'an: "those who, if we give
them power in the land establish worship and pay the poor due and enjoin kindness and
forbid inequity."5
Several things are clear from this commandment of the Qur'an.
It is necessary for the ruler that he must be himself steadfast in prayer since only then
can he be entrusted to establish it in the land over rest of the people.
Once installed in authority the ruler has the double responsibility of establishing the
prayer. As an individual person the ruler is required to establish it as his personal obligation.
And as a head of the Muslim community, he has the responsibility of establishing it over
rest of the people.
The foremost duties of the rulers are religious in nature. Fundamentally the office of the
ruler acquires legitimacy upon the fulfillment of these duties.
Prayer and Zakift, far from being only personal affairs of every Muslim, are at the same
time public affairs, the accomplishment of which is both a moral duty of the individual as
well as a legal duty falling within the jurisdiction of the rulers.
al-MAwardi thus attributed the exercise of the ruler's authority primarily to the
enforcement of religious obligations. He put great emphasis on the importance of
establishing these obligations within the political context. He clarified the responsibilities of
both the rulers and the ruled and extracted support from the verses of the Qur'an bearing the
E.I.J.Rosenthal, Political Thou ght in Medieval Islam, P.5 1.
4alMäwardI, Tashll, P.190.
5a1-Qur'än, 22:41.
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same theme. He quoted the verses from SUra al-Ta wba and drew conclusions regarding the
membership of the Muslim society. In the light of the text, he clearly debarred those
Muslims who refuse to accept the responsibility of establishing prayer and paying Zakat. In
Nas'ihat al-Mulük he identifies basically two kinds of person deprived of the benefits of the
membership of the Muslim community. 6 They are (1) an apostate who has renounced Islam
after accepting it; (2) a criminal who has violated a law of Islam. In the latter category he
also included those persons who are guilty of omitting the above mentioned two
fundamental obligations either through denying their obligatory nature (in which case they
will be treated like apostates) or missing them due to laziness. The rest of the Muslims are
qualified for membership of society. The text which al-Mãwardi relies upon clearly debars
all those members, who despite having made claim to embrace Islam refuse to accept these
two duties as regular obligations of Islam. The pronouncement goes as thus: " if they
repent, establish prayer and pay Zakã, then they are your brothers in religion." 7 The same
theme recurs after a few verses in the same SUra telling the believers to leave such people
(exempt them) who fulfil these two basic commandments. It is said: " if they repent,
establish prayer and pay Zakat, then leave their path."8
In the al-Alikam, al-Mãwardi puts them in the category of criminals on the authority of
four schools of jurisprudence and suggests to the ruler the different measures to bring the
criminals back to the right path. al-Mäwardi made it clear in the al-Ahkãrn that all four
schools of jurisprudence agreed to disqualify the person, refusing to bear these
responsibilities, from the membership of the society. al-Mawardi on the authority of the four
Imifins divided the culprits into various kinds and suggested the responsibilities of the ruler
regarding their treatment according to the nature of their omission. If they omit these
6 
al-MAwardi, Na1, P.468.
7a1-Qur'an, 9:11.
8 
al-Our'An, 9:5.
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obligations due to laziness they were to be reprimanded and forced to be punctual. If they
persisted in their refusal then they were to be kept in jail. If they insisted on principle that
these obligations are not part of Islam, then they were to be treated in the same way as
apostates. But before exacting punishment on them they were to be convinced so that they
might reform themselves.9
al-MAwardi's adoption of this viewpoint was precedent guided. Realising his
responsibilities with regard to one of these two fundamental obligations the first ruler of
Islam, Abu Bakr (R.A.A), fought the people who despite being Muslims refused to pay
Zakãt. Against the advice of certain companions to defer their punishment, he fought them
on the ground that a ruler couldn't absolve himself of these two fundamental duties. With
reference to his office he expressed his responsibilities in the following words: "the Prophet
(P.B.U.H) fought for three things: the testimony that there is no God except Allah, the
establishment of prayer and the payment of Zakãt. And Allah said that if they repent,
establish prayer, and pay Zokät, then leave their way. By Allah, I would neither add to them
anything nor shall I tolerate any omission from them."1°
From that time onward it became the regular practice of the Muslim rulers to associate
their most basic responsibilities with the establishment of these two fundamental
obligations. The Caliph 'Umar is reported to have secretly watched the prayer of the persons
to whom it was his intention to assign some important official responsibility. The Umayyads
and the 'Abbasids inherited the practices of the RffshidUn Caliphs and continued to assign to
the provincial governors the responsibility of leading the Friday Prayer as well as the 'Id
prayers. To impress upon the minds of the people the religious character of their authority,
the 'Abbäsids fully identified their rule with the establishment of these obligations. Their
aI-Máwardl, A.S., PP.83-84.
'°JaAs, Alikam aI-Our'.n, vol.2, P.82.
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rule which was famous for allowing free intellectual activity to all schools of jurisprudence
also witnessed the compositions of different rules stating the responsibilities of both the
rulers and the subjects with regard to the fulfilment of these religious obligations. We shall
deal with the details later on as stated by Mãwardi before we examine what else the Qur'an
requires of the ruler as his regular functions.
Establishment of Justice among the People
The word Caliph, in a strictly political sense, was applied to the Prophet David. He was
reminded about his responsibility in these words: "0 David, we have made you the Caliph
in the land, so judge between the people with justice and do not follow thy desire..."
To be able to fulfill the responsibility of administering justice, the ruler was required to
undertake a number of responsibilities. It covered not only the settlement of disputes
between contending parties through the establishment of the institution of judiciary, but
also the establishment of a strong executive for the maintenance of law and order, and the
establishment of institutions to prevent the oppression of the weak. All institutions to
achieve this end were, consequently, required to be brought into existence.
Moral Responsibilities of the Ruler
Morally the rulers were also bound to uphold their functions in a vigilant manner. The
Qur'an links the whole congregation of the Muslim society into a single bond where they
were obligated to mutually co-operate with one another over virtue and piety and withhold
from co-operation over sin and transgression) 2 Consequently whereas all the Muslims are
required according to their ability to act upon this commandment, the ruler's responsibilities
multiply for bringing the institutions into existence both for exhorting people to the right
path through persuasion as well as preventing them from evil through legal means.
"al-Our'än, 38:26.
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In the light of our study of the Qur'anic verses examined thus far it is clear that many
obligations imposed over the Muslims depended upon the appointment of a ruler. The
numbers of responsibilities studied so far can be classified into the following categories.
• There are commandments which are directly addressed to the rulers or refened to as
directly the responsibilities of the rulers.
• There are some commandments which are addressed to the Muslims as a whole. Since
everybody cannot perform them directly and as one is forced to achieve them through some
agency, they ultimately become the responsibilities of the rulers.
. There are some commandments which the ruler shares with all the Muslims. Since his
sphere of authority is broader than anyone else, he becomes the most exclusive agent for
enjoining virtue and preventing evil.
• Apart from imposing the laws and religious commandments, administering the affairs of
the state, maintaining the law and order, the ruler was also considered responsible for the
moral refinement of society. In this capacity he was to make use of all possible means
conducive to the achievement of his ends.
The Caliph had the duty of preserving religion against any intrusion from the outside. He
was made responsible for checking the innovations of those who attempted to introduce
innovations into religion.'3
We shall now take the Caliph's different responsibilities one by one which we have
discussed so far, in his various capacities.
Religious Responsibilities
First and foremost, the Caliph was a religious figure. In this capacity al-Mãwardi
assigned to the ruler some important functions of fundamental importance. In the first place
12 
al-Our'än, 5:2.
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he was made responsible for preserving the religion. The preservation of religion depended
upon his active supervision and directly patronising all religious obligations himself. He
was also made responsible for doing it according to the first generation of the Umma. 14 In
the case of some religious obligations the responsibilities of the ruler were considered to be
so extensive that al-Mãwardi devoted separate chapters to an explanation of the
responsibilities of the ruler.
Prayer
In the history of the early Islamic era, it was the mosque from where most of the official
policies were announced. The Caliph was also required to be the Imãin of the prayer or he
was required to appoint a deputy to do the same job on his behalf. It was in fact due to his
leadership both in spiritual and temporal affairs that the office of the Caliph combined in
theory a spiritual and secular function.' 5 al-Mãwardl realised in the proper enforcement of
these practices the solution to some of the political problems of his time. He was not content
to describe merely the fiqh details of the prayer but fully involved the ruler in the
appointment of Imäns in official mosques, with his active participation in their
administration, stating the limits of his authority, and explaining his relationship with the
Imãin. His commentary on the Friday prayer clearly reflects the idea that his motives in the
al-A1kãm were hardly theoretical. Along with discussing the responsibilities of the Caliph,
the Imn, and the people, he fully accommodated the Buwayhid authorities and justified
their assumption of authority on behalf of the Caliph. 16 We can study his emphasis on
different aspects of prayer under the following headings:
' aI-MwardI, AS., P.10.
' al-MAward!, AS., P.28.
I.R.Netton, A Popular Dictionary of Islam, P.143.
16 al-Mãwardl, A.S., P.159.
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Appointment of the Imân
During the Buwayhid period, when the Caliph was divested of his executive authority, he
in fact depended for legitimacy upon the exercise of his authority as a religious leader of the
community. He continued to exercise his right of appointing the Imãins in the mosques.
However, the Caliph's exercise of authority was restricted to the official mosques. a!-
Mãwardi stated the necessary qualifications for eligibility to the Imãinate but maintained the
Imnate of the less preferred (mafçfUl) to be the right one. Hence without giving up the
formula of holding the jurist scholar to be the best-qualified person for the office, he
maintained any Imãin to be a legitimate one who met the basic qualifications provided he
was appointed by the authorities.' 7
 Three important consequences follow from the text of al-
MAwardi determining the ruler/subject relationship:
1. The appointment of Imns in official mosques was a right which exclusively belonged to
the ruler. Any interference on the part of people was strictly forbidden.
2. Without relaxing the criteria for the appointment of the Imain, al-Mäwardi gave the ruler
a free hand in appointing even a less preferred man. In this appointment, we can see a close
parallel to al-Mawardi's legitimisation of a less preferred candidate for the post of the
Caliph.
3. The responsibility of the ruler in making such an appointment was recommended and not
obligatory. In the case of no appointment from the ruler, the right reverted to the people to
make up the deficiency.
However, the private mosques were to be left in the possession of the people. The Caliph
could interfere only if people either requested him for an appointment or did not agree over
the Imãinate of a person. Once appointed as Imän, people had no right to depose him
unless they had sound reason to do so.
17 Ibid, P.150.
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In the case of conflict between the Imain and the Caliph, the Caliph's will prevailed. In
the case of private mosques too, the Caliph was quite capable of nominating any individual
as an Jnäin in the presence of better-qualified persons, if people of the mosque could not
reach an agreement over the appointment of the Jmain. The ruler's exercise of this right was
however to be tolerated and not to be commended as the preferable course was still to
appoint the better qualified person as the Imifin. Abu Ya'lã, a Ijanbil scholar and
contemporary of al-Mäwardi, held a different viewpoint. According to him, in the case of
disagreement over the choice of Imain, people could decide by drawing lots.'8
The Criteria for Preference
al-Mãwardi seemed to be in agreement with Sarakhsi (d.483/1090), a Ianafischolar, in
regarding 'Jim as the top qualification.' 9 al-Mäwardi says: "if there is afaqih who is not a
reciter, and a reciter who is not afaqfn, thefaqih takes precedence over the reciter as long as
he knows the opening Siira, since what is necessary to know of the Qur'an is limited, while
the possible incidents which may happen during the prayer are without limit." 20 This is in
clear contrast to Abü Ya'la's judgement who preferred the reciter to the faqlh, as long as he
was aware of the rulings concerning the prayer. He preferred better recitation over
knowledge as far as the prayer was concerned.2'
Organisation of the Mosques
al-MawardI divided the mosques into two categories: official mosques and private
mosques.
18 AbU Ya'Ia, A.S., P.98.
Calder.N, 'Friday Prayer and Juristic Theory of Government', In BOAS, 1986, P.40.
20 al-Mawardl, AS., P.153.
21 Aba Ya'1A, A.S., P.97.
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The official mosques included those mosques where 'Id prayers and Friday prayer were
said as well as those mosques frequented and revered by the people under the care of the
Sultan. All the affairs in this mosque were to be administered by the authorities.
In al-Mãwardi's account, the structures of religious and political authority were governed
by the same principles. A less preferred (mafçfUl) Caliph could appoint a less preferred
(mafçlUl) Imifin who in turn was fully authorised to appoint a deputy to lead the prayer in his
absence. In the case of no appointment of the deputy by the Imain, people were still required
to ask the ruler's permission if it was possible. 22 The purpose of recognising a wide official
control through these arrangements was to create unity among the adherents of the four
schools which represented the SunnI population at that time. In this process the ruler was
required to maintain equality and benefit from all four schools. The ruler was made
responsible for forcing them to keep their differences within limits and renouncing them
where they threatened the unity of the 'Umma. Thus the Ijanafites were told that whereas it
was their right to pray at the last time of a prayer, it was necessary for them to pray early if
a Shi'iImff,n was leading the prayer. Similarly, the Shi'ites could be forced to say the
words of Jqaina twice against the requirements of their fiqh if they followed a Ianafite
Imän.
Ruler's Impartiality among Different Religious Schools
al-Mãwardi made the ruler responsible for mediating impartially among the adherents of
the four schools of jurisprudence. It was indeed a most important responsibility of the ruler
to preserve the religion according to the pattern of the Salaf guard the faith in its original
form, and combat innovations in every guise. 23
 He was also made responsible for
establishing prayer and Zakãt and facilitating fasting and -Iajj. Yet in the process of
22 a1-Mäward, A.S., P.153.
23 aI-Mäwardl, A.S., PP.27-28.
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preserving the faith and carrying out the above religious obligations, the ruler was bound to
act according to the agreed principles of all the religious schools and leave the followers
free in matters of detail. All the schools of jurisprudence were thus assured their right to
preserve their identity. At the same time, they were to be forced to treat these differences as
minor and resolve them for the sake of unity. The ruler, along with acknowledging the right
of religious schools to exist independently, was also made responsible for keeping them
united.
To overcome differences among various schools, al-MAwardi gave the ruler a right to
appoint Imäns from the four schools. He worked out a broad framework 24 within which he
dealt with the responsibilities of the ruler, the Imain, and the subjects. He stated the opinions
of different schools before the ruler recognised his right to act upon any one of the opinions
and did not make him bound by the opinions of one school. His aim in recognising the less
preferred (mafclUl) as a legitimate Imain was to minimise the tension which could arise
among the different schools due to conflicting criteria to the Imainate. The ruler was thus
made responsible for treating all the four schools equally.
Form the equal treatment of all the four schools regarding the appointment of an Imff,n, it
necessarily followed that al-Mãwardi did not allow a viewpoint of a single school to prevail
under the official patronage. This also explains his quoting of more than one juristic
opinion with regard to a matter without sometimes indicating the preference of one over the
other. He left it to a ruler to follow an opinion of any one of the four schools. Indicating the
nature of different rulings of al-A.iikn ' Aziz al-Azmeh says: "Mãwardi thus brought to bear
on the various topics of public authority various textual and other precedents from which
contemporary legal judgement could be made by the discretionary legal power of the
24 aI-Mawardl, belonging to Shafi '1 school of thought, freely relied upon the opinions of four schools and
recognized ruler's right to exercise Ijtih&! or to act upon any one opinion. He acted in true spirit of Imain
103
Caliph. Although al-Mãwardi often indicates preferences for certain positions, there is no
implication that these were in any way binding on the Caliph, who had the same capacity
for the legal decision as does a judge."25
Much of al-Juwayni's criticism against al-Mãwardi, therefore, seems to be invalid: he
blamed al-Mawardi for leaving his reader in confusion by quoting two or three opinions
over a matter without indicating his preference for anyone. 26 al-Mawardi adhered to the
principle that, in running religious affairs the ruler should not rely upon the viewpoint of
one school but he should provide an equal patronage to all the four schools.
For maintaining a balance among all four schools the ruler could force the adherents of
all four schools:
1. To pray behind the less preferred (nzafçliil) bnän if he was officially appointed,
2. to pray behind the Imn of any one of the four Schools,
3. to follow the Imäin 's method of prayer and not to stick to the viewpoint of his own Imain,
4. to say the Adhãrz, Takbfr according to the viewpoint of the Imãin. For the sake of desired
unity, the followers behind the Imän were required to abandon their method of prayer if it
was in conflict with the lrnän 's method of prayer.
5. to avoid schism, the people were required to seek the permission of the ruler for the
appointment of an Imain if it was possible,
6. to avoid holding a second congregational prayer in the same mosque at any one time. This
was considered an illegitimate act. Although saying the congregational prayer was
considered twenty seven times more rewarding than the individual prayer, people were
Shaft 'Iwho thus explained his viewpoint: "we regard our opinion correct but admit the possibility of mistake
in it. Similarly we regard the viewpoint of other school wrong but admit the possibility of soundness in it."
25 AzIz al-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, PP.169-170.
26 al-Juwayn!, al-Ghiyathl, P.67.
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required to ignore it if it was in conflict with the achievement of desired unity. It might
appear as an act leading to schism and disunity.27
From above discussion it is obvious how much a ruler was involved in patronising
congregational prayer and organising the affairs related to the mosque. The ruler was
responsible for taking care of this obligation with regard to himself, the Imain, the various
schools, and the subjects. However the ruler's responsibilities were far greater in the case of
the Friday Prayer because it was a more important congregational prayer than other
prayers. According to al-MãwardI, in the time of the Jahiliyya, the name of Friday was
'urUba. It was then named al-Jum 'a only for a big gathering of the Muslim in this day for
prayer.28 The Friday Prayer was not only religiously important as a communal prayer but
became politically important because the oath of allegiance was confirmed by the masses
after this prayer. Moreover, it was the seat from where the name of the Caliph was
mentioned. 29 It also reflected the continued allegiance of the provincial governors to the
Caliph through the Khufba. Omission to take the name of the Caliph in the khufi,a
amounted to revolt. We have therefore now to observe the importance of this prayer within
the political context and see the ruler's involvement in its establishment.
Friday Prayer
al-MAwardi began his commentary on the validity of the Friday Prayer by quoting an
important difference between the Shi'ites and the Ijanafites. This difference was with
regard to the existence of the Sultan as a prerequisite to the appointment of the Imãin. With
the Ijanafites the Friday prayer was valid when the Sultan led the prayer or appointed an
Imn to lead the prayer. 3° The Shl 'ites regarded the appointment from the Sultan as a
27 al-MAwardi, A.S., P.15 1.
28 al-Màwardl, Tafslr, 62:9.
B.C.Amoretti, "Forward" to 'Politics and Revelation', P.xviii.
° al-Mãwardl, AS., P.154.
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recommended and not a compulsory act for the validity of the Friday Prayer. AbU-Ya'la
shared al-Mãwardi's viewpoint on the authority of A1mad b. Ijanbal, that the appointment
of the Imän was a recommended and not a compulsory condition for the validity of the
Friday Prayer. People could themselves establish it even without the Sultan's authority.31
This difference was of great significance since it reflected the approach of both schools
to the issue of authority. The Ijanafites considered the presence of authorities essential for
preventing any fitna due to a large gathering. One of the famous jurists of this school,
Sarakhsi maintained the presence of the authorities as a deterrent for those who deliberately
missed the Friday Prayer. 32 Another aspect he related to the importance of the Imffin 's
presence was that his absence would lead to fitna, because people arriving at the mosque
earlier than others would perform it, and since the Friday Prayer was held once, others
would miss it. The ruler was therefore the most suitable man to deal with this matter. 33 The
Ijanafites were so strict in this regard that in their opinion if the inhabitants of a city left the
city due to fear or some other reason but returned after a few days, they could not now
establish the Friday Prayer unless they took a new permission from the ruler.34
The ShI 'ites and the Hanblites who did not consider the existence of the authorities
necessary for the validity of the prayer based their viewpoint on the traditions of the Holy
Prophet (P.B.U.H). The Ijanafites relaxed this condition in the absence of Islamic
authorities but retained it as long as the authority was in the hands of those who enforced
the Sharf a. Otherwise, people could organise it for themselves.35
Another distinction connected with the previous one, and highlighted by al-Mawardi,
was the condition of the city. The city was defined as the place where a person in authority
Abil Ya'1A, A.S., P.103.
32 Calder Norman, Friday Prayer and juristic theory of Government', BOAS, P.37.
33.Ibid.
al-FatAwa aI-Hindi yyA, Kitãb al-Salãt, P.146.
Ibid.
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saw that the Iudiid were established, as well as a QaçJi dispensed judgements. Whereas
Imän Mãlik, A1mad b. Uanbal and Shaft 'Idid not maintain it as a necessary condition for
the validity of the Friday Prayer, the Ilanfites insisted on the necessity of this condition
because of the presence of the authorities to deal with any disturbance that might arise due
to the presence of a large gathering.36
Regarding the number of mosques where the Friday Prayer could be held within the
same city or village, al-Mäwardi maintained that if all the persons could be accommodated
within a single mosque, it would not be right to hold it elsewhere. But if the space was
lacking, then after quoting two opinions, al-Mwardi seems to have favoured the viewpoint
that as long as the arrangement could be made without inconvenience, it was better to hold
it in a single place. However if it was not possible, the arrangements could be made in other
mosques. 37 Abu Ya'lã shared al-Mãwardi's opinion on most of these points. He agreed with
al-Mãwardi that it was preferable to hold the Friday prayer in the same mosque. But if there
was not enough space in the mosque, or weak persons were unable to attend, then it could
be held in two or more mosques due to necessity. But the preferable course was to hold it in
one place by making use of the space outside the mosque. According to him when A1mad
b. Uanbal was asked whether he ever knew of 'the holding of a Friday Prayer after a Friday
Prayer, he replied in negative.'38
By way of summary we can say that whereas both writers agreed on many opinions,
there were minor differences with regard to details they quoted to support their viewpoint.
Both writers were in agreement that it was not right to hold two Friday Prayers if the
authorities prevented such arrangement. But in case people did not comply with the orders
of the authorities and held the Friday Prayer in two different places, then one of those
Calder Norman, 'Friday Prayer and juristic theory of Government' BOAS, P.37.
al-MAwardi, A.S., P.155.
AbU Ya'Iã, AS., P.107.
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prayers would be valid while the other would be invalid. But here al-Mãwardi's treatment of
the problem was limited. He merely quoted two viewpoints of the Shafi'fte school.
According to one of them, the prayer said earlier was a valid one. According to the second
view, the prayer said in the main mosque where the Sultan prayed would be the valid one.39
AbU-Ya'lA was not content with the mere repetition of this viewpoint. Along with quoting
opinions of both schools with the different views, he also quoted the arguments on which
they were based. On the authority of A1mad b. Uanbal, he attached more significance to the
presence of the Sultan as a decisive factor for the validity of the Friday Prayer. Quoting the
argument for the first opinion according to which, Abu-Ya'lã like al-Mawardi had preferred
and declared valid the prayer of those who had said it earlier, he went on to say that holding
second Friday Prayer after the first one without any sound reason would make its validity
doubtful if the ruler did not attend it.40
The second viewpoint which Abü Ya'lã supported was that the presence of the Sultan
validated the Friday Prayer even if such a prayer was said afterwards. The reason for the
validity was that all the responsibilities then transferred to the ruler. This was again in
conformity with the practice of A1mad b. Uanbal who fasted on the same day as the ruler
when the day of fasting was doubtful.4'
Although the Imän could hold the adherents of all four schools to his viewpoint in the
mosque, the ruler could not force the Imam to act contrary to the requirements of his
religious school in the same way. The Irnãin was warned that if he carried out the
injunctions of the ruler and led the prayer in violation of the requirements of his school, the
prayer would be invalid. 42 al-Mãwardi allowed the Imän to resist the orders of the ruler if
he directed him to lead the prayer against the rules of his own fiqh. However, to avoid the
al-Mãwardl, A.S., P.155.
40 Abfi Ya'IL A.S., P.107.
" Ibid.
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displeasure of the authorities he could appoint a deputy who shared the viewpoint of the
ruler.43
Regarding the right of the authorities to prevent the Friday Prayer, the Ijanajites were of
the opinion that the rulers were justified if they had a sound reason for it, but if they
prevented it without any sound reason, then the people of the city were justified in
establishing it on their own. al-Mãwardi did not go to that extent and justified the saying
of the prayer at home if the authorities prevented the holding of the Friday Prayer
publicly. 45 The Ilanafites also recognised the right of the linflin to hold the prayer in his
palace provided that he allowed free entry to everybody. But if he did not allow this
concession to the people, then the Friday Prayer would not be valid.46
al-Mãwardi concluded his discussion regarding the prayer with the description of five
more Sunna prayers. They are the two 'it prayers, the Solar and lunar eclipse prayers, and
the Rain prayer. Here al-Mãwardi confined himself by quoting the two different opinions
that existed among the Shi'ites, one group regarding it as strongly recommended while the
other maintaining it to be incumbent on some of the people.47 The Ijanfites, unlike the
ShI'ites, did not place all these prayers in the same category. They regarded the two 'Id
Prayers as obligatory, the two Solar and Lunar prayers as recommended, and Rain prayer as
recommended (Mustahab). 48 In the case of all five prayers the ShI 'ites maintained that
they could be said both separately or with the congregation. The Ijanafites, on the other
al-Mawardl, A.S., P.156.
u Ibid.
' aI-FatãwA al-Hindiyya, vol. 1, P. 146.
aI-Mãwardl, A.S., P.159.
46 aI-FatAwãal-Hindiyya, vol. 1, P.148
al-Mawardi, A.S., P.156.
48 aI-Fatàwã al-Hindiyya, vol. 1, PP.149-154.
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hand, maintained that four prayers out of these five should be said with the congregation.
Only the Rain prayer could be said separately.49
Suppressing Innovations
First of all, the ruler was required to prevent himself from introducing any innovation. al-
Mawardi says: "he must guard the deen as it was established in its original form and about
which the first generations of the Umma are agreed."5°
It is clear from the above statement that the ruler was not allowed to introduce any
innovation which was contrary to the established principles of religion or agreed principles
of the jurists of the first generation. Hence any deviation on his part amounted to
introducing innovation.
The responsibility of the ruler to work within the framework of the early jurists also
required him not to impose his religious viewpoints on others. If he ever did so, that was
also regarded as innovation. al-Mãwardi's emphasis on this viewpoint showed his keen
awareness of the past Islamic history. Ibn Muqaffa"s advice to the Caliph ManUr to
integrate the different religious views into a single official fiqh was not approved by Imãin
Mãlik when the Caliph Manür sought his permission to implement his fiqh throughout the
Muslim lands under his control. 5 ' In the face of strong pressure from the 'Abbffsid Caliphs
Almad b. Uanbal conformed to the viewpoint of Imãm Malik when he refused to accept the
official creed of the 'created Qur'an'.52
Ibid.
50 al-MAwardl. A.S., PP.27-28.
AbU Zahra, Imãm Mãlik, PP. 179-180.
52 AbU Zahra, Abmad b. Hanbal, P.145. Ma'mtin was the first Caliph to institute a Milna for imposing the
Mu'tazilite doctrine of a created Qur'an under official patronage. A1.mad b. Uanbal refused to acknowledge
the doctrine of a created Qur'an and was therefore imprisoned and persecuted (I.R.Netton, A Popular
Dictionary of Islam, P.23) during the age of Mu'taim. The Caliph Wathiq continued the Milina but reverted
to the doctrine of uncreated Qur'an towards the end of his life. ( Suytii, Tãrikh al-Khuläfä, P.457 ) His
successor Mutawikkil, however, completely renounced the Mibna and Mu'tazila. (I.R.Netton, A Popular
Dictionary of Islam, P.185).
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al-Mwardi regarded the emergence and the development of the differences among the
various schools as natural as long as they were constructive and were not based on any
prejudice. But he pointed to the simultaneous existence of the opponents and the hypocrites
who accentuated those differences and introduced innovations in the guise of religion. The
ruler was, therefore, required not to allow himself to be lured into favouring any school of
jurisprudence at the expense of others. Since their aim was the satisfaction of their lusts,
they tried to make the ruler the most effective tool of realising their aims.53
Having warned the ruler of the existence of such elements, a1-Mwardi warned clearly
what consequences could follow if a king fell victim to their plots and designs.
If they succeeded in their designs, it would ultimately lead to the downfall of the
government. No one with the right faith would be ready to accept the officially imposed
innovations. The constant threat of revolt from different quarters of the people would
ultimately oblige the ruler to recruit a large army that would be a burden on the public
treasury. At any stage when the ruler finds himself unable to pay their salaries they would
rise and spread anarchy in the country.54
The principles stated above could be applied to any ruler and any group with such
motives but al-Mäwardi at the end pinpointed the Kharijites for adopting such an attitude.
al-Mawardi was highly critical of their behaviour and attitude and advised the ruler to avoid
such people.55
al-Mawardi considered it to be a responsibility of the ruler to deal with them most
systematically according to the nature of their crime. He relied upon the methods of the
Caliph 'All in dealing with the innovators. He suggested that the ruler should ignore such
innovators who have kept themselves apart from other people within an area and do not
al-MAwardi, Naslhat, P.118.
Ibid, P.119.
Jbid,PP.118-119
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constitute a threat to the population. This view was again according to the method of the
Caliph 'Ali who addressed the Khãrijites thus: ". . . three things are, however, incumbent on
us: we must not prevent you from entering the mosques of Allah to remember the name of
Allah therein, and we must not initiate any fight against you, and we must not withhold the
fay from you as long as your hands are united with ours."56
If they preached their views and mixed with the people, the recourse was still to be
sought to the argument rather than force. Before taking arms against them, the ruler was
advised to make every effort to persuade them to return to the right path.57
Method of suppression:
al-Mãwardi thought it the responsibility of the ruler to bring the innovators back to the
right path through policy of consent rather than force. al-Mãwardi said: ". . . if an innovator
appears, or someone of dubious character deviates from this deen he should make clear to
him the legal proof of his error, explain the right way to him and take the appropriate
measures regarding his liability and his punishment such that the deen is protected from
blemish and the 'umma is prevented from going astray. •,,58 Several principles are clear from
this statement: (1) the ruler is required to be a Mujtahid or he was required at least to work
in consultation with a Mujtahid to deal with such situation according tofiqh requirements.
1. The ruler was not only required to act in a legal capacity but also as a moral reformer to
rectify those who deviated from the right path. After their deviation, the ruler's treatment
towards them should be based on sympathy.
2. The ruler was required not to develop any prejudice against those who differed on
religious points.
56 al-Mãwardl, AS., P.88.
Ibid, PP.88-89
58 al-MAwardl, AS., P.28.
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3. The ruler was required to deal with them systematically. Initially they were to be
convinced by argument. 59
 In developing such a viewpoint al-Mãwardj must again have
relied on the precedents of past Caliphs. Tbn al-Jawzi states that before waging battle
against the Khãrjites the Caliph 'All persuaded them through argumentation by appointing
Ibn 'Abbãs from his side. The exchange of the arguments produced positive effects on the
Kharijites and many of them joined 'All. 60 The Caliph 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Azlz is reported to
have invited the Kharijites to hold debate (Munãgara) which in fact took place. 61 al-
Mãwardl also showed the necessity of holding debate (Munaara). 62 The ruler was,
therefore, advised to use force as a last measure. But while al-Mãwardi suggested various
measures for punishing the deviants, he strictly disallowed to impose the death penalty on
them. He based his view on the tradition of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H). In the words of the
Iladfth: "The blood of a Muslim is not to be shed except in three circumstances: rejection
after belief, adultery after being a Mujn, or killing someone other than in retaliation."63
Such a formulation al-Mawardi again confessed to have deduced from the Caliph 'All
with regard to the Khffrjites who separated from him at Nehrvän. al-Mãwardi says: " .. . he
appointed a governor over them and they submitted to him for a while; 'All maintained
peace with them until they killed the governor. He then sent word to them that they should
hand over the person who had done the killing, but they refused, saying: "all of us killed
him," to which he replied: " all of you should surrender and I will kill some of you." He
then went to them and killed most of them.64
59a1-MAwardl, A.S., P.89.
601bn al-Jawzl, The Devil's Deception, P.3 1.
61 MaudUdI, Khilãfat wa MulUkiyyat, PP.190-19 1.
62a1-Mward1, Nai1at, P.467.
63a1-Mäwardl, AS., P.89.
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Settlement of the Disputes
Another important responsibility assigned to the Caliph was the settlement of the
disputes among the subjects through establishing the limits of Allah. It could be achieved
effectively if the ruler acted impartially among his subjects and prevented them from mutual
injustices through their proper enforcement. al-Mawardi says that their blood, wealth,
chastity, and personalities were to be protected against any encroachment. The ruler was
thus required to promote maximum harmony and co-operation among the citizens. No
strong person was to be allowed to oppress a weak person and no weak was to be
victimised.65
Peace and Security
Providing peace and security was considered as one of the most primary duties of the
ruler. al-Mawardi regarded it necessary due to two reasons:
1. The routes were to be kept safe for the travelling of all subjects. The jurists had always
regarded it as one of the primary responsibilities of the ruler. However the emphasis on this
point might also directly be related to al-Mãwardi's own time. Facilitating the Ijajj
obligation was one of the ruler's responsibilities. Ibn Kathir mentions it under the events of
many years of the same period that this obligation remained suspended. 66 By putting
emphasis on this responsibility of the ruler, al-Mãwardi must have reminded the authorities
of his time to make the necessary arrangements for the fulfillment of this obligation.
2. People should also have no hindrance to conduct their business safely. In Nasibat a!-
MulUk. al-MAwardi stressed that the ruler should adopt strict measures against robbers on
the highway for the safe conduct of business and trade.67
65a1-MAwardl, Nailiat, P.203-204.
Ibn Kathir, vol. 12, (Ibn Kathir mentions the suspension of IJajj under the incidents of many years during
first half of eleventh century).
67a1-Mãwardl, Nallat, P.467.
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To make it possible al-Mäwardi strongly emphasised the need for the enforcement of the
Islamic law. In this connection he says: " the establishment of the limits of Allah, the
regulation of his injunctions among the people, maintaining justice in the cities and
enforcement of the right order regarding their blood, wealth, and chastity and protecting
them from wrong and offences of any kind and promoting harmony among them."68
Such an emphasis was not alone the characteristic of al-Mäwardl. Almost all the jurists
counted it among the responsibilities of the ruler. In his book, al-Siyasa Shar'iyya Thn
Taymiyya prescribed punishments to do away with crimes. Interpreting a verse of the
Qur'an " and when you decide among the people you must decide in a just manner" 69 he
said that people are ordered to appoint arbiters regarding the rights and the limits. For
example, regulation of His limits over the decoits, thief, and adulterer deserve the attention
of the government. To further support his viewpoint he quoted the following statement of
the Caliph 'Ali: "it is incumbent upon the people to establish the government whether it is a
bad or good."
People asked the Caliph 'All that installation of a good ruler is a right thing, but why a
bad ruler should be installed.' The Caliph 'All replied: " by the ruler the limits are
established, the routes are kept safe, jihäd is waged, and fay' is distributed."70
al-Baghdadi, a contemporary of al-Mawardi, highlighted the importance of this
institution with reference to the establishment of the same duties. He says: "it is incumbent
on the Muslims to have an Irnän who implements their rulings, establishes the limits of
Allah, leads the army to war and arranges the marriage of the widows and distributes fay'
among the people."7'
68 
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In his book, Nailiat al-Mulük, al-Mawardi reiterated the same theme. He stated that the
duties of the ruler include the establishment of the limits of Allah. He also held the ruler
responsible for establishing justice in the city as well as a right order regarding their blood,
wealth, and chastity of the subjects. It was also incumbent upon him to promote harmony
and prevent injustice.72
The above measures, however, merely ensured internal peace and security. To provide a
defence against foreign invasion the ruler was required to maintain a strong army. Its
existence was necessary for the protection of the frontiers of the country. The ruler was
advised to remain vigilant against any surprise attack of the enemy. 73 al-Mãwardj turned
towards this issue in his book Tashil al-Nazar and considered its existence to be a very
important one. At the outset it becomes obvious that al-Mãwardi was addressing
contemporary issues because he clearly stated the military basis of the ruler's authority
which was so typical of al-Mãwadi's time. al-Mãwardi said: "because of them (the soldiers)
he became king until he dominated, acquired authority until he was able to rule."74
The Receipt of Fay and Zak&
This was also one of the basic responsibilities of the ruler. The Fay' was the wealth
which was received from the enemy without any conflict. Collection and distribution of
Zakat was one of the most fundamental responsibilities of the ruler. At the outset of the
chapter al-MAwardi makes it clear by the use of a prophetic tradition that legally the ruler
was entitled to claim Zakift and nothing else from the wealth of the Muslims.75
From what kind of wealth could the ruler claim the payment of Zakift? al-Mawardi
divided every person's belongings into concealed and manifest goods. The ruler's right to
72 
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order the payment of Zakãt was restricted to the second category. As for the Zakãt over the
concealed goods like gold, silver and merchandise, the person was to be left to himself and
the ruler was neither responsible nor authorised to order from him anything in that respect.
The ruler's responsibilities began only with the manifest goods. Although this obligation
was to be performed under the supervision of the authorities, al-Mwardi also took into
account the other opinion which considered it just a recommendation and a man was also
allowed to perform this obligation on an individual basis. AbU Ya'la held a different
opinion regarding this issue. He agreed with al-Mawardi in authorising the ruler to demand
Zakãt on the manifest goods. Although he did not make it compulsory for the people to
perform this obligation through the ruler, he regarded it as a preferable course if the people
made payment through the authorities. al-Mawardi suggested two viewpoints, and without
showing preference for one over the other, ultimately demanded the authorities to fight
those who adhered to neither of the above viewpoints. Abu-Ya'la on the other hand clearly
indicated its payment through the authorities as a preferred course. 76 Its individual payment
was less preferred although it was a permissible act. Both writers agreed that a man who fell
into none of these categories was to be fought. Regarding a man who refused to pay Zakat
to the authorities and gave it privately, al-Mãwardi relied on the opinion of Abu-Uanifa who
prevented the authorities to fight him. Abii-Ya'lã, however, arrived at the same conclusion
without quoting any Imän on this issue. Abu-'Ubayd (d.227/841), an early Shi'ijurist of
the ninth century, dealt with the problem at some length. He was of the opinion that up to
the age of the Caliph 'Uthmãn, the receipt and payment of the Zakift had been solely a
matter of official concern. Afterwards people were divided on the issue. Some of the
companions continued to treat it as an official matter while others thought that it could be
performed individually as well. To the former group belonged Ibn 'Umar, 'A'isha, and
76 AbU-Ya'la, A.S., P.119.
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Sa'eed b. 'Musayyab. When some people asked them whether a person should give Zakãt to
the authorities if he feared its misuse by them, they insisted that the Zakãt should still be
given to the authorities. 77 The companions who differed on this viewpoint gave two
arguments: first, if they feared the misuse of the Zakãt amount, they were bound by
scripture to pay it to the needy and deserving persons. The second reason was with
reference to some companions, that only those people were required to give it to the rulers
who were either on an official role or who were the beneficiaries of the government. 78 The
Hanafites were far stricter regarding the role of the authorities in receipt and the payment of
Zakãt. Unlike al-Mãwardi, they would not tolerate its distribution privately. According to
them, the authorities could order a man to make a second payment even if they were aware
that he had already paid Zakãt to some needy person. They also considered a usurper's right
to the receipt of the Zakãt amount as a legitimate one.79
al-Mãwardi distinguished between two types of authorities appointed for collection and
distribution of Zakã.t. In the case of both he clearly explains the responsibilities and the
powers of both the ruler and the appointed person. If the appointed person was delegated the
authority to collect the Zakift, he could not be forced to act according to a ruler's ijtihä'l. On
the points of difference among the jurists he was to be authorised to act according to his
own Utih&J. Nor could he be bound to act according to the ijtihä-J of the owner of the good.
Here the same principle was at work according to which the lmain of the mosque was
authorised to hold everybody to his viewpoint. Neither the ruler nor the owner of the goods
could force him to act according to the requirements of their fiqh. But the Imain's right to
Abil-'Ubayd, Kitãb aI-Amwãl, P.506.
is Ibid, P.507.
al-FatäwA al-Hindiyya, vol. 1, P.184.
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act according to his ijtihad would be recognised if the appointed authority was merely
granted the power of execution.80
If the authorities arrived late for the collection of Zakãt, then those responsible for the
payment were required to note: if the delay occurred due to their engagement with other
people for the same purpose, they were required to wait as the authorities could approach
everybody one after another. But if they were apprehensive of crossing the reasonable time
limit before the arrival of the authorities, they were entitled to pay the Zakãt on their own.8'
The Ijanafites who were more strict regarding the payment of Zakãt to the authorities took
into account the official constraints but regarded the prior approval of the authorities
necessary. If a person distributed the Zakift amount on his own without seeking a prior
approval, then the authorities could force him to make a second payment.
Extra Legal Responsibilities of the Subjects
al-Mãwardi recognised the right of the authorities in acting upon their ijtihad in
collecting the amount of Zakat and made the owner of goods bound to obey them. However,
if the owner of the goods realised that the authorities received a lesser amount than the
required one, he was required to make up the deficiency by paying the difference in order to
be absolved in the eyes of Allah.82
The Responsibility of Subjects towards Corrupt authorities
al-Mãwardi states two kinds of officials, one of them being unjust in collection but fair in
distribution, and the other one, fair in collection but unjust in distribution. As for the first
person, al-Mawardi maintained it permissible for the subjects to conceal their wealth from
him although he equally allowed them to hand it over if they wished to do so. But for the
80 al-Mawardl, A.S., P.172.
81 Ibid, PP.172-173.
82 al-Mãwardl, A.S., P.173.
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second type of person, there was no alternative for the people except to make the payment
of Zakãt a second time if they were forced to pay it to the collector. It was because if the
deserving man did not receive the Zakat amount, the affluent class of the society was not
absolved of its obligation regarding the poor people. 83 The suggestion of this kind contained
a veiled criticism of the corrupt authorities because the ruling regarding the affluent class to
pay it twice if the authorities were not fair in distribution was bound to create hatred in the
minds of people against the authorities. Here al-Mawardi differed with Imain Mãlik whom
he quoted as saying that the payment of Zakãt to such a man was an accepted one and
paying it a second time was not obligatory. 84 Abü-Ya'lã here differed with al-Mãwardi on
two points. Whereas al-Mäwardi maintained that people were equally allowed to conceal
their belongings or to pay them to an unjust collector, Abfl-Ya'lã considered it better for
them to give it to the ruler (unjust in collection) but permissible for them to conceal the
wealth and pay it on their own. 85 People were thus persuaded to co-operate with the
authorities even if they demanded more than what was obligatory. If the distribution was
fair, the additional money would obviously be spent on the betterment of the poor. The
second point of difference was that Abu-Ya'l on the authority of A1mad b. Ijanbal
opposed al-Mãwardi's viewpoint and maintained that if the people were forced to make the
payment to a man who was unfair in distribution they were not bound to pay it a second
time. He quoted many traditions to support his viewpoint while he quoted just one tradition
for al-Mawardi's point of view.86
After the commencement of the period of Zakat, if a person claimed to have paid it due
to a delayed arrival of the authorities, his claim would be valid. But if the person in charge
doubted his claim he could force him to take an oath. al-Mãwardi quoted two opinions about
83 Ibid.
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taking an oath regarding the payment of Zakãt. According to one, it was obligatory on the
person to take the oath if the man in authority asked him. According to the second, it was
recommended and the claimant was not bound to take it if he thought it unnecessary. 87 Abü-
Ya'la differed with al-Mãwardi by holding that the payment of Zakat to the authorities as
irretrievable. On the authority of A1mad b. Uanbal he also ruled out the justification of the
oath taking by the authorities.88
The Sphere of Responsibility for the Ruler and Subjects
al-Mãwardi fully authorised the man in authority to distribute Zakãt without being
required to do so in the presence of the owner of the goods if the latter doubted his honesty
and thought his own presence necessary. Similarly, he could not force the owner of the
goods to be present during the distribution of Zakãt because the latter was absolved of the
obligation after handing it over to the ruler. 89 Both had a legal status and could not trespass
upon their jurisdictions. After the payment of Zakfft to the ruler, if the ruler lost the money,
neither the ruler nor the subject could be responsible for the payment. The ruler was not
entitled to reject the claim of the subject if he claimed the loss of wealth prior to the
payment of Zakãt. He could at most ask him to take an oath if he doubted his credibility.90
Abü-Ya'la again differed with al-Mãwardi on this point and did not think it proper for the
authorities to demand an oath from the owner of the goods.91
86 Ibid.
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If the subjects denied the receipt of Zaka.t but the ruler claimed to have distributed it among
them, the ruler was to be trusted. But the subjects would also continue to deserve the
Zakãt.92
The above were the rights and duties of both the ruler and the subjects with regard to the
receipt and payment of Zakfft. After the establishment of prayer this was considered as one
of the most necessary obligations of the ruler. In his book Nasiliat-al-Muluk al-Mawardi
highlighted the same aspect of the ruler's responsibility with great emphasis. He quoted the
Prophet (P.B.U.H) as saying while sending Mu'ädh b. Jabal to Yemen: " and teach them
that Allah has made Zakãt obligatory on them. It will be taken from the rich people and will
be given to the poor people."93
The Appointment of Competent and Honest Persons
According to al-Mãwardi, the management of the affairs of the country was a labour and
trial. 94 The effective management of this task consequently required the recruitment of
trustworthy persons and appointment of worthy counsellors capable of undertaking those
tasks delegated to them. 95 Consequently, the ruler was required to be very careful in the
exercise of his choice. aI-Mãwardi says in Nasihat al-MulUk: "he should appoint some of
them as his consultants and should allow their participation. They should work as a link
between him (the ruler) and them (subjects) and should work as assistants over the rest of
the people. The ruler was required not to entrust anyone of them except after test,
experience, and trial and after testing that the qualities of advice, affection, chastity,
consultation and keeping secrets and keeping faith for him are manifest in them..
92a1-Maward!, A.S., P.185.
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The above criterion was considered as a standard on which the Prophets in the past relied
and likewise the other polities based on religion. Their establishment required staff and
assistants and nothing could be put right except through a gradual process and correct
ordering as well as improvement through change from the present condition to a better one.
This resembled the Divine pattern and was the most decisive in deriving from Allah the
continuous infallibility (icmff)and Tawfiq.97
al-Mãwardi seeks Qur'anic support for his viewpoint and quotes the following verses
from the Holy Qur'an: (1) "And when We took from the children of Isr'il a pact and raised
among them twelve Naqib." 98
"And Moses chose of his peoples seventy men for our appointed tryst."
al-MAwardi also recognised its necessity from the Sunna of the Prophet (P.B.U.H). He
says: " and the Prophet (P.B.U.H) chose a group from among his companions for his
deputyship and consultation.
On the eve of Bay 'at Riç%van he chose a delegation and for his service a group, and for
the leadership of the army a group, and for his correspondence and writing, another
It is obvious from the order of the above pattern that al-Mwardi required the entrusting
of every task to those who were best fitted to do it. It is also clear that apart from being
competent they were required to be trustworthy and honest. He constantly referred to these
requirements as the pre-requisites of the ruler's associates. The perfect model for al-
Mãwardl was Mãrnun's when he expressed his requirement in these words: "I am looking
for a man for my affairs who has all of the qualities of goodness, who is modest in his
behaviour and resolute in his ways, a man who has been refined by manners and
Ibid, P.334.
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strengthened by experience, a man who if entrusted with secrets acts accordingly and if
entrusted with important matters moves to execute them, a man whose forbearance causes
him to be silent and whom knowledge causes to speak, a man for whom the moment is
enough and for whom a glance is sufficient, a man who has the intrepidity of Amirs and the
perseverance of the wise, the humility of the 'ulamã' and the understanding of the fuqaha';
if people treat him well, he is grateful and if put to the test by their mistreatment, he is
patient; he does not sell the portion of today only to be deprived the next; a man who
captures the hearts of men by the sharpness of his tongue and the beauty of his
eloquence."0'
al-Mäwarclj frankly admitted that these qualities were seldom perfected in one person.
The administration would consequently suffer in proportion to the deficiency of those
qualities lacking in the person. In the absence of honest officials the administration would
be corrupted.'°2 But his stress on competence was no less striking than his emphasis on
honesty. Talking about the different aspects of this, he says that although it was not a
requirement of religion, it was a condition of good administration which was inseparable
from religion' 03 . In al-Mawardi's ideal model for close associates of the ruler, most of the
required qualities were related to the quality of competence. The qualities like resolution,
strength, experience, ability to execute, sharpness of mind and judgement were related to
the quality of competence. The stress on the quality of competence was an agreed principle
according to the famous jurists. The Imãin al-Juwayni favoured the installation of a less
preferred (mafc/Ui) ruler if he had the ability to administer the public affairs. He clearly
favoured to a more knowledgeable man who lacked the ability to run the public affairs in an
100 Ibid,
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effective manner)°4 We can also find a parallel to this thought in the writings of Ibn
Taymiyya who went to great lengths to stress the need for these qualities for the ruler. He
considered competence to be just as necessary as honesty. He also thought it necessary for
the ruler to appoint such persons as governors, Wali or Ijakim who were the fittest for the
job. If he managed to do it, i.e, to bring the fittest man to the job, he had then performed his
duty. He pointed to the two aspects of authority, the power and trust.. .every office is
suitable for a man with corresponding abilities. For instance, the man in charge of military
affairs should be brave and well aware of warfare tactics)05
The source of strength is knowledge, justice and ability to enforce the rulings of the
sharf a over which the book of Allah and the Sunna of the Prophet (P.B.U.H) provide
guidance.
The source of trust is fear of Allah. The ruler should not sell the hereafter for this
worldly life. He should disregard popular censure.'°6
Finally al-Mãwardi required the ruler to be highly vigilant and required him to personally
look after public affairs. The ruler was required to be himself, watchful in the execution of
policies and should avoid excessive reliance on the delegation of authority. Although a!-
Mãwardi indicated passion as the worst enemy in execution of the public affairs, he did not
allow that the ruler should involve himself in excessive worship excessively lest it should
detract him from public affairs.'°7
Quoting the verse of the Qur'an in which the Caliph David was ordered to administer
justice al-Mãwardi said that Allah did not merely delegate the khila to David but ordered
him to personally execute the affairs of the Muslims. He evidently meant to show by this
'° al-Juwayni, al-Ghi yãthl, P.47
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example that if the Prophet (P.B.U.H) was not exempted from the execution of these
policies, how much a Muslim ruler would be bound by that obligation.
With reference to this responsibility of the ruler, al-Mãwardi, however, maintained that it
was not the ruler alone who should be responsible for performing his job effectively. Every
man was responsible within his sphere of responsibility and was required to be watchful
over his subjects. al-Mawardi quotes the tradition of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H): "
everyone of you is a shepherd and will be asked about his flock."08
Every subject was considered responsible for the flock under his control. Success of the
system consequently depended upon everybody fulfilling his role in an effective manner. If
the subjects were neglectful of their duties, this was bound to affect the ruler. Explaining the
mutual dependence of the ruler and the subjects, al-Mãwardi considered that the need of the
ruler towards the subjects was never less than was the need of the subject towards the ruler.
Both were like one body. One could not flourish at the expense of the other. If the subjects
perished, the rulers would also perish. And if the people suffered in their wealth and blood it
was ultimately bound to recoil upon the ruler.'°9
If the rulers lost the zeal and passion to reform the corrupt masses, they were virtually
contributing towards their own destruction. al-Mãwardi says in this respect: "the reluctance
of the governor to fulfil his responsibility for bringing about reform despite the corruption
among the masses is like the removal of a head from a body following the destruction of
bodily
Summary & Conclusion
The establishment of the religious obligations, according to aI-Mãwardi, was the most
important responsibility of the ruler. Primarily his office acquired legitimacy upon
'°8lbjd
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complete observance of these obligations. Among the religious obligations, the
establishment of prayer was first and foremost. People were urged to bear with an unjust
ruler as long as he established the prayer. No other single religious act gave the ruler a right
to continue his rule over the Muslim masses, as did the prayer.
The establishment of prayer and the other religious obligations, however, were
considered only as parts of a ruler's overall responsibility with regard to preservation of the
religion. The ruler was also responsible for doing away with innovations. The use of force,
in the process, had to be exercised as a last measure. Prior to the taking of this measure, the
ruler was responsible for reforming the deviants through arguments and persuasion. From
this it necessarily followed that the ruler was not merely confined to the execution of law by
force but he was responsible for the purification of people's thought as well as rectifying
their morals.
Being the main custodian of the law, the ruler was responsible for its proper execution
for settling the disputes among the subjects, providing them with peace and security,
making the routes safe for travelling and performing the Ijajj obligation.
The ruler was also responsible for building up a strong army and managing their affairs in a
proper way so that they should protect both the subjects and the rulers against their enemy.
The proper receipt and payment of Zakift was among the primary responsibilities of the
ruler. For maximum benefits to reach the needy, its proper receipt and just distribution was
necessary.
The choice of competent and honest people for the important official posts was also
considered an important duty of the ruler. The union of virtue and competence in the same
person entitled him to the post for which he was eligible.
"°Ibid.
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Finally vigilance and active supervision of public affairs were required of the ruler for
fulfilment of his responsibilities.
In our study thus far, we have examined that not only did al-Mawardi link the legitimacy
of the ruler to acquisition of authority in a legal manner but also with carrying out a number
of religious, moral, social, and legal responsibilities according to requirements of religion
and justice. In the next chapter we shall examine how did Mãwardi go on to determine the
legitimacy of the 'Abbasid rulers with respect to the fulfillment of the above requirements.
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Chapter Four
Mawardi and the 'Abbasid Authorities:
The Concept of Political Legitimacy
Historical Background
Following the martyrdom of the third RffshidUn Caliph, 'UthmAn, the umma found
itself embroiled, for a considerable period, in a series of civil wars. When the situation
calmed down, it was the Umayyads who ultimately succeeded in establishing
themselves in authority. The futility of frequent revolts against the authorities led jurists
to justify revolutionary means only under favourable conditions when the probability of
the success was high.' The hard-hit descendants of the Hãshimites who had reached
similar conclusions by their own sufferings at Umayyad hands, began to employ secret
but peaceful methods to achieve their objective of acquiring the Caliphate. After initial
disagreement over the transfer of leadership to the 'Abbffsids, the followers of
descendants of the Ban!Hashim ultimately joined hands with the 'Abbäsids in planning
the overthrow of the Umayyads.
After taking the reins of leadership into their hands, the 'Abbasids had to assess the
situation realistically. Although the Uniayyads had firmly established their control over
the masses, the manner in which they exercised their authority had made them
unpopular among the masses. 2 The era of their rule was subsequent to the RärhidUn
'Su1An Khälid Hethlain, IftA' and Res ponse of Prominent Mufts to the Uma yyads and Earl y 'Abbãsid
Unpublished Thesis, University of Birmingham, P.233
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period. Hence people longed for a leadership which could restore a just order in a proper
manner.
The 'Abbãsids judged the whole situation cautiously. They launched the movement
with the main objective of restoring the rights of Ahi Bayt but provided leadership to all
those dissatisfied with Umayyad rule on various grounds. According to Hitti, the
'Abbaisids also provided a platform to all those who were politically, economically, and
socially dissatisfied with Umayyad rule. 3 They acted very cautiously, wisely avoided
any confrontation with the authorities, and kept their activities secret for a considerable
period of time.
With the rapid decline of the Umayyad authorities in post Hishajn era, the 'Abbaisid
movement grew proportionately stronger. They were eventually able to seize authority
from the Umayyads after defeating their last ruler,Marwãn 11, in 750 A.D, near the river
Zab.4
'Abbäcid Da'wa
Already after the fall of KÜf two months before the battle of ZAb, al-S affä1
(d. 1 36/753)had been proclaimed as the Caliph. Soon after his accession to the throne he
delivered the Khulba, outlining the aims, purposes and policies of his government. The
Khufba began thus "Praise be to God," he said, "Who chose and honoured Islam as the
best of His religions ... He made us its shelter, its fortress, its supervisors, its protectors
and defenders... He singled us out to be the blood relations of His Messengers and the
progeny of his forebears... He placed us in an exalted position in Islam and among its
followers, and He revealed a book to the Muslims reminding them of this." At this point
he quoted a number of verses from the Qur' an about the rights of relatives, as if they
Philip. K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, P.282.
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were concerned specifically with the Prophet's relatives. "The blundering Saba 'iya" he
resumed, "claim that there are others who have a better title to leadership, government
and Khilafa. Those disgusting men! How could that be? 0 people, it was through us that
God led the people on the right path after their wandering... God revealed the right path
to Prophet Mubammed (P.B.U.H) as a token of His grace and kindness. When the
Prophet Mu1ammed (P.B.U.H) died, his companions occupied his seat of authority.
With their authority resting on Shiirã (consultation), they took charge of the heritage of
the nations. They acted justly in regard to it, using it in proper ways, bestowing it upon
those who deserved it and keeping themselves clear of it... Then there arose BanU Uarb
and Banü Marwãn. They grabbed that heritage for their own use, claiming it all for
themselves, and they oppressed those entitled to it. God gave them a long rope until
they angered Him. And when they did so, he avenged Himself on them through us. He
restored to us what was ours by right and led the community back to the right path
through us. He helped us to win the victory and assume authority so that we may
'succour those who have been weakened in the land.' He made us the end as we had
been the beginning... Kilfans, you harbour love and friendship for us. You never
changed in this respect. The persecution of tyrants never made you waver. Our time has
come and God has brought you our rule. With us you are the most favored people. I
hereby increase your stipend by one hundred Dirhams ... but beware that I am al-Saff1
(the shedder of blood) and the destroying avenger."5
From this point onward DAwüd b. 'All continued this Khufba thus: "0 people," said
DAwüd, "by God, we are not seeking this authority in order to gain more silver and
gold... but because of our anger at the usurpation of our rights, our zeal for our cousins
and our concern for your welfare ... The Almighty and Blessed lord, His Messenger and
Mubanm-ied Had! Uussein and Abdul Uamid kamáll, The Nature of Islamic State, PP.59-61.
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al-'Abbãs are your guarantee that we shall govern you in accordance with what Allah
has revealed, administer your affairs in accordance with the book of Allah, and lead you
in accordance with the practices and the ways of the Prophet of Allah. May the Banu
Ilarb, the Banu-Ummayad and the Banü MarwAn perish. They preferred the life of this
world to the eternal one... they practiced inequity, they oppressed the people, they
violated the women, they spread crime and were unjust in their dealings with the people
throughout the land. 'The wrath of Lord came down upon them while they slept' ... 0
KUfans, by Allah, we were persecuted and deprived of our right until Allah helped us
through our party, the people of Khurasaiz. Allah has shown you through them what you
have been longing to see. He has produced in your midst a Khalfa from among the
descendants of Hãshim. Receive with thanks what Allah has granted you: obey us; do
not deceive yourselves; for the authority we wield is yours. Since each dynasty has a
capital of its own, your city is our capital."6
Analysis of Da'wa
The very first claim of the 'Abbäsids regarding the legitimacy of their rule was that
they were the direct choice of Allah or as Binder has interpreted it that Divine
providence had elevated them to this status. 7 The Caliph Manur is also reported to have
claimed during his reign that he was a Divine representative on the earth.8
Such a claim made within an Islamic context raises a number of grave questions. To
begin with, if the rise of the 'Abbffsids, to power was the manifestation of the Divine
will, the means to acquire this power could not have been so worldly oriented. A
revolution, which they identified as having been achieved with Divine assistance,
6 Muliammed Had! Ilussein and Abdul klamid Kamãl!, The Nature of the Islamic State, PP.59-61.
7Leonard Binder, "Ghazali's theory of the Caliphate"; M.M.Sharif, History of Muslim Philosophy, vol.!,
PP. 776-777.
llasan Ibrahim Ijasan, Musalmanon KA Nazm Mamlekat, P.63.
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should have been by and large beyond any moral reproach through all the phases of its
development. But by their acts and policies the 'Abbasids proved that they stood in
glaring contrast to what they actually claimed. The letters of al-Saffä1's father to AbU
Muslim (d.137/754) to put to death every Arabic-speaking person in Khurasffn,9 Abü-
Muslim's atrocities against the masses, 1 ° and the 'Abbasid's exhuming of dead bodies of
the Umayyads and subjecting them to cruel treatment" reflected the fact that they fell
short of even the minimum requirements of justice. The fact that the 'Abbasids
committed such immoral acts and still continued to claim themselves as the fortress and
shelter of Islam' 2 indicates that such claims were not as much their religious convictions
as their attempt to realize their political motives in religious guise.
Mãwardi's account of the RashidUn period reveals that none of the Caliphs in the
same period attributed his accession to the rule as a consequence of direct Divine
involvement. Whether through nomination or election, their appointment came through
human agency duly endorsed by the people through an oath of allegiance.' 3 As Caliphs
they were still human beings accountable for their policies and actions both before the
people and Allah. The sense of their increased responsibility prevented them from
making any special claims but rather led them to self-denial. AbU Bakr in his first
inaugural address to the people ruled out any possibility of Divine connection and asked
the people to put him right if they found him going astray. 14 Basing their rule on the
Sh iira system, not only did they tolerate criticism but encouraged it. The claims of the
'Abbffsids regarding the Divine origin of their authority are consequently unsupported in
al-Mãwardj's account of Islamic politics. However, the office of the Caliphate was
Ibn Kathir, aI-BidAya, vol. 10, P.33.
'° Ibid, PP.56-57.
"Ibid, P.38.
12 See the Da'wa text at the begging of this chapter.
' al-Mawardl, AS., P.12.
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maintained to be a freely contracted office, which depended on the free will of those
who contracted it. Of course bringing it into existence was incumbent on the Muslims
according to the mutual consultation of the believers. But it was not stated in any text of
the Qur'an or the Uadith (na) that the office belonged to a particular family and that it
should be maintained through nay as the 'Abbffsids claimed.
Prior to the advent of their rule, the restoration of the rights of the Ahi Bayt had
supplied the strong basis for the ideology of revolution. Now their own elevation to the
throne, and not that of their 'Alit cousins, meant that such restoration had been
achieved. But the slogan continued to serve as the means to fortify their claims to the
leadership on a permanent basis. Declaring themselves to be the closest in relation to the
Holy Prophet ( P.B.U.H), they thought the right of the Caliphate should revert to them
for ever. They shared the viewpoint of their 'Alit cousins that the Caliphate must belong
to the kinsmen of the Prophet (P.B.U..H) but maintained that their ancestor 'Abbãs was
closer in relationship to the Prophet (P.B.U.H) than anyone else.' 5 Hence they
considered themselves the most legitimate claimants of the Caliphate due to their being
the descendants of 'Abbãs. Thus, from the concept of confining the Caliphate to the
Quraysh, the 'Abbffsids moved further to confine it to themselves alone until they would
pass it on to the MandL'6
al-Mãwardi's concept of office of the Caliphate negates all such notions.
Relationship to the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) does not qualify any person to lay claim to
the Caliphate on that basis. Three reasons taken from al-Mawardi's account suffice to
prove the above argument:
14 IIasan Ibrahim Uasan, Tãrikh, vol. 1, P.64.
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kãmil, vol. 5, P.199, Mani1r, in his letter to Nafs Zakiyya, gave a number of
arguments to validate this point.
16 See the Da'wa text at the beginning of this chapter.
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1. al-Mäwardi does not mention the relationship to the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) as a pre-
requisite for a claim to the office of the Caliphate. The Caliph needs to be from the
Quraysh but not necessarily from the family of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H).'7 Nor did
'Abbasid ancestor, al-'Abbäs consider himself as a worthy candidate for the office. The
only sect to believe this claim was Rãwandiyya who, according to Imifin al-Ash'arl,
believed in the legitimacy of the Prophet's uncle al-'Abbas through na.18
2. al-'Abbãs, the Prophet's uncle was never thought of as a serious candidate for the
Caliphate throughout the RäshidUn period.
3. 'All b. Abi rfãlib did not claim the Caliphate for himself but recognized the first three
Caliphs as legitimate.
The above arguments are supported through the following text of Mãwardl. In the
words of the text as quoted in the al-Abkãm: " 'Umar, may Allah be pleased with him,
entrusted the matter of the Imnate to a council, consisting of the most prominent
members of the community, and this was then accepted by the community which was
convinced of the validity of this way of contracting the Imifinate and of the fact that the
rest of the Companions had been excluded from it. 'All replied to al-'Abbãs, may Allah
be pleased with them both, after the latter criticized him for participating in the council:
"it is a big and important issue in Islamic affairs of Islam and I did not think I should be
excluded from it." Thus the contract of the Imarnate was fulfilled by a consensus
agreement."9
In order to fortify their claims to the Caliphate, the 'Abbasids quoted a number of
revelations from the Qur'an and specified their application to the Prophet's (P.B.U.H)
al-Mãwardi, A.S., P.12.
18 Imãm al-Ash 'an, Magalät Tslämi yy!n, vol. 2, P.135.
' al-Mãwardl,	 P.18.
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relatives, to which they thought of themselves as most uniquely entitled to lay claims.
The Umayyads were severely criticized for the omission of this acknowledgement.2°
Interpreting the same verses in his exegeses, al-Mawardi does not adhere to the same
viewpoint. For instance, interpreting the verse: "Allah's wish is but to remove far from
you the uncleanness, 0 folk of the household, and cleanse you with a thorough
cleansing."2 ' Along with other interpretations al-Mãwardi quotes the interpretation by
Ibn al-'Abbãs, that the Ahi al-Bayt in this verse refers to all the wives of the Prophet
(P.B.U.H) and the application is restricted to them alone.22
The second revelation quoted to justify their rule refers to the following verse of the
Qur'ãn: "Say (0 Muhammed, unto mankind): I ask of you no reward therefore, except
loving kindness among kinsfolk."
al-Mãwardi quotes five interpretations, none of which alludes to the establishment of
the 'Abbãsid claim to the Caliphate.
First of all, al-Mawardli quotes Ibn al-'Abbãs along with other narrators thus: " its
meanings are that you should not hurt me because of my relationship with you, this
exclusively refers to the entire body of the Quraysh because there was none among
them except that there existed a relationship between him and the Holy Prophet(
P.B.U.H.).
The second interpretation is that of 'All b. Husayn along with others in this way: "it
means that you should fulfill your obligation of relationship with me."
According to the third interpretation, which is from Ibn Zayd: " it means that you
should love and support me in the same way as you love and support your own
relatives."
20 See the Da'wä Text at the begging of the this chapter.
21 
a1-Qur'n, 33-33.
22 
aI-Mãwardl, Tafsb, 33-33
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The forth interpretation puts emphasis on: " cherishing love with Allah and seeking
nearness towards him through obedience and right actions." Uasãn and Qatada reported
this interpretation.
According to the fifth and the last interpretation: "it means that you should love your
relatives and promote relationship with them.23
But the 'Abbãsids to serve their political objectives, attempted to strengthen the
validity of their claims in the light of interpretations of the Qur'ffnic revelations. In the
course of bringing change to society, they referred to the Holy Prophet ( P.B.U.H) as
their predecessor for which they claimed full credit. The authority was then transferred
from the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) to the rightly guided Caliphs who were sincere in
making right use of it and they passed it on to their deserving successor. 24 It is here that
contradiction within their Da 'wa become obvious. If the Caliphate was a succession to
the Prophethood through his progeny, how could the assumption of the authority by the
Rash idUn be justified? If their assumption of the authority were legitimate as accepted
by the 'Abbãsids, their own claims to the authority on the basis of relationship to the
Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) would lose all significance.
The political character of their tactics is obvious. In order to appease all sections of
society; they managed to accommodate contradictory claims within their Da 'wa. In
order to consolidate their rule it was necessary to satisfy the masses on religious
grounds more than ruling them on the basis of force. Some sections from the people of
Khurasãz believed in the Divine right of the kings and accorded a special status to the
progeny of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.).25 Hence the 'Abbãsids thought it expedient to
base their claims on both elements. However, in order to satisfy a large section of
23 Ibid.
24 See the Da'wa Text.
25 Uasan Ibrahim Uasan, Tärikh al-Islam, vol. 2, P.18.
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society who believed in the traditional Sunnitheory of the Caliphate, it was necessary to
indicate their commitment towards the theory acceptable to the jurists under whose
influence most of the Suunipopulation fell. In fact, to go ahead with a political strategy
which could secure the obedience of the bulk of the masses on religious grounds led
them to base their claims on different grounds.
After the consolidation of their rule throughout the empire, it was obvious that they
did not differ much from their Umayyad predecessors. In their Da 'Wa they had
promised to return to the practices of the Rashidiin period but in fact perpetuated the
evil characteristics of the Umayyad period. The ShUrãcontinued to remain suspended as
before. In matters concerning the public treasury they did not accept the restrictions of
Shari' a: to treat it strictly as a public trust but the ruler often spent the wealth according
to his discretion.26
The 'Abbffsids claimed authority on the basis of lineage to the Holy Prophet
(P.B.U.H), while at the same time they thoroughly praised the practices of the Rashidiin
period. In actual practice they reverted to the traditional Sunni theory of the Caliphate
(i.e, ahi sunna wa al-Jama'a) to which most of the Sunni 'ulama' adhered. Sourdel says
that about this time three different claims to authority existed throughout the Muslim
world. The first of these three regarded 'All as a legitimate Caliph or Imain both on
account of his kinship with the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) and his early conversion to
Islam. His descendants were to inherit the Caliphate from him. According to this
viewpoint the Caliphate was thus limited to the one family.27
26 al-Mawdüdl, KhilAfat wa MulUki yyat, P.195.
27 Sourdel, Medieval Islam, P. 107
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Opposed to them were the Khãrjites who believed that this right should revert to the
best person of the community regardless of his status or tribe. He is worthy of
deposition if he is found wanting in observance of religious law.28
The 'Abbãsid Caliph held a middle position between these two extremes. The ruler,
according to the 'Abbaids, was to be chosen from the community, who undertook to
lead the community according to religious law without fear of ever being deposed.29
The contrast with the promised return to the RashidUn Caliphate quickly became
obvious. Having established themselves in authority, they had the opportunity to
establish a system based on consultation, free choice of the Caliph, and recognizing
every man's right to free criticism. But they were determined to continue the same
autocratic rule as that of the Umayyads. However, since the revolution was achieved in
the name of Islam, as champions of the faith and religion they claimed to replace the
'secular' Umayyads, they had to impress upon the people the religious character of their
regime. They put on a cloak, which was claimed to have been worn by the Holy Prophet
(P.B.U.H). They also kept the sceptre and bonnet as sacred relics, which gave their rule
legitimacy.3°
In observance of religious obligations they surpassed their Umayyad counterparts.
But at the same time they also continued and in some respects surpassed the royal
practices of the Umayyads.3'
The 'Abbäsids combined in their character some contradictory qualities and
characteristics. They ruled despotically and resorted to repressive measures. But
sometimes they were overcome by religious sentiments and forgave their adversaries.32
28 Ibid. P.108
29 Ibid.
° Shawkat 'All, Masters of Muslim Thoug, vol. 1, P.14.
u Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. 2, P.60.
32 Naeem Siddiqul. Ma'rka Din wa Siyasat, P.41.
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They patronized the 'ulamã' and were surrounded by them; but they also encouraged
sports and music as regular parts of the court life. 33 In their zeal to enforce Islamic
injunctions, they took steps to make Islam prevail, but to please all the people of the
society they allowed some concessions inconsistent with the principles of Islam.
Long experience and involvement in the affairs of the empire had afforded them a
keen insight into the politics of their time. In the period immediately following the
assumption of authority they were engaged in quelling revolts, which had occurred in
the name of religion, to which they were indebted for their own rise to power. At the
outset of their rule they promised to bring reform through restoration of a right and a
just order34 which they were now bound to carry out.
The Attitude of the Leading Jurists towards 'Abbaid Rule
The 'Abbasids, therefore, had to pursue a religious policy and get the support of the
'ulamã' to facilitate their task. The famous 'ulama' of the time had a mixed response
towards the regime. One of the most famous of the 'ulamã' of the period was Imãm Abü
lianifa (d. 150/767). Being averse to the policies of the late Umayyads, he justified the
rebellion of Imain Zayd (d. 122/740)) against the Umayyads and persuaded people to
join the revolt. He gave afatwato the effect that those joining Zayd's forces were like
those who went to the battle of Badr in the company of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.).35
With the transfer of authority to the 'Abbãsids, Abü Uanifa first gave allegiance and
extended his support towards them. With the passage of time, as it became clear to the
Imain that the 'Abbffsids were just as wanting in fulfillment of their responsibilities as
the Umayyads, he began to criticize them but did not break his oath of allegiance with
Ibid.
D.B.McDonald, Development of Muslim Theolo gy, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory , P.93.
MawlänA Manäzir AIsan Geelanl, 1-ladarat Imam Abu- Hanifa K! Si yãsi Zindagy, P.151.
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them. 36 The Caliph ManUr (d.158/774) was keen to seek his co-operation and offered
him a judicial post but the Imain Abu Ijanifa refused to co-operate with the authorities.
He also supported the revolt of Nafs aI-Zakiyya (d. 145/762) against Manür. After some
time, ManUr again offered him the post and the Imifin 's constant refusal to accept the
offer resulted in constant persecution of the latter at the hands of Manur.37
Imifin Mãlik's (d. 179/795) attitude towards both the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids
had been neutral during the progress of the revolution. 38 When his disciples asked him
regarding participation in the revolution in favour of the 'Abbffsids he remarked, "let
Allah take revenge on an oppressor by means of another oppressor and take revenge on
both of them."39
But once the 'Abbãsids were established in authority, Imãin Malik not only accepted
the regime as legitimate but also went on to co-operate with the authorities. According
to Imn Mãlik:" the 'Abbãsid policies might not be in conformity with the Shar! a
standards, yet the revolt could not be justified because it would lead towards further
deterioration. He sanctioned to cultivate relations with the authorities but only with the
intention of advising them to enjoin the good and forbid the evil. He himself lived up to
the standards of his teachings and when reprimanded by someone for his frequent visits
to the authorities, he remarked: "if I do not visit them, whom would they listen to for
advice."40
Irnim al-Shäfi'i (d.205/820) explained the purposes of the Imifinate in the following
words: " under the shadow of the Imänate the believer takes rest and the non-believer
also lives peacefully. Under the leadership of Imnate, war is waged, peace is
36 S.K.HethlainjftA' and Response, PP.295-296.
Manzir AIsan Ceelani, Haçlarat Imäm Abil Hanifa id Siyasl Zindagy, PP.460-466.
38 S.K.Hethlain, Ifta' and Response, P.306
AbU Zahra, irnm Mãlik, P.54.
40 S.K.Hithlain, Ift and Res ponse, P307-308; al-Qacli 'Iyãc, Tartib al-Madärik, vol. i, P. 207.
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established, and routes are safeguarded. It is the Imãnate which restores the right of the
oppressed from the oppressor until the pious men are pleased and feel secure from the
wicked ones."41
So keenly was the Imffin al-Shafi'i conscious of the need of its establishment that he
agreed to the legitimacy of any Caliphate even without bay'a under unfavourable
conditions. But instead of confining the Caliphate to BanUHashim, he regarded it to be
the privilege of the entire body of the Quraysh.42 With such views and ideas about the
necessity of the Caliphate, the 'Abbasid Caliphate naturally met the standards of Imain
al-Shaf'i. As wielders of authority they were recognized as legitimate because they
agreed to remain active in the service of religion and despite their shortcomings they
were able to enforce Islamic practices to a considerable extent.
aI-Mawardi and the Legitimacy of 'Abbid Rule
From the above study it is clear that contemporary jurists, in recognition of the
powerful status of the 'Abbasids, maintained their rule as legitimate although they were
considered guilty of many violations of the shar!a rulings. Since the 'Abbasids agreed
to carry out the right order, their rule was tolerated despite their acquisition of authority
in an unconstitutional manner. al-Mawardi followed the jurists of the traditional Sunni
theory but dealt with the problems of authority more thoroughly and systematically than
his predecessors. The status of the 'Abbasids can be determined precisely in the light of
those principles. What place did they occupy in al-Mãwardi's account of Islamic
politics?
Abfi ZahrL ImAm aI-ShAfi'I, P.121.
42Ibid.
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As mentioned earlier, al-Mãwardi legitimized the rule of the less preferred person.43
He could not, therefore, justify the 'Abbasid rebellion against the Umayyad authorities
on the basis that this right should revert to the best man from the family of the Prophet
(P.B.U.H).
The 'Abbffsids revived their claims to the Caliphate on the basis of their close
relationship with the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H). According to al-Mäwardi's viewpoint,
they could not be legitimate successors to the Prophet (P.B.U.H) in the matter of
authority since on the basis of this relationship they did not deserve the office more than
any other member of the Qurayshite origin. In fact, seeing no hope for their desired
goals within the framework of the traditional Sunni theory, they embarked upon
revolutionary means to seize authority from the Umayyads.
The Kharjites who demanded strict obedience to the law maintained that any
departure from the fundamental obligation would place a believer out of the community
and turn him an apostate. The principle equally applied to the Caliph who was required
to submit to the judgement of the community, which could designate or depose the
Ca1iph. The legitimacy of the 'Abbffsids was thus challenged by them on the ground
that they were not the best persons to uphold the sharf a Moreover, they were
considered as worthy of deposition under the accusation of the breach of religious law.45
Notwithstanding these strong reasons against the legitimacy of the 'Abbffsid rule, al-
Mãwardi maintained their rule as legitimate. Although they relied upon repressive
policies and unfair means both for the success of the revolution and consolidation of
their rule, they were now the holders of authority, which was necessary for the required
accountability for the above violations. At the same time the organization of public
al-MAwardi, A.S., P.15.
Sourdel, Medieval Islam, P.109.
Ibid, P. 108.
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affairs as well as the upholding of the right and just order could not be held in
suspension46
 for which people could only look towards them as the representative of
authority. Hence the breach of constitutional principles by the 'Abbasids could be
tolerated and they could be recognized as legitimate if they submitted to the legal
requirements of accession to authority and carried out a number of religious and
administrative responsibilities.
But the objection remains that the 'Abbffsid claims to the authority through the
lineage of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) was altogether inconsistent with the viewpoint of
al-Mãwardi who strongly adhered to the traditional Sunnitheory. How then could their
acquisition of authority be legitimately recognized or how could they further hold it on
legitimate grounds?
In fact, their manifesto, claiming authority on the basis of the lineage to the Prophet
(P.B.U.H), was more a political ploy than a code of sacred religious beliefs for them. It
contained some mutually contradictory provisions on which the 'Abbãsids relied to
entice the maximum popular support. According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam: " the
legitimism of the 'Abbãsids thus depended on various arguments, whose vogue changed
with the times, arguments which were sometimes radically opposed to those upon which
the Umayyad legitimism had been based and which sometimes approximated to
them."47 This did not escape the attention of the jurists. The 'Abbãsids were, therefore,
judged by their actions rather than by some contents and provisions of Da 'Wa.
In actual practice the 'Abbasids were considered legitimate due to reverting to the
traditional Sunni theory. In discussing the three schools regarding the legitimacy of
authority about this time, Sourdel put them into the category of those adhering to the
46 
al-MAwardi, A.S., PP.53-54.
.Sourdel, art. "Khalifa" Encyclopaedia, vol. IV, P.939.
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traditional Sunni thought. As opposed to their claim to the Caliphate through Divine
right they actually adhered to the Umayyad viewpoint, acceptable to the contemporary
'ulamI', and perpetuated it. th the words of Sourdel: "in any case, the concept of power
held by the Umayyads was defended anew by the 'Abbasids who acceded to the
Caliphate in 750, and was justified chiefly in the course of the ninth century by the
Ianblite doctors ,,48
The 'Abbasids did not consider their appointment through Divine agency as having
exempted them either from popular consensus or from the oath of allegiance to the
people of power and influence. As Sourdel puts it: " taking the oath was always
necessary before a caliph could effectively ascend the throne. In this way of proceeding,
the approval of the community was reconciled with the maintenance of power by a
single dynasty, and the foundation of sovereignty remained the contract agreed at the
taking the oath or bay 'a between each new sovereign and his subjects; this created
obligations on both sides which it was in principle impossible to break. . .
In executing the requirements of Islamic law, they did not assign to themselves any
special role for interpreting the law as Divine agents. It was the religiously learned who
were allowed to play a pivotal role in its codification.
Since the 'Abbãsids agreed to establish a system based on religion and justice in a
traditional Sunni way, they were recognized as the legitimate rulers of Islamic lands.
That this system was in fact carried out was to be confirmed through the regulation of
certain Islamic practices on their part at the collective level. al-Mãwardi dealt with those
fundamental responsibilities of the ruler at length and divided them into a wide range of
religious, legal, political, and moral responsibilities, which will now be described to see
48 Sourdel, Medieval Islam, P. 110.
Ibid, P.113.
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how closely the 'Abbffsids adhered to them. Did they deserve the legitimacy they
acquired, through fulfillment of those responsibilities?
The Establishment of Religious Obligations
Prayer
The most important obligation after faith, says al-Mãwardi, is the establishment of
worship related to the body, i.e., prayer and fasting. Prayer takes precedence because it
is the comparatively easier of the two. It consists of both fear and love towards Allah
and is an important means to establish a bond between man and Allah.5°
Such emphasis regarding the prayer was both on an individual and a collective level.
Its establishment at the collective level was considered to be the responsibility of the
government. This viewpoint was based on the text of the Qur'an. According to the text:
those who, if we give them power in the land, establish worship and pay the poor
due..."5'
And through the text of a Iladfth the believers were clearly advised to avoid
confrontation with their rulers as long as they were active in establishment of this
obligation.52
The Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H), when appointing governors to the different areas,
assigned to them the leading of prayers as one of their primary responsibilities. The
precedent was fully established during the Rashidiin period and subsequently
acknowledged by both the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids.
During the Umayyad period when the rule of the best man (afQTal) no longer
prevailed, the ruler was still required to lead the prayer in order to demonstrate the unity
50 al-MAwardi, Adab, P.96.
51 
al-Our'An, 17-4 1.
52 
"Kitãb al-Imära", Sabib Muslim.
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of the religious and political functions. As a governor of Medina, Marwän (d.65/684)
used to lead the prayer and the famous Companions used to pray behind him. 53 People
were averse to his rule and tolerated it reluctantly but were reconciled with the exercise
of the religious functions as a ruler. This remained the typical mode of behaviour of the
Companions and their followers during the Umayyad period.
Hence al-Mãwardi, in the context of explaining various religious responsibilities of
the ruler, devoted a special chapter to the establishment of this obligation. Its
administration was solely the responsibility of the authorities. al-Mãwardi pointed out
the difference between the official and private mosques. He also considered the
officially appointed Imain as acceptable one even if he possessed fewer qualifications.54
In addition to putting emphasis on the need for sound administration on the part of
the rulers if the inhabitants of a country were caught up in calamities, he also required
them to lead the special prayers on such occasions. These prayers include Kasiif (solar
eclipse), KhasUf (lunar eclipse) prayers, and Istisqa (rain) prayer.55
The importance which the 'Abbasids attached to this obligation can be assessed by
an event during the reign of the Caliph Härün al-Rashid. Irnifin Abu YUsuf (d. 181/797)
convened a court session in which he declared that the testimony of the Caliph's
minister could not be accepted. Following the complaint by the minister, Hãrun asked
Abu Yüsuf as to why his testimony could not be accepted. Qaçfi Abu Yüsuf told the
Caliph that he had heard him saying: "I am the slave of the Caliph. Moreover he does
not perform the congregational prayer." Listening to this Hãrun kept quite. Afterwards,
Abfl al-KalAm, Masla Khiläfat,P.95.
aI-Mawardl, A.S., P.150.
Ibid.
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the same minister had a mosque built within the premises of his residence and began to
offer the congregational prayers.56
Zakat
Iii fulfillment of this important obligation, al-Mãwardi saw 'a sympathy toward the
poor, co-operation with needy persons, containment of mutual hatred, prevention of the
severing of relations and persuasion to cultivate relations..
al-Mãwardi attributes the widening gap between the rich and the poor to the lack of
the observance of this obligation. al-Mäwardi says: "when hope fades and need grows
intense, hatred takes place and envy intensifies, and leads towards the isolation of the
poor from the rich until it leads towards severe competition for grabbing wealth by
both. The payment of Zakai is an exercise for one to attain generosity. ,,58
From the above text it is clear that the payment of the Zakat aims to guarantee the
well being of the whole society, with everybody sharing its benefits. It was, therefore,
from the very start a collective obligation. According to al-Mãwardi, it was made
compulsory for the companions at the time when its establishment was possible at a
collective level.59
Accordingly, we see in the al-Abkãm, al-Mãwardi fully explained the
responsibilities of both the authorities and the subjects regarding the fulfillment of this
obligation. He assigned the responsibility to the government, to administer this affair
through appointed designates.
He preferred its distribution through the representatives of the government. Here he
took into consideration the opinions of two schools; one of them considered it
56 Naeem Siddiqui, Ma'rka Din Wa Si yãsat, P.115.
aI-Mãwardi, Adab, P.98.
58 Ibid.
aI-Mawardi, A'lärn, P.287.
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obligatory to pay it only to a man appointed by the government, individual payment
being disallowed. The second school, however, allowed the individual payment. 6° al-
Mãwardi gave latitude to both schools but fully authorized the ruler to make sure that
everybody responsible for the payment fulfilled the obligation. He also made it
obligatory on the part of the ruler to fight those who were guilty of omission just as the
Caliph Abü-Bakr fought those who refused to pay Zakift. Deliberate non-payment of
Zakã.t was considered tantamount to rebellion.6'
zjj
Similarly, great stress was laid on governmental responsibility for facilitating the
performance of ifajj. One of the primary responsibilities of the Caliph was to keep the
routes safe for those travelling throughout Muslim lands. 62 This responsibility was more
important in the case of the Ijajj routes because in the eyes of people the authorities
were responsible for the safety of IjaJj routes and the people could perform this
obligation only if the authorities undertook to fulfill this responsibility properly. As a
result it was generally assumed that the government which failed to keep the routes safe,
neglected one of its basic responsibilities. The 'Abbffsids showed keen interest in
patronizing this obligation so as to confirm their position as the legitimate claimants of
authority. During the early 'Abbasid regime the founding fathers of the dynasty mostly
led the IjaJj expeditions. The Caliph ManUr led the expedition shortly before his
death.63 During the late 'Abbffsid period when the authorities did not pay proper
attention to this responsibility, people severely criticized them on account of their
neglect of this fundamental responsibility. For this omission, many chronicles noted
60 
aI-Mäwardl,	 P.168.
61 Ibid, P.168.
62 Ibid, P.28.
63 Ibn al-Athir, al-KAmil, vol.6, P.2 1; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaa, vol. 10, P.103.
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with special concern, in the context of the events of the late 'Abbãcid era, the inability
of the authorities to make the IjaJj arrangements.64
However, al-Mãwardi made a distinction between the responsibilities of the rulers
with regard to the establishment of this obligation and the establishment of other
obligations like prayer and Zakat. In the case of the establishment of the first two
obligations the authorities were duty bound to take action if a subject was found guilty
of omission. But if someone deliberately neglected the Ijajj obligation, the authorities
could not force him to perform it. The only thing the authorities were entitled to do was
to forcibly take money from his belongings after his death and make someone perform
this obligation on his behalf.65
Fasting
Fasting is one of the five pillars of Islam. The person observing the fast has to
abstain from satisfying most of his bodily requirements from early morning until sunset.
It is a form of personal worship for every person but all the Muslims have to share this
devotional religious exercise in the same month and are made responsible to keep the
uniformity of the time and the rules.
al-Mãwardi did not make the authorities responsible for forcing people to carry out
this obligation in the same way in which they could force them with regard to the
establishment of prayer and Zakat. The authorities were only entitled to appoint the
officials to prevent an open violation of the sanctity of the month, because Muslims
were strictly forbidden to probe into the affairs of the other person. If a person was not
found guilty of open violation, the official could not inquire into his private life and the
person was to be trusted for what he claimed. In the case of open violation, however, the
Ibn al-Athir and Ibn Kathir have mentioned this omission on the part of authorities under the events of
years of forth and fifth century AH.
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authorities could punish him in order to preserve the sanctity of the atmosphere. Or if a
person did not fast without any excuse and made it publicly known without hesitation,
he was to be punished for this omission 66 until he repented as this jeopardized the
sanctity of the religious commandments.
Enforcement of Islamic Law
Islamic law stretches beyond the mere settlement of mutual disputes. It covers all
aspects of human life. Instead of leaving the religious and moral issues to an
individual's discretion, it brings them within a collective context. Similarly it deals with
the laws of war. It also covers the economic aspects of life. Family laws like marriage,67
divorce68 and inheritance69 are also dealt with at great length. Above all, it also claims
to contribute to the moral development of man and society by supplying details about
religious aspects of life like prayer 70, Zakift, Iajj71 , and fasting.72
The Prophet (P.B.U.H) organized the affairs of the Muslim community according to
the Divine commandments. His practices were based on the revelations of the Qur'ãn. A
Muslim ruler, installed to inherit the functions of the Prophet (P.B.U.H), had
consequently to depend for his legitimacy upon the continued enforcement of these
commandments. No ruler who failed to carry out this responsibility in a proper manner
could, therefore be recognized as a legitimate ruler of a Muslim community. The
Qur'Anic injunctions clearly support this viewpoint. According to a verse of the Qur'äi-i;
"whoso judgeth not by which Allah hath revealed: such are disbelievers (KffflrUn)." 73 In
65 aI-Mäwardl, A.S., P.3 14.
Ibid.
67 
a1-Our'n, 4-3.
68 aI-Qur'An, 2-229.
69 
aI-Our'n, 4:11.
70 aI-Qur'An, 4:102.
" aI-Our'An, 4:97.
72 i:Q!it:in , 2:185.
ai-Qufn, 5:44.
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two other verses in the same context such rulers are mentioned as unjust (?alimiin) and
evil-livers (faiq Un).74
Interpreting these verses, al-Mãwardi, on the authority of Ibn al-'Abbãs, divided
such rulers into two categories: (1) those who neither acknowledged the importance of
such revelations nor enforced them. They were declared as non-Muslims. (2) Those who
acknowledged their importance but did not enforce them. They were called the unjust
(zâlimEin) and evil-livers faiq Un).75
The legitimacy of the ruler was thus closely linked to the enforcement and
continuation of these laws. The importance attached to this responsibility explains why
the Companions and the jurists tolerated the early Umayyads in recognition of their
carrying out the Islamic commandments at the public level. This view remained
prevalent throughout the course of Islamic history: all the jurists adhered to the
viewpoint. The legitimacy of the ruler ultimately depended on his commitment to
enforce Islamic commandments at a collective level.
The four Imains of the Sunni schools of jurisprudence, despite their critical attitude
towards the 'Abbasid authorities did not break their oath of allegiance because they
recognized the necessity of political organization for the enforcement of Islamic law.
All the succeeding jurists conformed to their viewpoint. To give a few examples, al-
Baghdadi, (d.429/1037) a famous ShI'fjurist and a contemporary of al-Mãwardi, was
of the opinion that the ruler owed his legitimate existence to the continued enforcement
of the Divine commandments. The ruler ensures internal security, provides defence
against external aggression and ensures the well being of the destitute. 76 al-Mãwardi
maintained that government operated and existed not only in succession to the
aI-Qur'An, 5:45-47.
al-Mawardi, Tafsir, 5:44.
76 
al-Baghdad!, Usfil al-Din, P.271.
152
Prophethood to deal with the affairs related to the hereafter, but also as an institution for
the management of the affairs of this world through the enforcement of religious
commandments.77
al-Qurçubi alluded to the unanimous agreement of the Companions on the
appointment of the ruler immediately after the Prophet (P.B.U.H) passed away. al-
Qurtubi justified their decision by the argument that the Companions considered the
continuation of Divine commandments as their foremost duty. He pointed out that
although the issue of the best candidate was the subject of dispute for a while, the
appointment of the ruler itself did not become a controversial issue.78
In the post-Rash idiin period when the elective character of the Caliphate underwent a
considerable deterioration, the attention of the jurists was consequently shifted to the
acts and the policies of the ruler. The 'Abbasids, along with relying on other factors for
the success of their revolutionary movement, highlighted the Umayyad shortcomings
with respect to their failure for carrying out their functions properly. After the
assumption of authority they reiterated the need to fulfill responsibilities through their
commitment in the Da 'wa.79 To strengthen and consolidate their rule they pursued a
religious policy throughout the empire to provide an ideological legitimization to their
rule.8° It is important to note that the 'A lids8' and the Khãrjites rose in rebellion against
the 'Abbãsids and justified their uprisings on account of the failure on the part of the
'Abbasids to adhere to the Islamic principles properly.
" al-MAwardi, A.S., P.10.
78 al-Qurpibl, al-Jämi', 2-30.
See the text of the Da 'wa at the beginning of this chapter.
80 Hanna Mikhail, Politics and Revelation, P.16.
81 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil vol. 5, PP. 202-204, When Manflr's commander 'Isa, laid siege on the city of
Medina and offered Nafs Zakiyya (The 'A lii leader) amnesty if he surrendered, the latter turned down his
offer. He reiterated his viewpoint that he called him to act upon the teachings of the Qur'an and the
sunnah of the Prophet (P.B.U.H).
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Unlike the Uinayyads, the 'Abbasids did not concentrate upon the expansion of the
empire, but instead focussed their attention upon the promotion of the various branches
of learning and knowledge. As they impressed upon the minds of their subjects the
religious character of their rule, they took a keen interest in patronizing the religious
sciences and gave the religious scholars an important place in their court. Their era was
considered very important in the development of the religious sciences. The work of
codification was started and completed under the supervision of the religious scholars in
this period.
al-Mãwardi, concerned with proposing the fiqh solutions to contemporary issues,
held the ruler responsible for their enforcement. The composition of the al-Ahkäm was
primarily an effort in the same direction. al-Mãwardi wrote this book to assist the ruler
in the management of different religious, legislative, administrative, and political affairs
according to Divine law.82
Existence of a Strong Judiciary
al-Mãwardi's concern to keep the judiciary independent of the executive control is
vividly illustrated in his description of the qualifications of the QffçIL Apart from his
being a Muslim, male, freeman, and of perfect health, he is required above all to possess
the soundness of character and legal competence. With reference to the sound character
al-Mãwardi says: " he must be of just character, a quality requisite in all kinds of
authority. Justice consists in being true in speech, manifest in his fulfillment of a trust,
free of all forbidden acts, careful to guard himself against wrong actions, free of all
doubt, equitable both when content and when angry, chivalrous and vigorous both in his
deen and his worldly affairs."83
82 aI-Mawardi, A.S., PP.7-8.
83 Ibid, P.99
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Such qualities obviously require men of strong character who should neither
succumb to the pressure of the authorities nor submit to the influence of the wealthy
class, thereby keeping the judiciary independent of external control. Recruitment of
such people was meant to give the judiciary an independent status enabling the judges to
protect the subjects against the arbitrary and unjust official control.
al-Mawardi, therefore, in the context of describing justice as a broad principle of
society, attached foremost importance to the justice administered by the government
towards its subjects. The ruler was required to base his policies on consent rather than
force or arbitrary exercise of power. 84Government by consent was meant to be a
responsible government: whose personnel were to be put under legal restraints and held
accountable for a breach of law. This could be achieved only through independent
judges who were authorized to act even against the top executive authorities.
Did the 'Abbasids allow the judges to act independently and maintain a sound
judicial system?
Against the general assumptions, that the 'Abbasids maintained an autocratic system
of government, Sourdel calls the 'Abbãsid Caliph a quasi despot because of restraints
put on him by his entourage and public opinion. 85 Besides other high officials, their
entourage also included a chief justice. The first man to be given this office was the
QaçlfAbu Yüsuf in the reign of Härun.86
The policy to recruit pious 'ulamã' for the judicial posts had begun from the earliest
period of the 'Abbasid Caliphs. From the very start of their rule, the 'Abbasids realized
the importance of a strong and independent judiciary. The Caliph Mantir is reported to
have indicated the necessity of an impartial judge as the most important of all four
84 al-MwardI, Adab, P.142.
85 Sourdel, Medieval Islam, P.126.
86 Ibn Kathir, al-Bid ya, vol. 10, P.148.
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constituent elements in the make up of the empire. In his words, " a judge who could
decide without the fear of 'censor from those who censor'."87 He is also reported to
have constantly persuaded and pressurized the Imifin, Abu Uanifa, to accept the post of
chief justice, which the latter refused. He also went to Imn Malik and asked his
permission for making his fiqh the official doctrine. Ima,n Mãlik did not accept the
proposal and tried to convince the Caliph that it would fail to create the desired unity.88
The Caliphs Harün and al-Mämün acquired the services of Abü Yüsuf, Yalya b.
Aktham, and Abmad b. Dãwüd (d.2401854).89
The question naturally arises that did such a policy reflect a genuine desire on the
part of the 'Abbffsids to see the full restoration of justice based on Islamic law, or was it
done to pacify people who, as past experience had shown, could be stirred if the 'ulamã'
stood outside the government?90
Although the 'Abbisids were committed to maintaining justice through the
recruitment of pious 'ulamff' to judicial posts, sometimes their personal and royal
interests distracted them from pursuing a just policy and they rejected their advice under
the excuse of expediency. 9 ' This did not happen too often and sometimes the 'ulamã'
stood opposed to the Caliphs and resisted their unjust policies. A few examples would
show the validity of this:
A famous incident is related about QaIf Ijif b. Ghiyath (d.196/811). He decided
against Marzabãn, a famous slave of Zubayda (d.216/831). Marzabãn constantly
referred to the fact that he was the slave of Zubayda (the Caliph Hãrfin's wife), but the
Qaç!f did not take any notice, decided against Marzabãn and sent him to jail. The news
87 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kãmil vol. 5, P.9.
88 ManAir A1san Geelãni, Mugaddima Tadwin Figh, P.206
89 Manãir A1san GeelAni, ImAm AbU Hanifa K1 Si yãsl Zindagi, PP.495, 532,535
9° Naeern Siddlqui, Ma'rka Din wa Si yäsat, P.90. Na'eem Siddiqui is of the opinion that the
'Abbisids recruited the 'Ulama' to the judgeships in order to forestall the prospects of revolution.
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spread across Baghdad. Zubayda became furious at this and immediately ordered his
release. The prisoner was at once set free. When the QaçJi came to know about the
release of the prisoner he warned either to send the prisoner back to jail or else he would
not preside over the court any further. The man, who set the prisoner free, in
anticipation of some penalty, requested Zubyda to permit him to temporarily send the
prisoner back to jail. The request was granted. When Härfin came, Zubayda showed
much anger and said: " your judge is foolish. He has insulted me. He should be
suspended immediately." In order to settle the matter peacefully Hãrun wrote to the
Qaç!f to ignore the matter and exempt the slave Marzabãn. Meanwhile the Qaficame to
know about the dispatch from Hãrün. He began to expedite the rest of the case very
quickly but before he could complete it, Hãrun's messenger made his appearance. The
Qaçlf asked him to wait until he had finished. The messenger called his attention but the
QaçIi paid attention to him only after the decision had been sealed. Then he read the
letter and said: " convey my regards to the king and say that the Qaçff had decided
before your letter was received." The messenger said that the deliberate delay which
the Qaff had made, would also be reported. The Qffff paid no attention to this and said:
"tell him what you want". The messenger narrated the whole story to Hãrfin. Hãrun did
not show any displeasure but laughed and ordered thirty thousand dirhams to be given
to the Qaç'L Now Zubayda's desperation knew no bounds. She said to Hãrun: " our
marriage bond should not continue any further unless you dismiss Qa'çJI IIif." The
matter was ultimately resolved by transferring the Qac1fUif to Küfa.92
The following example quoted by al-Mãwardi in the al-Ahkãm shows how keenly
the 'Abbasids were interested in the administration of justice and how sometimes they
' Na'eem Siddiqul, Ma'rka Din wa Si yãsat, P.75
92 Khatib BaghdAdl, TArikh BaghdAd, vol. 8, PP.191-192
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went as far as to decide against their own kith and kin on the complaints of ordinary and
weak persons.
'It is narrated that al-Mãmün, may Allah be pleased with him, used to personally sit
in the court for grievances on Sundays; one day he rose to leave a sitting when a woman
in rags confronted him, saying: "0 flower of the Just to whom even uprightness itself is
guided, 0 Imn by whom the whole land has been illuminated! A widow takes her
complaint to you, 0 support of the realm, against whom, without means of defense, a
lion has made an attack: he has seized lands from her after she was rendered incapable
and had become separated from her family and children.
al-Mä.mün lowered his eyes a moment and then raised his head saying: "Before less
than what you have spoken of, patience and fortitude themselves would have weakened;
my heart is sickened by your sadness and affliction. Now is the time for midday prayer,
so depart and bring your adversary on the day I shall promise to you: the court sits on
Saturday, and if I sit on that day I will see that you receive justice; if not, then at the
Sunday sitting."
She then departed and attended on Sunday in the first row. al-MämUn then asked her:
"Against whom do you lodge a complaint?" She replied: "The one standing by your
side, al-'Abbãs, the son of the Amir of the Believers." a!- MãmUn then told his QäçJi
Ya1iyã b. Aktham, (while others say that it was his wazir Abrnad b. Abi Khälid), to hold
a sitting with both of them and to investigate the case - which he did, in the presence of
a1-Mmfln. When the woman raised her voice and one of the attendants reprimanded
her, aJ-Mãmun said: "Leave her, for surely it is the truth which is making her speak, and
falsehood which is causing him to be silent," and he ordered that her land be restored to
her. al-Mamün's action in having the investigation take place in his presence, but
without taking it up in person, was indicative of good administration in two ways:
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firstly, it concerned a judgement which might have been in favour of or against his son:
one may not pronounce judgement in favour of one's son, although one may pass
judgement against him; secondly, the litigant was a woman with respect to whom al-
Mãmun was too highly placed to respond; moreover his son, by virtue of his rank found
himself in a position in which no one other than the Caliph could enforce the law. Thus
al-Mãmun referred the investigation, in his son's presence, to someone who was able to
converse with the woman and so resolve the claim and elucidate the pertinent facts- but
it was al-MAmün himself, who issued the executory judgement and enforced the
law.. ;93
In pursuance of their religious policy the 'Abbffsids deemed it necessary to recruit the
religiously learned whom the people acknowledged as their religious leaders on account
of their scrupulous regard for Islamic principles and vast religious knowledge. It
explains why the early 'Abbffsids desperately wanted to acquire the services of the
famous jurists like AbU Uanifa, Imain Malik, and Sufyan al-Thawri (d.161/778). These
jurists declined the offers because the portfolio was not completely independent of royal
influence. Apart from the dependence of the judges on the executive authorities for their
removal and appointment, sometimes decisions were not taken impartially if the royal
interests were at stake.
It was in the reign of Hãrun that the judiciary was made more effective and
independent. To attain this goal the Caliph HãrUn al-Rashid appointed I,nn Abu Yusuf
as the chief Justice and gave him full authority to appoint and remove the judges. The
pattern thus established was followed during the subsequent 'Abbasid period. Giving an
overall picture of administration of justice during the 'Abbasid era the Encyclopaedia of
Islam acknowledges a certain degree of independence of the QaçfLi both in the Capital
al-Mãwardi, A.S., P.128.
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City and provinces. Clarifying this further, it is highlighted that men of high learning
were appointed for judicial posts and it was not uncommon for them to resist official
control. As the time went on, the judiciary acquired more strength and after the end of
3rd1 9th century with the establishment of high court, the arbitrary powers of the Caliph
were restricted still further.94
With the appointment of Imãn Mubammed (d. 189/804), Imn Ya1ya b. Aktham and
Almad b. Dã'üd as chief justices the policy to make the judiciary stronger was allowed
to continue by the 'Abbasids. Such a policy pursued over a period of time had lasting
influences. During the period of disintegration of the 'Abbffsid Empire when the
independent dynasties came into existence, the dynasts followed the 'Abbãsid pattern in
upholding the impartial character of the judiciary.95
To put a further check on the haughty behaviour of the executive officials, the
'Abbãsids perpetuated and strengthened the office of judicial redress. Its functions
included: the investigation of abuse of power by the rulers towards the subjects...; to
investigate the extortion made by agent collectors when exacting tax on property...;
restitution of things seized by force...; the supervision of the Waqf institutions...; the
execution of those judgements which the QffçIis had suspended due to their own
weakness and incapacity in applying them to the party against whom the judgement has
been made...; to see that public acts of worship are respected like Friday prayer, the 'LI
prayer, and the Ifajj and the Jihffd etc.. 96
al-Mãwardi traces the origins of this institution to the time of the Caliph 'All. With
the advent of the Umayyads its need became increasingly felt as the dissension began to
take place among the people. 'Abd al-Mãlik and 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'AzIz laid the
94D.Sourdel, art, "Khalifa", Encyclopaedia,vol. IV, P.941.
Mnãzir A1san Geelani, Imam Abu Hanifa KI Si yasl Zindagl, P.550.
96 aI-Mãwardl, A.S.,PP.121-125
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foundations of this institution, to investigate wrongs and order restitution. The
'Abbäids perpetuated this system and were considered responsible for its healthy
development. Sometimes they themselves sat in judgement in the case wherein some
person was wronged, and they restored his rights to him. So the judiciary reinforced by
Nap al-Ma?alim restored justice and served as a check on the arbitrary exercise of
authority by executive officials.97
Status of the 'Ulamä'
al-Mawardi considered the administration of justice as the responsibility of the
judiciary. The Qaçli to be able to perform his responsibilities efficiently was required to
combine in his person the qualities of piety and courage. He was also required to
possess a comprehensive knowledge of Shari' a: in order to decide in accordance with
the requirements of justice. According to al-Mãwardi: "he must have knowledge of the
laws of the shari' a and his knowledge must extend to a comprehension of its principles
and to the execution of legal decisions based on these principles. The principles from
which the laws of the shari' a are based are four in number: first, he should have
knowledge of the Book of Allah, may He be exalted, in such a way as to enable him to
attain a proper knowledge of the various kinds of laws contained within the Book...
second, he must have knowledge of the authentic Sunna of the Messenger of Allah
(P.B.U.H), that is his sayings or deeds, and the way in which they have been
transmitted- in multiple chains of transmission or isolated ones... third, he must have a
knowledge of the interpretations arrived at by the first generations...; fourth, he must
have a knowledge of analogy enabling him to refer matters about which the law is silent
97 Ibid,PP. 117-119.
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to clearly formulated principles accepted by all, such that he knows how to deal with
new situations and is able to differentiate the true from the false."98
From the above criterion it is obvious that recruitment to the post of QffçIi required
the 'ulamã' to be highly independent, honest, and free from influences of the wealthy
and the ruling classes. In addition to providing personnel for the judiciary the 'ulamã'
were required to carry out some other responsibilities. They were required to provide
honest bureaucrats. The 'ulamã' were also made responsible for guiding the people in
matters of religion.99 They were required to combat the growth of innovations in
society. They had to impart education to the masses in various religious branches. Apart
from these responsibilities they were assigned special responsibilities in the political
context. Mãwardi fully works out the ways and methods according to which both the
'ulamif' and the rulers should behave towards each other. The following are some of the
important responsibilities, which they owed to one another.
Responsibilities of Rulers Towards the 'Ulama'
1. Here al-Mãwardi begins with his advice to the ruler that in the first place he should be
thoroughly conversant with the religious sciences. Most important of all knowledge is
the knowledge of religion that would give him a proper understanding of Allah and his
signs. It also brings forth a variety of advantages like the welfare of this world and the
hereafter. It is the foundation of the state, directing the ruler towards the right decision
such as whether to fight the rebels and whether it was right for him to kill them. He can
only be guided right in the light of knowledge towards faith and religion before waging
98 Ibid, P.100.
al-MãwardI, Adab, P.93.
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war against them. In the absence of religious knowledge rulers will be easily overcome
and remain ignorant.'°°
2. The king or the ruler needs the company of the 'ulamã' more than most of the other
people. 101
, Rulers should spend their leisure time in reading the books of the 'ulamã'.102
4. Rulers should cherish the love of the 'ulamã' more than their love for the clown, singer
or other artists.'°3
, Rulers should not increase enmity between him and other religious factions.'°4
6. If the ruler is inclined towards knowledge, he should not permit it to become a source of
earning his special favour. The ruler should rather grant everybody what he deserves.'05
This is a brief description of al-Mãwardi's recommendations of the responsibilities,
which he thinks the ruler should adopt towards the 'ulami.
Responsibilities of the 'Ulamä' towards the rulers
1. The 'ulama' should advise the rulers when asked to do so.'°6
They should restrict their advice to the minimum. Some 'ulama' show excess in
demonstrating their knowledge. This becomes a source of anxiety for the ruler and
makes him averse, as he has to deal With so many problems and cannot spare his
time for knowledge as a specialist.'07
3. The 'ularna' should advise and not teach.'°8
°° al-MAwardi, NaIhat, PP.215-217.
'°' Ibid,P.100.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
'° Ibid, P.223.
105 al-Mäwardl, Adab, P.92.
106 Ibid, P.91.
'° Ibid.
108 Ibid. aI-Mäwardi assigns to the 'ulami.' the role of reformers and does not allow them to contest the
ruling power. This is directly opposed to the concept of Wilaya!at al-Faqih as it was introduced and
practiced in modern Iran. According to al-Mäwardl, only a man from the family of Quraysh could aspire
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4. The 'ulamã' should keep the pleasure of knowledge above all other pleasures.'°9
5. Knowledge should be a good compensation for all other luxuries. al-Mäwardi
supports his argument by quoting an author in these words: " A man who
exclusively devotes himself in search of knowledge is not scared of solitude
6. al-Mãwardi advises the 'ulamã' to avoid the doubtful earnings. They should impart
religious education for the pleasure of Allah without expecting any worldly
reward."
He strictly warns the 'ulamã' not to follow the rulers in those matters, which
contradict religion and are inconsistent with the truth just to support their opinion
and follow their whims."2
al-MAwardi shows his concern for the importance of the matter saying that in this
respect most of the 'ularna' fumble either due to greed or threat. They then go astray
and lead astray with serious consequences."3
The last obligation prescribed by al-Mãwardi required the 'ulamã' to keep them
highly independent of official control. Indeed cooperation with the authorities must be
from the viewpoint of bringing reform and not endorsing their wrong policies. al-
Mawardi's support for the 'ulama' of the past whom he quoted in his writings shows
that he always recognized those 'ulamä' who maintained their honest and independent
status. He recognizes them as ' the most excellent 'ulamã' of the time who were not
to the office of the Caliphate. Moreover, it was illegitimate to rise in revolt against the ruler even though
he might not be the best man of the community of Muslims. That being the case, the 'Abbisids were
considered to be legitimate rulers and the 'ulamif' had to confine themselves to advice and exhortation.
According to Khomenl, any man could become the ruler of Muslims if he had the knowledge of Law and
quality of Justice. The Fuqaha', by mutual agreement, were thought eligible to strive for their political
ascendancy. Khomeni made the Fuqahä' responsible to struggle for political domination of Islam. (Imam
Khomeini, A1-Iakllmat al-Islarniyya, , PP.16-17).
Ibid, P.92.
° Ibid.
' Ibid.
1t2 Ibid, P.91.
Ibid.
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afraid of the censor of those who censor."4 al-Mãwardi therefore attributed the
existence of recognizedfiqh work solely due to those pious 
'u/ama' who rendered their
contribution independent of all control.
H.A.R.Gibb acknowledged the independence of the 'u/ama' in these words: " the
religious institution of Islam was independent of the Caliphate or any other political
institution, that its source of authority could not be controlled by political governors but
were possessed by the community in its own right."5
Hanna Mikhail disagrees with this interpretation of Gibb. In his research work,
'Politics and revelation', he refutes Gibb's conclusion regarding the independent status
of the 'ulamã'. In support of his viewpoint he quoted a few arguments and concluded
that al-Mãwardi deserved full credit for including politics as a regular part of the juristic
theory."6
That the 'u/ama' did not exist or work independently of official control has been
stated by him in the following way:
Although the rulers did not arrogate to themselves the exclusive right to develop and
codify either law or traditions, to see the 'u/ama' as arriving at consensus through
independent activity would be an exaggeration."7
The statement seems to be doubtful because the famous 'u/ama' of the four schools
appear to have arrived at the consensus through independent activity. As mentioned
before, Imän Abü Uanifa was offered a lucrative judicial post, which he refused to
accept both in the Umayyad and the 'Abbãsid periods. Later on his pupils changed their
stance about the government service but while performing their duties they showed
resistance to unjust pressure.
114 al-Mward1, A.S., P.23.
' H.A.R.Gibb, Studies On Civilization of Islam, P.12.
116 Hanna Mikhail, Politics And Revelation, P.19.
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The same was true of the famous fuqaha' of other schools. For example, Imãin M1ik
took a bold stand on the issue of ' forced divorce'. Despite severe persecution by the
authorities he did not change his stance.118
Similarly A1imad b. Uanbal (d.241/855) had to face a lot of persecution for not
complying with the authorities on the issue of the creation of the Qur' n. 119 The right to
interpret the dogma and all the injunctions of the faith remained exclusively the
monopoly of the 'u/ama'. Attempts on the part of some 'Abbãsid rulers to bring the
'u/ama' under their control were hotly contested by the latter and the struggle as Gibb
remarks, ended with the victory for the orthodox 'ulamã.'20
Moreover, in the process of codification of fiqh work they do not appear to have
attached any importance to prestige or wealth. Two examples support this claim. When
the Caliph Manilr told Imn Malik that he would implement his fiqh as an official one,
the latter strictly forbade him to do so. In the words of the Imn Mälik: " when the
'Abbãsid Caliph, Maniir performed -IaJj, he said to me. I have made a firm resolve to
copy all your books and ask the people from the towns and the cities to only act upon in
accordance with those books and not to go beyond them." When Imifin Mãlik was
informed of Manür's intentions, he said: " 0 AmIr of Muslims, do not do this at all.
People have accepted the sayings of their learned persons. They have listened to
A i&iii h. They have narrated traditions. People have started acting upon what has
already been conveyed to them. The residents of every population should be left to
pursue what they have decided about themselves."2'
" Ibid, P.17.
" AbU Zahra, ImAm MIik, P.61.
" Abil al Uasan All Nadvi, Saviour of Islamic Spirit, PP.78-82.
120 HA.R.Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam, P.12.
121 Manäzir Alsan, Mugaddima Tadween Figh, PP.205-206; al-She 'räni, al-Mizan aI-Kubrä, PP.45-46.
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In the reign of al-Mutawakkil (d.247/86 1), Almad b. Uanbal was profoundly revered
and considerable sums of money were sent to him as a gift from the authorities. These
official rewards upset him to the extent that he is reported to have cried: " this is a
greater calamity for me than the punishment and imprisonment of the past."22
In spite of all these punishments and inducements the 'ulainã' did not allow any
official interference in codification of the religious law. They thus established examples
due to which the fiqh work by the jurists remained independent thereafter.
2 Mikhail's next objection was that the fuqaha' and the Iladfth work neglected the
constitution of the government beyond certain general principles.' 23
 It was later on a!-
Mäwardi who made up what was ignored by the early jurists.' 24
 In his recent study,
Aziz al-Azmeh has demonstrated that in the al-Alikam, there was much repetition of the
legal principles produced in the course of centuries through the efforts of the fuqahä'.'25
It is right that he gave a new shape and order to scattered material but; most of the fiqh
principles had already been laid down and al-Mawardi clearly referred to those
principles in the a1-Ahkm when dealing with any problem.
The fuqahã' dealing with various collective issues of collective life did not exclude
the responsibilities of the Caliph. al-Mãwardi repeatedly quotes the famous juristic
opinions on a matter and represents the viewpoints of various schools. Indicating the
purpose of the al-Abkãm al-Mãwardi clearly states at the outset that his main object was
to bring together the views of different jurists regarding the government and the
constitution. 126 In other words al-Mãward.i was convinced that the fuqaha' did not
neglect the constitutional organization of the government but mixed the principles
122 MawlänA al-MawdUdi, Tajdeed wa lbya' Dln.P.63.
123 HannaMikhail, Politics And Revelation, P.17-18.
124 jbid, P.19.
125 tZ1Z aI-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, PP.169-170.
126 aI-Mawardl,	 P.7.
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regarding it with other fiqh rules which it was now his responsibility to bring together in
the form of a book.
Mikhail's next objection is that the men of religion were strikingly limited in the
field of politics.' 27 It is however suggested that the 'ulamã' did not always seem to have
been strikingly linited in the field of politics. Sometimes they enjoyed considerable
influence. In order to exercise authority on religious grounds the 'Abbãsids maintained a
strong judicial system. For impartial justice the services of upright and highly learned
were required. From the time of MãmUn (d.218/833) it was a regular policy that no
decision would be valid until ratified by the chief justice. The 'ulamã' thus not only
delivered justice to the ordinary man but put brakes on royal despotism. The powers of
apointment of the judges were also transferred from the Caliph and the provincial
governor to the chief justice.'28
The 'Abbësids were aware of the popularity, which the 'ulamã' enjoyed among the
masses. Despite their political despotism, they sought the support of the Muff and
judges in state policies.' 29 Although they did not accept them as ultimate judges over
their own political decision' 3° as Imn Abü Uanifa would have desired, 13 ' the Caliphs
normally thought it wise to act through their medium.
In the reign of the Caliph ManUr, people of MuiI revolted against the authority.
Judges and the 'ulamã' were summoned. Some of them said that owing to their breach
of contract, putting them to death was lawful for Manur but the decision of lmãm Abü
1-lanifa prevailed. According to him the Shart a did not grant them the right to conclude
127 1-lanna Mikhail, Politics and Revelation, P.18.
128 Manäir Absan Geelãnl, Imm Abil Hanifa Ki Si yäsi Zindagi, P.495
129 Naeem Siddiqi, Ma'rka Din Wa Si yãst, P.75.
130 1). Sourdel, art, "Khalifa" Encyclopaedia, vol. IV, P.94 1.
130 Manãzir Absan GeelAni, Imäni Abü Hanifa 1(1 Si yasi Zindag, PP. 273-74, It was Imãm Abü Hanifa's
view that if the ruler is guilty of a crime involving people, the Qffçfiwho is nearer to him (serving in the
area of ruler's residence) should convict him.
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a contract regarding their own life. Hence it would be unjust for Manur to put them to
death. 132
In light of the above discussion it can be concluded that the political authorities
could not easily put limitations on the 'ulamä" and they exerted considerable influence
in the politics of the country. It can, therefore, be said in the light of the preceding
discussion, that the work of codification of the fiqh by the four schools was completed
without any royal assistance and interference. Sometimes, the fuqaha' performed it in
face of severe opposition. They accepted the cooperation of the authorities only if it did
not interfere with performing their work independently. Hence Gibb's analyses about
the independent status of the 'ulamã' are sound and much of Mikail's criticism against
it seems to be incorrect.
Lack of Agreement over the Alternative Leadership:
al-Mãwardi was acutely conscious of the dearth of versatile characters who could
combine the qualities of piety, good administration and politics. According to al-
Mãwardi, this problem was felt even as early as the reign of the Caliph 'Umar. He
narrates the following tradition thus: " Ibn Is1ãq (150/767) relates from al-Zuhrl
(d.95/713) from Ibn 'Abbas saying, 'I came across 'Umar one day in a state of distress:
he was saying, ' I do not know what to do in this matter. I get up to settle the matter
then I sit down.' I said to him: ' Have you considered 'All?' He replied, ' he is surely
suitable for it but he is a man with a sense of jest and I consider that if he took charge of
your affairs he would not lead you on the path of truth that you are familiar with.' I said:
'And where do you stand with 'Uthmän?' He replied, 'if I were to designate him he
would have (his family of) Banü Abu Mu'ayt lords of the people and the Arabs would
132 Na'eem Siddiqui, Ma'rka Din WA Si yAsat, P.121.
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not turn to him but to strike off his neck. By Allah, if I were to choose him he would do
this and when he had done it they would react accordingly.' I then said: 'And Tal1a?'
He replied, 'He is proud: Allah would not entrust the affair of the Umma of Mu1anmied
(P.B.U.H.) to him, considering what he knows of his pride.' I then said, 'And what of
al-Zubayr?' He replied, 'surely he is a brave man but he asks about the ia' and mudd
measures in the Baqi' market- is this man to be entrusted with the affairs of the
Muslims?' I then said, ' Sa'd ibn Abi Waqq?' He said, ' He is not the one- he is a
warrior, well able to defend the squadron but as for being in authority, no!' I said,
What about 'Abd al-Ra1mãn ibn 'Awf?' He replied, 'Yes, you have mentioned the best
of men, but he is weak. By Allah, 0 Ibn 'Abbãs, only the strong person without
violence, the one who is gentle without being weak, the one who is economical but
without being miserly and the one who is generous without being wasteful is worthy of
this affair."33
The Caliph 'Umar was restless due to the absence of the best-qualified man for the
Caliphate. Although his attention was drawn to several prominent figures who were
considered best at the time, he did not nominate any one of them as a successor due to
some deficiency. It would certainly not have escaped his attention that some of the
proposed names were better than the others in piety and religion. But his concern for
good administration led him to find the person combining the quality of piety with the
ability for good administration.
The same theme recurs in al-Mãwardi's writings in the context of the 'Abbasid
authorities. For the conduct of good administration, he quoted the Caliph al-MãmUn as
describing the required qualities of the wazir thus: " I am looking for a man for my
133 al-Mãwardl, A.S., PP21-22.
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affairs who has all of the qualities of goodness, who is modest in his behaviour and
resolute in his ways, a man who has been refined by manners and strengthened by
experience, a man who if entrusted with confidential matters accordingly and if
entrusted with important matters moves to execute them, a man whose forbearance
causes him to be silent and whom knowledge causes to speak, a man for whom the
moment is enough and for whom a glance is sufficient, a man who has the intrepidity of
Amirs and the perseverance of the wise, the humility of the 'ulamä' and the
understanding of the fuqaha'; if people treat him well, he is grateful and if put to the test
by their mistreatment, he is patient; he does not sell the portion of today only to be
deprived the next; a men who captures the hearts of man by the sharpness of his tongue
and the beauty of his eloquence."34
Having mentioned these qualities al-Mãwardli admitted that it was very rare that all
such qualities were perfected in a person. He had therefore to depend upon the men with
lesser qualities for the higher administrative posts. The question then naturally arose as
to whom he was willing to entrust the highest administrative responsibility if the choice
was to be made between a pious but a less competent man or the one with less piety and
better ability to rule?
After examining the opinions of the various schools al-Mãwardi arrived at the
conclusion that the Imãinate of the less preferred (MafçIUl) was legitimate. He
acknowledged the right of the people of power and influence to nominate him in the
presence of the best man due to his popular standing, expediency, or any other reason
provided he possessed the basic qualifications for the office.'33
'' Ibid, P.38.
' Ibid, P.15.
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The same question arose during the 'Abbasid's reign when it was queried as to who
deserved to be preferred, the one with less piety but having the strength to manage
affairs effectively or the weaker man who was more pious.? A1mad b. Uanbal clearly
preferred the strong but less pious man to the pious but weaker man. The Imain argued
that the strength of the strong would be for the Muslims while his lack of piety would be
only against himself. Whereas the piety of the pious man would be for himself but his
weakness would be against the Muslims.'36
al-Mawardi considered the 'Abbffsid rule legitimate on the same ground, since they
met the basic qualifications for the Caliphate.
Another valid ground for continuation of their rule was to avoid conflict and
bloodshed due to lack of agreement over the alternative leadership. The 'Abbasids
themselves were conscious that as long as they performed their responsibilities in a
good manner they could continue to exercise authority because there was no agreement
among people over the leadership of a single person. The following dialogue quoted by
Suyui between the Caliph al-Mãmun and a pious man illustrates the point.
"Ibn 'Asãkir has stated it on the authority of Yaliya b. Aktham. al-Mãmfin used to
convene the meeting of the fuqaha' on Mondays to discuss fiqh problems. One day
when the meeting was in progress, a man wearing simple dress and carrying shoes in his
hands stood in the corner. He greeted the gathering and inquired as to the nature and
purpose of the gathering. Was it for the sake of the unity of the Umma or as an
expression of pomp and show? To this al-Mamfin replied that he meant by such
gathering none of the two purposes. The reason of this was stated thus: this power was
in the first instance bequeathed to my brother. Then it devolved upon me. I carefully
136 KilnA Uasan KAtA, a1-Nariyya SiyAsiyya 'md Ibn Taymiyya, P. 92.
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reflected and found myself in need of unity of the Muslim cause so that all the Muslims
of east and west should agree upon me. I saw that if I abandoned the government the
security of Islam would be disturbed and public affairs would fall into confusion and
there would be strife and discord. Jihad would cease to be performed and the Muslims
will be hindered from performing pilgrimage and doing their duty. Therefore, I arose in
defense of people. Should they be of one accord upon the man whom they approve, I
would then resign the government to him. When they agree upon a man I would
abdicate in his favour."37
al-Mãwardi seems to have adhered to the same reason for the continuation of the
'Abbasid rule. To avoid a conflict and bloodshed, the one established in authority was
allowed to continue his rule if he possessed the basic qualifications for the office and
carried out his responsibilities in a good manner. The viewpoint was in conformity with
the pattern of the companions and the jurists of the early Umayyad age.
al-Mãwardi followed the line of the jurists who were indebted for their viewpoint to
the *Iadfth literature. In anticipation of such a situation they were guided by the
injunctions laid down in IadRh literature which exerted a lasting influence on the views
of the jurists.
Impact of Fkidlh Literature
The .a-Iadfth injunctions had a great and lasting influence on the views of the fuqaha'.
Despite the differences regarding the interpretations of some fiqh problems among the
fuqaha' of the four schools, all of them shared almost the same viewpoint with respect
to their attitude towards political authority. Explaining the verse: "0 you who believe,
obey Allah and obey the Prophet and those in authority among you" al-MAwardi quotes
JaIAI al-Din Suyil1, Tarlkh aI-Khulaf', P. 285.
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A'mash b. 'All Shahb b. Abü Hurayra quoting the following tradition of the Holy
Prophet (P.B.U.H), "who obeys me obeys Allah and he who disobeys me disobeys
Allah, and who disobeys my Amir disobeys me."138
A little further, explaining the last part of the verse ' those in authority' al-Mãwardi
first of all quotes the saying of Ibn 'Abbãs, Abü Hurayra, SuddI, and Ibn Zayd, that here
it means rulers.
Explaining the extent and limits of obedience within the context of the same verse,
al-Mãwardi quotes the Ijadfth by Hishãm b. 'Urwa who quoted from Abü Sli1 b. Abu
Hurayra: "You will be governed after me by the governors. The righteous will govern
you righteously and the wicked one will govern you wickedly. Listen to them and obey
in all what is in conformity with the truth and pray behind them. If they do good, it is
both for you and for them, and if they do bad, it will be against them and for you."39
Although al-MAwardi referred to some other interpretations in the context of the
same verse, his main emphasis was upon its meanings with reference to the authorities.
He explains further within the same context: "obedience to the ruler is necessary if it is
consistent with obedience to Allah, without any disobedience to Him. Obedience to the
rulers can change into disobedience but disobedience to the Prophet of Allah (P.B.U.H)
is not justified due to obedience to the ruler."14°
In support of his viewpoint he quotes another tradition from Nãfi' b. 'Abd Allah:
the Muslim is required to obey, irrespective of his likes or dislikes except when he is
ordered against religious commandments. Then there is no obedience."4'
138 al-MAwardi, Tafsir, 4-59; "Kitãb a1-Imãra",j1b Muslim.
' al-MAwardi, Tafslr, 4-59.
'4°jbid.
141 Mawardl, Tafsir, 4-59; "KitAb al-Imära", bMmiim.
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Thus we see that al-Mãwardi was indebted to the A4iadfth for determining the criteria
for obedience and disobedience to rulers. Obedience towards rulers was obligatory for
Muslims but not in disobedience towards Allah and His Prophet (P.B.U.H). But while
Muslims were urged not to co-operate with the authorities if they ordered something
wrong, they were asked to bear with the authorities, pray behind them and not to raise
the standard of revolt against them. This explains the attitude of the fuqaha' of the early
Umayyad age. They managed to accommodate both the rulings of the Sharf a. They
prayed behind the Umayyads, co-operated with them in right policies but did not act
upon their orders which were contrary to Islamic injunctions. al-Mãwardi acknowledged
their mode of practice to be the standard one. He therefore regarded it as one of the pre-
requisites for a Mujtahid to know the interpretations of the verses of the Qur'ãn as
arrived at by the first generations after the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H))42 Guided by their
precedents, he acknowledged the 'Abbasid authorities to be legitimate.
Criticism
Our attempt thus far has been confined to highlighting al-Mãwardi's appreciation of
'Abbffsid rule. Indeed, whilst appreciating the early 'Abbasids for having carried out
their functions in a good way, he thought them to be nowhere near the ideal practices
associated with the Islamic model of an ideal state. In some respects he found the
'Abbäsids just as wanting as the Umayyads in their declining phase. In narrating an
event al-MAwardi quotes a stranger on the occasion of pilgrimage who addressed the
Caliph ManUr in a very critical manner. The criticism stands true about the other
'Abbaid Caliphs as well.
142 aI-Mãwardl, A.S, P.100
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The stranger said "Manfir's greed has kept him away from public welfare." ManUr
expresses his surprise and asks how he could be greedy while he possessed gold and
silver treasures. The stranger reiterates the point and says: " can the greed infiltrate
anybody more than it infiltrated you? Allah placed you over the Muslims and their
wealth (you neglected their affairs and amassed wealth for yourself) and you
constructed barriers (made of bricks) between yourself and them, with iron gates with
armed guards. You imprisoned yourself in that (palace cutting yourself off) from them.
You then sent your men fully armed for collecting money.
"You ordered that no man from the masses should see you except very few persons,
the limited men being named by you. But you did not order access to be given to the
wronged, the needy, the hungry, the weak and the beggar, although none has a right to
this wealth equal to theirs... you amass wealth and do not distribute it. They (your
retinue) said: " He (the Caliph) has betrayed Allah and His Prophet (P.B.U.H), why
should we not betray him and he has is accessible to us. They conspired that no
information about public affairs should reach you except through them; none of your
officials goes out but they destroy him if he opposes their policies, take your favour and
downgrade him. When these evil practices became well known and widespread, people
began to fear them and ranked them very highly...,"43
Having thus highlighted the malpractices of the age al-Mãwardi turns towards the
remedies suggested by the stranger. He begins his advice by citing the example of the
Chinese monarch. In his words: " once I took a journey to China and the Chinese
monarch had a hearing problem. His friends advised him to remain patient. He said he
did not lament his misfortune but he wept for someone wronged knocking on his door
" 
al-MAwardi, Nasihat, P. 559-562.
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whom he might not hear." He said: 'my hearing has departed but not my eyesight. Tell
the people that none of them should wear the red dress except the oppressed ones.'
Then he used to ride an elephant on both ends of the day, looking for the oppressed
one..."
"If you amass wealth for your son then Allah has given you an example of the child
who is born out of his mother's womb without any wealth in this world. And there is no
wealth except that which is possessed by a miser's hand.., it is not you who gives to
anybody but it is Allah who gives to whom He wills.
If you say: 'I amass wealth to strengthen my rule', then Allah has shown you the
example of Ban! Umayya. Their stores of gold, silver, soldiery and armament did not
avail them when Allah did intend with them what He intended. Indeed for the people
there are dignitaries ('ulamif') whose help they seek in your religion (Islam) and are
content with them, so make them your retinue and they will guide you, consult them and
they will put you on the right path.
Manilr said: "I sent for them but they ran away from me."
The stranger said: " they feared that you would force them to move your way. Open
your door to them and allow them to see you. Help the oppressed one and persecute the
wrongdoer. Take thefay and the daqat and distribute them justly among the deserving
persons. I guarantee you on their behalf that they would come to you and assist you in
rectifying the people "
Summary & Conclusion
al-Mãwardi adopted the position of the jurists who recognized and legitimized the
'Abbãsid government. Their viewpoint was clear: the issue of the Caliphate was settled
''Ibid.
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after violent warfare with the Umayyads. The holders of authority were now unwilling
to go back to the RffshidUn period or subject royal politics to the ideal shari a. However,
at the same time, they were quite willing to regulate the sharia at public level, establish
the religious obligations, ensure a strong judicial system, leave the 'ulamã' independent
in the elaboration and codification of shari a, maintain internal security and protect the
frontiers of Muslim lands. Since the 'Abbffsids performed the above responsibilities
appreciably and showed keenness in identifying themselves with Islam, al-Mawardi,
like otherfuqaha', had no hesitation in recognizing them as legitimate.
Guided by the IIadfth literature and the precedents of the early fuqaha', he saw in
their commitment towards Islam the required fulfillment which did not make them
guilty of open breach of faith (kufr bawá). By recognizing the 'Abbasids as legitimate,
the fuqaha' were not reconciled with the evils of tyrannical rule; but aimed at bringing
change through reform, criticism, and non- co-operation over sin and transgression, co-
operation with the authorities to bring reform by working inside the government etc.
Attempts to revive the practices connected with the ideal Caliphate by justifying
rebellion would hardly have been an adequate recommendation. The best course,
according to al-Mãwardi, was to be content with the working of Islam at a public level
and aiming at the attainment of practices associated with the ideal Caliphate through
gradual and peaceful means.
The problem of legitimacy was not an acute one during the heyday of the 'Abbasid
power since the Caliph was both the holder of power and the religious head of the
community. With the passage of time as the position and the power of the Caliph began
to wane and he was confined to religious and judicial affairs, the jurists were confronted
with the dilemma: why retain such a Caliph who for all practical purposes had lost his
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previous position? al-Mãwardi attempts to answer the question, and this will form the
subject matter of our next chapter.
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Chapter Five
al-Mawardi and the Buwayhids:
The concept of Political Legitimacy (continued)
Historical Background to the Advent of the Buwayhids
The 'Abbãsid policy of equal treatment to the non-Arabs gave rise to 'Arab-'Ajam
conflict which reached its culminating point during the age of Mu'taim (d.227/841). The
recruitment of Turkish soldiers to rectify the situation turned out to be a bad bargain in the
long run because of their increased involvement in royal politics and their assuming the role
of the Caliph-makers.' The Caliphs, on their part, wanted to reassert their authority and the
resulting tug-of-war with the Turkish soldiers proved detrimental to the Caliphate.
After the murder of Muqtadir in 320/932, the precarious financial conditions and restless
desire on the part of various administrative and military chiefs to exercise authority on
behalf of the Caliph led towards the further weakening of the Caliph. 2 The rise of powerful
dynasties in the outlying regions reduced the influence of the Caliphate to Baghdad and its
surrounding regions. Nevertheless, the Caliph continued to remain a legitimate leader in the
eyes of the Muslims. Hence there was a great desire on the part of the dynasts to be
legitimized by the Caliph.
'SuytltT, TArikh aI-Kulafä', PP.301-320.
2 Ibn Miskawaihi, The Ex periences of The Nations, vol.!, P.440; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidä ya, vol. 11, PP.167-
168.
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After the death of Tüzün in 354/965, a Turkish military chief, Ibn Shirzãd, succeeded
who could not control the situation properly. 3 A Buwayhid ruler, Mu'izz (d.356/966) had in
the meanwhile consolidated his position as a powerful dynast. Seeing the capital city in a
deplorable condition, he matured a plan to take possession of, and establish his authority in
Baghdad. He entered Baghdad unopposed and took over the control of government into his
hands.4 Mu'izz thus established the Buwayhid rule that lasted over a century in the central
province of the Muslim lands with its capital at Baghdad.
The Buwayhid's Treatment of the Caliphate
After taking over the government and administration, one of the earliest issue worthy of
attention for the Buwayhids was: what to do with the SunniCaliph. 5 The following options
were available to them.
(1) The Buwayhids could have rid themselves of the institution of the Caliphate altogether.
(2) They could have replaced the Sunni Caliph with his 'Alit counterpart 6 (or a person
from the Imãmi sect) The Shi'fte regarded the 'Abassid Caliph as the usurper since the
Caliphate could be inherited by the progeny of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) through the
offspring of 'All and Fama.
(3) They could have rendered allegiance to the Fafm ii Caliph.
(4) They could have allowed the SunnI Caliph to continue in his office albeit in the
capacity of a usurper.
Ibn al-Athir, al-KAmil, vol. 8, PP.448- 449.
' Ibid, PP.449-450.
M.A.Shaban, Islamic History, A New Interpretation, vol.2, P.162.
6 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kmil, vol.8, P.452. Ibn al-Athfr says that Mu'izz, on the persuasion of his close
associates, seriously thought of transferring the Caliphate to the 'Allis.
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Out of these options they preferred the last one. It was not practicable for them to
exercise the first choice of ridding themselves of the institution of the Caliphate. The time
and circumstances did not allow acting upon the policy of doing away with the institution
of the Caliphate. At this point, says Shaban, "their first instinct was probably to get rid of
such an unnecessary figurehead but they were reminded that it would create more problems
than it would solve."7
At this point of their settlement in Baghdad, Mu'izz was better aware than any one else
that his power was not too overwhelming to outclass all the provincial governors of
surrounding dynasties who gave allegiance to the SunniCaliph. It was therefore in keeping
with the requirements of the time to leave the institution intact. In spite of their rise to
power the Buwayhids could not yet claim to be undisputed masters of the Muslim world.
Twelve years earlier Mu'izz's elder brother Imãd al-Dawla (d.338/949) had rendered
allegiance to both Mardãwij (d.323/934) and the Caliph and had promised to take the names
of both in Khufba. 8 Mu'izz himself had left Wasit when the Caliph al-Mustakfi (d.338/949)
along with TuzUn had come out to evacuate the land of Wãsit from him. As long as Tuzün
was alive, he did not attempt to capture Baghdad. It was only after the death of Tuzün that
Mu'izz once again contemplated to capture Baghdad and bring under his subordination the
same Turkish forces who had defeated him under the leadership of Tfizün in Wasit two
years ago.9
Moreover, the course of further events indicated that the institution of the Caliphate was
necessary under the existing circumstances. On the suspicion of intrigue by the Caliph al-
M. A. Shaban, Islamic History, A New Interpretation, vol. 2, P. 162.
B Ibn al-Athir, al-KAmil, vol. 8, P.92.
Mu'In al-Din Nadvi, TArIkh Islam, P.385.
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Mustakfi with the Turks for his deposition, Mu'izz blinded and imprisoned him.'° This
caused a storm of opposition in the Sunni population and the Ban! Uamdan of MUil
resolved to salvage the SunnI Caliph from the hold of the Shfite rulers. The battle was
almost won for Nair al-Dawla against Mu'izz when the last moment's stratagem saved the
day for Mu'izz's army and his dynasty." The humiliation of one SunniCaliph being taken
so seriously, it would have been hard for the SunnI population to reconcile with the
abolition of the Caliphate. However, there were some other considerations too, which
stimulated the Buwayhids to continue the Sunni Caliphate. The Caliph was recognized at
that time as an undisputed head of the Sunnipopulation. Shaban puts the same theme thus:
"however, despite their differences, all the orthodox circles were agreed on the necessity of
continuation of Ameer al-Mu 'minfiz."12
The second alternative, which seemed to be a religious necessity of the Buwayhids, was
the replacement of the Sunni Caliph by a Shfite Caliph. Mu'izz is reported to have almost
committed himself to taking this step when a wise man's advice to refrain from this hasty
step withheld him from taking this decision. The Buwayhids believed that the 'Abbãsids
were usurpers who had forcibly occupied the Caliphate. Everybody of Mu'izz's circle
endorsed his plan of transferring the Caliphate to the 'Alki Caliph but the wise man's
judgement prevailed. Against the opinion of everybody he did not favour the idea of
replacing the Sunn lie Caliph with the Shfite one. On Mu'izz's inquiry, he explained the
reason of his opposition in these words: "according to you and your friends the 'Abbasid
'° Ibn Miskawaihi, The Ex periences of The Nations, vol. II, P.89; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kãmil, vol.8,
P.450
Ibn Kathir, al-Bidãya, vol. 11, P. 179; Ibn Athir, al-Kãmil, vol.8, PP.454-455; Ibn Miskawaihi, The
Experiences of The Nations, vol. II, PP.95-96
12 M.A.Shaban, Islamic History, vol. 2, P. 162.
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Caliph is not a legitimate Caliph. If you act according to your will and plan, under the
patronage of SunniCaliph, you are free to do that. You might indeed force the Caliph to act
according to your will. But if you replace him with the 'A lid counterpart, people will treat
him as a legitimate Caliph and then on his commands you might be put to death". The
advice produced desired effects and Mu'izz refrained from replacement of the SunniCaliph
with the 'Alit Caliph.'3
The above statement truthful as it is, explains the partial motivation, which led to
abandoning the idea of abolishing the Sunni Caliphate. Mu'izz must have attached
importance to some more practical consideration. We can note through the military exploits
of the three Buwayhid brothers that they did not come from Daylam with religious mission
to spread the Shfite version of Islam in the lands where they established their rule.
Throughout the period of their government they concentrated on consolidating their rule
without any concern to impose the Shfite dogma on the Sunni population. Momentary
desire might have led Mu'izz to consider abolishing the Caliphate but as a man of great
experience and practical insight it could not be imagined of him to abolish the SunnI
Caliphate without giving the matter a thorough consideration. He had planned to govern
Baghdad for a long period of time. It was therefore important for him not to alienate the
Sunni population who held the institution of the Caliphate in high esteem.
The volatile behaviour of the Turkish soldiers was too well known by that time. In the
installment of the 'Alit Caliph, the Turks who were Sunnis and were absorbed recently in
his army might soon have changed his era into a period of civil anarchy. It would then have
been difficult for the Buwayhids to contemplate a long-term rule. The Sunnl Caliph was
u Ibn al-Athir, al-KAmil, vol. 8, P.452; Ibn Kathir, al-BidAya, vol. 11, P. 179.
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also considered as the religious head of community and as such was greatly revered by the
Sunni people. Recognition from the Buwayhids would win them public support and give
them a free hand in politics without any active interference by the Caliph. Had the Caliph
himself opposed the Buwayhid rule, it would have been another matter. But the warm
welcome by the SunnI Caliph gave the Buwayhids an ample opportunity for continuing
government in a legitimate manner and they lost no time in completing the legal
requirements which legitimized their rule.'4
The Religious Policies of the Buwayhids
The religious policies of Mu'izz, which he carried out in his reign, demand careful
analysis. At first, he seems to be a bigoted Sh! ire, but a careful study of his religious
policies makes it clear that he gave religion a subordinate place and aimed at using it as an
instrument to realize his political objectives. Writers differ with regard to the exact nature
of Mu'izz's policies. Mafizullah Kabir' 5 and H.A.Siddiqui regard his policies as prejudiced
while Kraemer says his attitude was conciliatory.' 6
 In my opinion, both are right. Although
he pursued some pro- Shfite policies, his aim in doing so seems to have been more political
than religious. His summoning of the body of the Sunni 'ulamã' towards the end of his
life' 7 seems to leave the impression that he had no pre-conceived hatred towards the Sunni
religion. In determining the kind of sect to which Mu'izz belonged, Shaban's statement
' Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, vol, 8, P.449. Ibn al-Athir says that the Caliph Mustakfi expressed his delight
at the arrival of Mu'izz in Baghdad and justified his early hiding for dispersal of the Turks thereby
facilitating Mu'izz's unopposed entry into Baghdad and preventing any bloodshed. There was a
degree of truth in this statement because when the Turks knew that the Caliph had gone into hiding,
they left Baghdad and went to Muil.
' Maulzullah Kabir, The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad, PP.204-205.
16 J.L.Kraemer, The Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam, P.40.
Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya, vol.11, P.222
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looks reliable when he says that beyond knowing the mere fact that they were the Shfites
they did not know the specific details of the creed of the Shfite sects.' 8 Kraemer's opinion
also seems to endorse this point of view. According to him, Mu'izz attempted to bring
about reconciliation between Sunn lies and Shfites.19
At the same time, certain measures implemented to protect and promote the Shfite
religion indicate the high favour, which Mu'izz showed for the Shfite religion. He
encouraged many Shfite practices, which offended the Sunni population of Baghdad. He
allowed the celebration of the Muiarram ceremony, which took place on the tenth of the
month. On that day in his reign, says Ibn Kathir, women came out of their houses bare-
headed, beating their faces. 2° The open vilifying of the companions of the Holy Prophet
(P.B.U.H) also began during the same period. 2 ' Now the question arises: was it all out of
his devotion to the Shfite cause or were these several attempts on the part of Mu'izz
towards the realization of his political objectives? As a matter of fact, as will be examined
below, his policies reflected both attitudes although the political aspect seemed dominant.
The religious obligation of appointing their co-religionist Caliph was abandoned for
achieving his political objectives. However, simultaneously, at the time of their rise to
power, after experiencing long vicissitudes, the Shfites had finally gained a firm footing in
Baghdad. 22
 It therefore could not be improbable that in order to make up the deficiency of
nominating the Shfite Caliph, Mu'izz embarked upon a series of measures that won him
18 M.A.Shaban, Islamic History. A new interpretation, vol. 2, P.162.
19 J.L.Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam, P.40.
20 Ibn Kathir, al-BidAya, vol. 11, P. 215.
21 Ibid; Ibn al-Athfr, al-KAmiI, vol.8, P.542
22 Maflzullah Kabir, The Buwayhid Dynasty of BaghdAd, P.202.
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the support of his co- religionist. This also absolved him from the charge of adopting an
anti-Shfite stance.
Once again the political nature of Mu'izz's policies becomes obvious when two more
aspects of his policy are highlighted. Firstly, the more he seemed to promote the policies
favouring S/if ism, the more his wazir, Muhallibi (d.3521963) seemed to redress the balance
by sticking to moderate policies. Muhallibi did not allow the S/if ites of Baghdad to go
beyond a certain limit.23
 In order to satisfy both the sects, Mu'izz and Muhallibi apparently
pursued inconsistent policies. An apostate made a claim about the transmigration of souls.
Muhallibi imprisoned him but owing to his S/if ite origin Mu'izz set him free. 24 Similarly
when abuse of the Holy Prophet's companions by the S/if ites was reported to Mu'izz,
Muhallibi suggested that the offensive words be changed with words having broad
meanings. He suggested that a curse be invoked on those who usurped the rights of the A/il
Bayt without naming the person. Now both the sects could interpret it to their own
advantage.25 According to Ibn Kathir, Mu'izz had appointed two spies, one in the Sunnf
circle, the other in the S/if ite circle and he had directed them to keep him informed of all
the developments taking place within the circles of both communities. Both were highly
paid and enjoyed a respectable place in his court. 26 Another distinguished feature that
marked his rule was Mu'izz's decision to leave the Sunni population free to practise
according to the requirements of their own fiqh. Religious affairs, law, and the judiciary
strictly remained under the influence of the Caliph and the 'ulama'. Finally Mu'izz's
23 J.L.Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance, P.40.
24 Ibn al-Athir, al-KAmil, vol. 8, P.372.
25 Ibn al-Athir, al-KAmil, vol. 8, PP.542-543; Muflzullah Kabir, The Buwavhid Dynasty of BaghdAd,
P.204.
26 Ibn Kathir, al- BidA ya, vol. 11, P.222;
187
summoning of the body of the 'ulamff' towards the end of his life and putting queries on
them about religious matters reiterates Shaban's basic assertion that beyond merely
knowing the fact that they were Shfites, they did not know the specific details of the
different types of the Shfites. When Mu'izz was told, says Ibn Kathir, that the Caliph
'Umar was the son-in-law of the Caliph 'All, he swore to express his ignorance regarding
this matter. He turned repentant before them and adopted the Sunnifaith.27
After Mu'izz, Bakhtiyar's (d.367/977) era is not worthy of any particular attention
because of his involvement in civil wars. During the brief interval when relative peace and
security prevailed, he gave himself up to a life of luxury and ease. 28 Following his
dethronement, 'Aud al-Dawla's (d.373/983) reign began which may be said to be truly
reflective of the policies of the Buwayhids. He committed himself most seriously to
bringing about a genuine restoration of law and order. Both the Sunnites and the Shfites
were banned from eulugizing the respective heroes of their communities. Adherents of both
creeds were told to stick only to the Qur'an and that it should only be a means of revealing
their identity. 29 Compared to the early two Buwayhid rulers he remained a strict adherent of
the policy of moderation.
27 Ibid; Ibn Miskawaihi, The Experiences Of The Nations, vol. H, P.245. Ibn Miskawaihi says that during
his last illness, Mu'izz al-Dawla asked the jurists and theologians whether it was possible to turn
repentant at that stage. They answered positively and proceeded to instruct him in what should he say
and do.
28 Ibn al-Athir, al-KAmil, vol. 8, P. 576.
29 Ibn Kathir, al-BidAya, vol. 11, P.246; Ibn Miskawaihi, The Experiences of The Nations, vol.1!, P.446,
Commenting on the neutral policies of 'Aud al-Dawla, Ibn Miskawaihi says: "People (of different sects
and tendencies) participated with each other in visitations and at the oratories after hostilities had been
rife between them to the extent of mutual execration. They made truce and those tongues became mute
which had brought about crimes and kindled riots, all owing to the protecting shadow of a strong ruler
and a broad-minded administration."
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The Buwayhids and Legitimacy of the SunniCaliphate
Although the Buwayhids were Shfites, they did not pursue the policies that would make
their rule inconsistent with the Sunni way of life on a public level. The SunnI jurists
therefore found it convenient to legitimize their rule. At the apex of the authority the Sunni
Caliph reigned; he was still recognized as giving validity both to the Buwayhid ruler and the
umarã' of the neighbouring dynasties. It was he who delegated authority to the Buwayhid
rulers who were the real wielders of authority and in fact ran the administration. It is right
that the Caliph gave legal validity to the measures they adopted, that his authorization was
considered necessary had a significant importance. The very fact of reconciliation with the
constitutional subordination to the Caliph indicated the willingness of the Buwayhids not to
alter the old set-up they had inherited from the conquered people. So the question naturally
arises whether this policy was contrary to their religious requirements or did they pursue it
in a justified way?
The Shfites have a particular viewpoint regarding the Caliphate, which distinctly differs
from the Sunniviewpoint. According to the former, the Caliphate is one of the essential and
cardinal features of the religion which through Naçc was determined by the Holy Prophet
(P.B.U.H) for the Ahi Bayt. With the Sunnites, it is one of the commandments of religion
because the Muslims in their collective capacity were made responsible for carrying out
certain obligations whose existence depends upon the maintenance of this institution.30
Prior to the establishment of the Buwayhid rule, the Sunnis were able to continue the
historical SunniCaliphate. With the disintegration of the empire in the late 'Abbãsid period
the Shfites were also able to establish their rule in some parts of the empire. In that case
30 AzIz al-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, P.17 1.
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they did not render obedience to the SunniCaliph. With the establishment of the Buwayhid
rule a new situation was created. The effective wielders of authority were the Shfites but at
the top of the authority stood the Caliph whom the Buwayhids did not remove on purpose.
On the social and political level both communities were allowed to practise theirfiqh.
Paradoxically, far from being antagonistic to the existence of the Sunniinstitutions, the
Buwayhids insisted on the necessity of continued co-operation with them. Hence in addition
to taking the practical measures to bridge the gap between both communities, the
Buwayhids patronized the Imänf 'Ulama' who accommodated the Buwayhids conciliatory
attitude towards the SunnI Caliphate and institutions. The era is famous for the
transformation of the Shfite theology.3 ' The concepts of the Imãinate and legitimacy of
authority under the non-Shfites were interpreted in response to the new situation,
rationalizing the existence of the SunnI institutions. It was considered legitimate to
provisionally accept the 'Abbasid Caliph, and to exercise authority themselves, without
installing an 'Alit Imãm.32
The Sunnijurists, in response to the detailed Shfite interpretations of the Imainate and
authority, had, therefore, also to explain the concept of the Imainate, authority, and
delegation in the context of new time and circumstances. Whereas al-Bãqillani
(d.403/1012) and al-Baghdadi (d.429/1037) dealt with these issues at some length, it was
al-Mawardi who thoroughly dealt with the contemporary issues according to the fiqh
requirements. He brought together the views of the past and contemporary jurists and
systematized them in his book al-Alikäm.
' Heinz Haim, Shiism, P.52
Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam, P.41.
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al-Mãwardi's views on the Legitimacy of the Early SunniCaliphates
al-MãwardI conceived the establishment of the Caliphate as obligatory for the
continuation of the Shari'!politics as revealed to the Prophet (P.B.U.H) and practised by
him.33 The fulfillment of this obligation, according to the al-Ahkãm, was then carried out in
the time of the Räshidtin Caliphs. al-Mãwardi regarded their age as a model one for
succeeding generations. He acknowledged the different modes of appointing the Caliphs
during this period as the standard precedents for the succeeding generations. The sphere of
the ruler's responsibilities was determined and he was acknowledged as the head of the
community both in religious and temporal affairs. The Caliphs exercised authority both for
the revival of religion and the well being of the subjects. 34 In the administration of temporal
affairs, they were just and impartial. 35 They put an end to tyranny and oppression. 36 At the
same time they did not neglect their responsibilities with regard to the promotion of
religion. They were concerned with the spread of the right cause and patronized their
subjects in fulfillment of their religious obligations. 37 They were thus not merely content
with the fulfillment of bare minimum but also set higher religious standards, which became
standard precedents for succeeding generations. aI-Mäwardi thus shared the viewpoint of
Ibn Khaldün (808/1405) who, in the words of Aziz al-Azmeh, compared this period with
the time of the Prophet (P.B.U.H). In his opinion: "the Medinian period, for all its brevity,
was a quarry of moral and religious perfection, of altruism, unworldliness, and pure
al-MAwardi, A.S., P.10.
' al-MAwardi, Na1h, P.119.
Ibid.
36 Ibid.
Ibid, PP.119-20.
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justice... it shared with later, brief periods of the fully Shar'ist Caliphate, in which it was
copied."38
In the post Rash idlin era, the Umayyad and the 'Abbãsid Caliphates were established. al-
Mãwardl considered most of the rulers of these regimes as worldly oriented. 39
 He severely
criticized the Umayyads for introducing innovations and altering the ways of the Sunna of
the Prophet (P.B.U.H).4° Similarly, he did not spare the 'Abbãsids for their neglect of public
welfare, their indulgence in expenditure on the construction of palaces, their lack of contact
with the needy and the poor, and their depriving access to the oppressed. 4 ' In the light of
the above remarks it would be wrong to assume, as Amoretti remarks, that there is a total
absence of any form of criticism in al-Mãwardi's writings towards the orthodox Caliphal
dynasties including the Umayyad dynasty which was ousted by the 'Abbãsids.42
At the same time, al-Mãwardi praised some of the Umayyads and the 'Abbãsids for their
commitment to uphold religious obligations. He also recognized their contribution with
regard to the enforcement of religious commandments. In his view, the 'Abbäsids deserved
full credit for the promotion of knowledge, for the enforcement of I-Iudi1, and for waging
jihäi43 Both his censor and praise for the same rulers meant that although he regretted the
lack of religious spirit, which characterized the RashidUn era, he considered them legitimate
rulers for carrying out a number of practices. He criticized them for evading that religious
spirit ideally required of a ruler which, however, did not deprive them of legitimate status.
38 AzIz aI-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, P.164.
al-MAwardi, NaIbat, P.121.
40 Ibid, P.133.
'"Ibid, P.560.
42 B.C.Amoretti, "Foreword" Politics and Revelution", P.xix.
' al-MAwardi, Nailat, PP.136-37.
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Their fondness of wealth and luxury were not so much legally reprehensible as inconsistent
with the religious spirit of Islam.
Attacks against Legitimacy of the Weak 'Abbid Caliph:
In the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Caliph had become weak and lost his previous
powers and prestige. Theoretically his supremacy was recognized but in reality he
depended for exercise of his authority on the Buwayhids who based their rule on military
strength. As mentioned earlier, the Buwayhids did not abolish the institution of the
Caliphate and exercised powers delegated to them by the Caliph. All official activities were
carried out in the name of the Caliph. Although the Buwayhids selected the person of their
own choice for the office, they nevertheless observed the necessary legal requirements for
the deposition and the installation of the Caliph.'
But was the mere adherence to these legal requirements enough for the legitimacy of the
Caliph? We have examined earlier that in the post Rffthidiin period the jurists linked the
legitimacy of the ruler with his ability to enforce Islamic injunctions. al-Mãwardi shared
their viewpoint and clearly acknowledged that the institution was indebted to the
management of religious and temporal affairs. 45 Objection could thus be raised as to how
the Caliph could be considered legitimate if he had lost the substance of his authority in
management of temporal affairs?
The rulers in Spain advanced the argument for the transference of the title to them on the
same ground. Although the process of disintegration of the 'Abbffsid Empire had since long
set in, none of the dynasts dared to assume the title of the Caliph as long as the 'Abbasid
441bn Athir, al-KAmil, vol.9, PP.80-8 1; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidã ya, vol. 11, P.15
al-MAward!, AS., P.10.
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Caliph was strong enough to exercise his authority in an effective way. In the tenth century
when the Turkish soldiers began to interfere in official matters and the authority of the
Caliph was considerably reduced, 'Abd al-Rabman III (d.350/961) claimed that the title
should naturally revert to him. Previously, the Umayyad rulers of Spain had refrained from
doing so, and in spite of assuming independence, had the Khujba read in the name of the
'Abbäsid Caliph. Ibn Khaldfln explained this change in their attitude and consequent
assumption of the title of the Caliph due to the weakness of the 'Abbffsid Caliph in
Baghdad. At this stage 'Abd a1-Ra1mãn III advanced further justification of the assumption
of the title because of the challenge of Ismã'ilism to the Sunnf world to which he considered
only himself in a position to respond effectively. Internally he also claimed to preserve
the religion according to the pattern of upright ancestors, revive the Sunna and defend the
faith.47 It followed from these claims that a ruler who was able to perform the most basic
responsibilities associated with the office of the Caliph could be the legitimate Caliph of the
Muslim world. The rulers of Spain thus thought that the title should now be conferred upon
them.
Ibn Khaldun's grandfather in North Africa advanced a similar argument for his
viewpoint regarding the Caliphate. According to him, with the weakness of the Caliph at
Baghdad, the claims to the leadership of the whole Muslim world should now be
transferred to Ibn Tumart(d.524/l 130), the ruler of North Africa.48
But in spite of all the arguments noted above, al-Mãwardl, like the majority of the jurists
of the age, recognized the 'Abbasid Caliphs legitimate during the period of his weakness. It
46 Janina Safran, "The command of the Faithful in Andalus": A Stud y In The Articulation Of Caliphal
Legitimacy; mt .J .Middle East Studies 30, P.190.
" Ibid, P.191.
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was in fact this viewpoint which held ground in the long run. According to Aziz al-Azmeh,
all the claimants, besides the 'Abbasids, could not continue with their claims as legitimate
in the long run and the 'Abbasid version remained an acceptable one.49
We can study al-Mãwardi's defence of the weak 'Abbasid Caliph during the Buwayhid
age by dividing the period into two parts. In part one we shall deal with the Caliph as he
acted and performed his responsibilities in al-MãwardI's own time. In the second part we
shall discuss the weak Caliph during the early Buwayhid period. aI-Mãwardi believed all
the 'Abbãsid Caliphs down to his own age to be legitimate, although from the tenth century
onwards, most of them had lost the substance of actual authority and relied on the Amir in
the fulfillment of their task.
The Legitimacy of the 'Abbäid Caliph in al-Mawardi's Time
Shortly before al-Mãwardi's time, the Caliph began to reassert his authority after
remaining under the tutelage of the Buwayhids for a considerable period of time. In the
words of Kraemer, al-Mãwardi advanced an ideological legitimization for a restored
Caliphate. 50 It is therefore not correct to assume the Caliph of al-Mãwardi's age as a puppet
in the hands of the Buwayhid Amir. The main factors, which contributed to the
development of this situation, can be explained as follows:
After the period of unity under the reign of the Buwayhid Amfr, 'Aud al-Dawla, his
successors were soon involved in internal rivalries and mutual conflicts. After the death of
'Aud al-Dawla, his successors could not solve the succession problem peacefully.
Although $amäm al-Dawla (d.388/998) was a common choice of the dignitaries who
Aziz al-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, P.166.
Ibid, P.167.
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raised him to the office of Amir al-Umara', his brother Sharaf al-Dawla (d.379/989) did not
acknowledge him and eventually succeeded in defeating him and assuming the control of
government. 5 ' Similarly after the reign of Bahã'al-Dawla (d.402/1Ol 1), Musharraf al-
Dawla (d.416/1025) rose in rebellion against SultAn al-Dawla (d.415/1024) and succeeded
in establishing his rule in Khuzistan and Iraq, though he later on acknowledged Sultan's
control over some parts of the empire. 52 Jalãl al-Dawla (d.435/1043) succeeded Musharraf
al-DawIa53
 whose period of government is well known for military revolts and anarchy.54
The constant civil wars proved detrimental to the stability of the government and once
again created problems for the Buwayhid government. Due to non-payment of salaries, the
soldiers rose in rebellion and regular uprising on their part undermined the authority of the
government.
The military insurrection of the Turkish soldiers, which subsided during the reign of
Mu'izz al-Dawla and 'Aud al-Dawla due to their wise policies, again revived and
contributed much to the undermining of the Buwayhid authority. Mu'izz al-Dawla absorbed
the fallen forces of al-BaghdAd into his army and treated them on an equal footing with the
Daylamites. 55 'Açlud al-Dawla proved himself equal to the task of keeping both the
Daylamites and the Turks united under his command. But none of the successors could
continue the policies initiated by the two early Buwayhid monarchs, Mu'izz al-Dawla and
'Aud al-Dawla. The civil war between Samam al-Dawla and BahA al-Dawla was in fact
fought between the Turks and the Daylamite soldiers and the victory of BahA' virtually
50 Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam, P.63.
51 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kãmil, vol.9, P.48; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidãya, vol. 11, P.260
Ibid, PP.317-327
Ibid, vol.9, P.376
Ibn, PP. 403-409; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidya, vol. 12, PP.19-36;
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meant the victory of the Turkish soldiers. 56 Having thus established their role, they began to
interfere in political affairs in the late Buwayhid period. By the time of Jalal's rule the
Turks began to exert considerable influence over matters of governmental policy.
With the resumption of control by the Turkish soldiers, the position of the Buwayhid
Amir was undermined. The Caliph took advantage of this situation and began to re-assert
his authority which he could hardly do previously.
Another factor, which led to the restoration of the Caliphate during the late Buwayhid
period, was the passing of the initiative from the Shfites to the Sunnites in the series of the
protracted dissension's which had continued from the beginning of Buwayhid rule. In the
age of Mu'izz al-Dawla when Shfite practices were encouraged under official patronage,
the Sunnites were helpless against this development. Following the peaceful and neutral age
of 'Açlud al-Dawla, the reign of Bahã' al-Dawla witnessed the Sunnifaction assuming the
initiative. 57
 This development coincided with the rise of Ma1müd of Ghazna whose open
professions of loyalties to the Caliph encouraged the Caliph to act in a bold manner.
Regarding the changed positions of both communities in this period, MafIzullah says that
the Sunnftes now held parallel ceremonies with the Shfites and the Caliph asserted himself
vigorously in religious matters.58
The natural effects of these developments resulted in the restoration of authority of the
Caliph who now regularly began to assert his authority through his acts and policies. A few
examples support this claim.
M.A.Shaban, Islamic Histor y. A New Interpretation, vol. 2, P.163.
56 Maflzullah Kabir, The Buwayhid Dynasty of BaghdAd, P.89.
r Ibid, P.206.
58 Ibid.
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Up to the age of the Caliph Tai'(d.393/1002) the Buwayhids played a key role in making
and deposing the 'Abbasid Caliphs. With the uprisings of the Turkish soldiers, the same
practice did not continue. Now the Buwayhids were themselves faced with the problem of
constant insurrections of the Turkish soldiers. Sometimes they requested the Caliph to settle
their disputes with the Turkish soldiery and the Caliph in fact settled their disputes by
playing the role of a mediator.59
Making an appointment to the judicial post continued to remain the responsibility of the
Caliph. Once Bahã' al-Dawla appointed Alimad al-Musãvi as the chief Qaçi'i The Caliph
strongly objected to the appointment. The Buwayhids Amfr did not insist on his decision
and immediately withdrew the appointment.60
The Caliph owed his legitimate existence primarily to the exercise of his authority as a
religious figure. During the period under discussion the Caliph began to assert his religious
powers in a more effective way. Qädir Bi Allah (d.42211030) issued a famous proclamation
known as the Qa'Jirite creed. According to it, the Mu'tazilites were prevented from the
propagation of rational interpretations of their religious ideas, which ran contrary to the
views of the traditionists. Strong measures were also adopted with respect to heretics and
they were prevented from spreading their ideas any further. 6 ' The open vilifying of the
Companions of the Prophet (P.B.U.H) was declared unlawful. The fact that this creed was
enforced testifies to the restored status of the Caliph. These injunctions were not limited to
the lands under Buwayhid control but were conveyed to the powerful dynasts of the time.
For instance, QAdir Bi Allah directed Maimüd of Ghazna (d.421/1030) for the revival of
Ibid, P.200.
60 Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya, vol. 11, PP.285-286; Ibn Athir, al-Kãmil, vol.9, P.182
61 Ibn Kathir, al-B idãya, vol. 12, P.6.
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the Sunna. Ma1mud's compliance with the directive indicated that he recognized the Caliph
as the religious head of the Muslim community.62
However, restoration of Caliphal authority during this period needs to be interpreted in a
realistic manner. Although the Caliph's authority in religious and judicial affairs was fully
restored and cases of resistance to unjust policies of the Amir were not uncommon, the
Amir still retained initiative in the executive sphere. The Caliph continued to be a
stipendiary of the Buwayhids right to the last years of their rule, 63 although they could not
now easily interfere with his income resources. The Caliph's protest against the
confiscation of jawãif (poll tax) by Jalãl al-Dawla (435/1043), the latter's attitude towards
the protest and subsequent developments explain the position of both the Caliph and the
Amir during this period. On this occasion, writes Ibn al-Jawzi (d.751/1350), the Caliph
wrote to Jal1 al-Dawla that he would have overlooked the negligible amount, had Jalãl al-
Dawla taken it in a proper way. The unjust usurpation by JalãI al-Dawla posed a challenge
to his authority and prestige. In protest he threatened to leave the city, close the mosques
and prevent the holding of the Friday Prayer. In reply Jaläl al-Dawla assured him of his
complete subordination and clarified his constraints of facing the dissatisfied soldiers who
demanded money for which he had no alternative except to take this money. From the
following year he restored the Caliph's income to him.M
The Legitimacy of the Weak 'Abbäid Caliph during the Early Buwayhid Period
Compared to this age if we look at the early Buwayhid age, the Caliph MutI' (d.363/974)
could not resist the unjust demands of the Amir Bakhtyar (367/977) and had to sell his
62 Ibid.
63 MalIzuIIah Kabir, The Buwavhid Dynasty of Baghdad, P.192.
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personal belongings to satisfy his demand of payment of a big amount of money.65
Removal and installation of the Caliph during this period largely depended upon the will of
the Amir. Unlike Qaim bi Amr Allah (d.467/1074) who forced the BuwayhidAmir, Jalãl al-
Dawala to restore his annual income which he had unjustly seized, the Caliphs of the early
Buwayhid age were helpless against the regular usurpation of their income by the
Buwayhids.66 The Caliph was unable to carry out some of his religious responsibilities like
making arrangements for the pilgrimage and waging Jihad. Yet having lost most of his
actual authority the Caliph continued to perform some important religious and judicial
functions which earned him a legitimate status and showed the existence of the institution
to be necessary.
In the exercise of temporal affairs al-Mäwardi relied upon the Amir whose constitutional
supremacy was still recognized. His legitimacy as an office holder was unaffected because
as a Caliph he imparted his powers to the Amir who exercised them on his behalf through
the principle of delegation. We can sum up the arguments for his legitimacy under the
following heads:
Observance of Legal Procedure
Although the Buwayhids chose the person of their own choice as a Caliph during this
period, their options were limited in making this choice. For instance, the Buwayhid Amir
had to choose a Caliph from the Quraysh lineage. The Buwayhids never chose a man
having some defect, which could render him disqualified according to the fuqaha'. The
Buwayhids also gave due regard to the opinion of the people of power and influence in the
Ibn aI-Jawzl, al-Muntazam, vol. 15, PP. 285-286.
65 Ibn Miskawaihi, The Experiences Of The Nations, P.330; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidãya, vol. 11, P. 230
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choice of the new Caliph. They took an oath of allegiance to the Caliph. The Umarã' of the
neighbouring dynasties then ratified it. On the death of each Caliph or Amir it was renewed
from both sides. Thus we see that after the deposition of al-Mustakfi, Mu'izz's choice fell
upon Muqtadir's son Faal who was also a favourite of the dignitaries of the court.
Similarly Qadir Bi Allah was a common choice of the Buwayhids, the dignitaries of the
court, the Daylarnites and the Turkish military chiefs.67
Even after the deposition of the Caliph the Buwayhids observed the legal procedure and
immediately installed a new Caliph so as to give continuity to the office of the Caliphate.
Moreover on the deposition of the Caliph, his signature was secured on the document of
abdication and witnessed by the judges and the senior officials. 68 After the installation of
the Caliph the traditional procedure of ratifying the oath of allegiance by the 'ulamã', the
dignitaries of the court, the military chiefs, and finally by the people at the Friday Prayer,
continued to be a regular practice throughout the Buwayhid period.
Having seen that the Buwayhids did not disregard the observance of the legal procedure
in the choice of the Caliph, we now turn to the role played by the Caliph in some important
affairs like the administration of the judiciary and religion. Although the Caliph was
deprived of most of the executive powers, which were carried out in his name, some
judicial and religious functions were performed directly under his supervision. His
existence was therefore considered necessary.
Maflzullah Kabir, The Buwayhid D ynasty of Baghdad, P, 191.
67 Ibn Athir, al-Kämil, vol.9, P. 80; Ibn Kathir, al-B idaya, vol. 11, P.264
68 Azfz al-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, P.166.
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The Head of an Independent Judiciary
The Caliph's independence as a head of the judiciary was a function of most
fundamental importance, which remained almost unchallenged throughout the Buwayhid
period. Referring to this period, A.H.Siddiqi observed that since the 'U/ama' who were
raised to the post of Qafi received very little or no salary, the institution remained
completely immune from official interference. 69 Even the Caliph himself could not affect
the normal work of the department. But he did not allow anybody else to interfere in the
judicial business of the country. The Buwayhid's intervention in the administration of
justice was very minimal compared to their influence over other departments.7°
Mu'izz, the founder and the most powerful ruler of the Buwayhid dynasty, reduced the
powers of the Caliph to a considerable extent. He nevertheless preferred to stand aside in
the conduct of the judicial business of the country. He allowed it to continue under the
supervision of the Caliph. On one occasion, sixteen years after the inauguration of his rule,
he was caught up in economic crises. He decided to bring the judiciary also under his
control. On the death of the Shl'i Qaçlf al-Qudat, Abfl al-Sã'ib 'Utbã Al- Hamdänl in
340/96 1, Mu'izz gave this post to Abu al-'Abbas Abd Allah Ibn 'All Ibn Shawãrib in
exchange for an annual payment of two lacks Dirhams, to meet the requirements of the
treasury. The Caliph Muti' could not reconcile himself to this measure and decided to exert
moral pressure by declining to see him or appear along with him in public ceremonials.
This measure together with a refusal to bestow honours on the appointee of Mu'izz forced
the appointee to go to Mu'izz for the same purpose. The appointment was ridiculed to the
extent that it did not find acceptance even by the co-religionists of Mu'izz. Two years later
69 A.H.Siddlqul, The Caliphate and Kin gship in Medieval Persia, P.33.
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Jbn Abi Shawãrib was dismissed when an 'A/id ascetic, Abü Abd Allah Dã.i appealed to
Mu'izz in the name of 'All Ibn Abi Tãlib to cancel the appointment.7'
So the judiciary continued to remain within the jurisdiction of the Qacli under the
patronage of the Caliph. If sometimes the Buwayhid Amfr wanted to impose a man of his
own choice against the choice of the Caliph, his attempt was resisted and did not succeed.
By another example we can also recognize the constraints of the Buwayhids in the
conduct of judicial business at that time. Qaçfic were free and uninfluenced in the selection
of attestors. Once 'Aud al-Dawla's military General asked him for the inclusion of a
name, via the Qaçii in the list of the attestors. 'Aud warned him to refrain from interfering
in judicial matters, which were exclusively the business of the QafL He said: "Neither you
nor I have any say in the matter."72
Of course while the Caliph exercised a check over the inclusion of the name, it
nevertheless remained the business of the Qaff under the supervision of the Caliph.
The Delegation of Powers
Universal recognition of right order based on religion and justice in medieval Islam had
persisted up to the time of the Buwayhids. Hence the regulation of contemporary politics,
like other aspects of life, had to be carried out according to its requirements. Within such a
context it is easily understandable that during the period of instability before the Buwayhids
when the different dynasts came to occupy the capital of the Caliphate, no conscious effort
was ever made to alter the fundamental concept regarding the exercise of authority. Under
the Buwayhids too, the fundamental concept regarding the exercise of authority remained
70 Muftzullah Kabir, "Administration of Justice under the Buwayhid", Islamic Culture, P.69.
' Ibid, PP.70-7 1.
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unchallenged. Accordingly the Buwayhids, following the tradition of previous dynasts,
conformed to the practice of seeking their place by continuing the old system. Through a
carefully worked-out formulation, al-Mawardi sought to regulate their mutual relations in
which several religious obligations were imposed on both the Caliph and the Buwayhids7.
The legitimization of their exercise of power was conditional upon the fulfillment of
those requirements. Through such a formulation both the Caliph and the Amir were
accommodated within the Caliphal set-up. Along with safeguarding the constitutional
means of the acquisition of authority, the power realities of that period were also
recognized.74
The Caliph, the lawful occupant of authority, had now become weak but was still
recognized as the legitimate source of all authority. Pointing to this medieval attitude and
practice, Rosenthal rightly remarks that the Caliph's right to impart authority to
subordinates obliged even the self-appointed rulers to submit to the Caliph.75
In Islam it was classically hard to distinguish the worldly from the religious, for
undertaking all the worldly affairs, it is claimed that man is bound to be compensated in the
hereafter. Consequently every act has religious consequences, hence the legitimization of
power through a religious source for which the Caliph was the highest authority. Since all
authority could legitimately be derived from him, the principle of delegation was one of the
cardinal features of al-Mãwardi's formulation; and it was only through this that the
Buwayhids could exercise authority effectively without compromising the constitutional
72 A.H.Siddlqul, Caliphate and Kin gship in Medieval Persia, PP.44-45.
al-Mawardi, A.S., P.34.
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status of the Caliph. But to be able to exercise the powers in a legitimate manner they were
also made responsible for carrying out certain responsibilities the proper observance of
which would turn their usurpation into a legal rule and would make delegation a proper
device imparting validity to their rule.76
They took the oath of allegiance at the hands of the Caliph. They were bestowed
honours by the Caliph in the ceremony regularly held on the death and deposition of every
Caliph and Amir. 77 According to Bosworth, the Caliph gave the seal of Sunni orthodoxy
and legitimacy to the secular ruler of Islam by sending them a formal document granting
them lands ('Ahd,ManshUr).Usually such a grant was also accompanied with other insignia
of royalty, a standard (Liwã), robes of honours (KhilTashrfat), and above all, by an award
of honorific titles (Alqab).78
The quest for legitimacy on the part of the Buwayhids through these titles was so great
that although Shfite in origin, they always sought their honorific title from the 'Abbffsid
Caliph. They gave assurances of loyalty to the Caliph through written documents.79
All the three requirements amounted to recognizing the constitutional requirements,
which they fulfilled. The Caliph on his part delegated his authority to them because at this
moment it was only they who were in a position to exercise authority on his behalf. But the
delegation was conditional on continued observance of the right order based on religion and
justice.8°
76 al-MAwardi, A.S., P.38.
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With the recognition of the less preferred (MafcJUl) as a legitimate Caliph, the 'Ulamã'
assumed some of the responsibilities, which ideally belonged to the Caliph. The Caliph
acknowledged their role to interpret the law in all walks of life including politics. During
the late 'Abbffsid period, the weak Caliph was recognized as legitimate in the same manner.
The Caliphate continued to be considered a religious necessity but the Caliph was too weak
to exercise many of his powers in an effective way. The best solution to retain the Caliphate
without losing its central figure was to delegate his powers to someone who could
effectively exercise it on his behalf. The Caliph Rã1 Bi Allah (d.329/940) was the first
Caliph who realized the necessity of this principle. He authorized Ibn Rai'q (d.330/941) to
exercise authority on his behalf. 8 ' From that time onwards, it became an increasing desire
of different provincial dynasts to occupy the seat of authority in the capital city and exercise
these powers on behalf of the Caliph.
The inclusion of the Amir, therefore, as an effective wielder of the authority added an
effective person for lending support to the system which had become difficult for the
Caliph to manage on his own. The Amir was made responsible for assisting the Caliph in
enforcing the commandments, which the Caliph could not properly carry out due to his
increased weakness. The Amir was required to exercise his authority within certain limits,
and any permanent deviation on his part justified his exclusion from authority. 82 His
legitimacy, therefore, depended on the exercise of his authority within a religious context.
The 'ulama', therefore, continued to play their traditional role of explaining the law
regarding all the aspects of life. The Amir was responsible for its enforcement under the
supervision of the Caliph. For instance, the 'ularnã' explained the responsibilities of the
81 Ibn Miskawaihi, The Experiences Of The Nations, vol.], P. 3961; Ibn Kathir, aI-Bidäya, vol. 11, P.432.
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Caliph with regard to congregational prayer in the context of his time and circumstances.
The Amir was responsible for assisting the Caliph for its enforcement. Similarly in the case
of the Ijajj obligation the Caliph acquired the services of the Amir to make the routes safe
for people to perform the IEIajj in peace and security.
In the light of the above facts we can say that the Buwayhids did not neglect their
responsibility with regard to exercising their authority within a religious context. They
might occasionally have had a strained relationship with the Caliph over the exercise of
authority, but never brought into question the manner and the purpose of exercising the
authority. The effective ruler, throughout the era of the weak Caliph, never disputed the
complete guidance through religion regarding all aspects of life including politics, although
he may have fallen short of its proper observance.83
Discussing the mutual relationship of the Sultan with the Caliph, Bernard Lewis avoids
using the terms 'religious' and 'secular' since, as he states, there was no such division in
Islam and the character of all the authority was regarded as religious in that period.84
Moreover there was no interference in the elaboration of the Divine law and it remained
the function of the jurist. Nor could the deviations of the Amir from Divine Law ever form
valid precedents. Nor was he ever regarded as being above criticism if he violated it.
Talking about the reign of the Caliph versus the strong Amir Rosenthal says: "the whole of
life is ordered by the religious, all-embracing Divine law. The authority and validity of this
law were never questioned by any effective Muslim ruler, no matter what his own practice
was. He could not abrogate the religious law, though he might at times set it aside. The
82 al-MAwardi, A.S., P.34
83 E.I.J.Rosenthal, Political Thou ght in Medieval Islam, PP.23-24.
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unchallenged exercise of political power could not clear him from offences against the
Shari a, though the Caliph would not dare to challenge him for want of effective power."85
Realizing the validity of these principles with regard to the Buwayhid era, Rosenthal
repeats similar impressions. He says that in view of the all-pervading character of the
Divine Law, it was not possible for the Buwayhids to ignore the fundamental principle that
the authority bestowed by ijma' or the Muslim community on the lawful Caliph was the
only acceptable authority to the Muslims.86
Concluding the contract with the Caliph, therefore, gave them legal status: through the
delegation by the Caliph they became legitimate in the eyes of the Muslim masses. Hence
without violating the juristic principles on which the theory of the Caliphate was based, it
was possible to regularize the Caliph-Amir relationship by accommodating both within the
Caliphal set-up. As we can see throughout the period of the Buwayhid rule, on no occasion
did they fall short of fulfilling the legal requirements, which legitimized their rule. 87 From
the fulfillment of these legal requirements regularly carried out on the installation and
deposition or the death of every Caliph and AmIr we can recognize and appreciate that the
principle of the delegation of power was put into practice. For the Buwayhids it was an
effective means of securing the loyalties of their subjects.88
Legally all the institutions derived their legitimacy from the person of the Caliph. It was
also in recognition of this principle that the Amirs of different dynasties were able to assert
their control without at the same time refusing to acknowledge the Caliphal supremacy.
85 E.I.J.Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, PP.23-24.
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Supporting the same idea, AzIz al-Azmeh states that in this system the powers were not
derogated but delegated. Legitimacy, according to him, was the fulfillment of certain legal
conditions.89
Irrespective of the bad treatment to which the Caliph was subjected, the institution of the
Caliphate remained intact. If the Caliph interrupted the exercise of delegated authority by
the Amir whom he legitimized as the holder of authority, the latter's act of deposing the
Caliph was not performed without conforming to the legal requirement of the procedure.
The signature of the deposed Caliph was secured in the first instance; if he did not co-
operate in this regard, a letter of impeachment issued from the chief Justice duly signed by
the high officials served the same purpose as an alternative method. In either case the legal
requirements were fulfilled to effect the deposition.9°
al-Mãwardi's primary object in stating the theory of Caliphate was to assert the
establishment of the right order based on religion and justice. According to aI-Baghdadi, he
considered the revealed law as the final authority.9'
The weakness of the Caliph was accepted but his relations with the Amir were regulated
in such a way that the absolute character of the Caliphate should be least effected.92
If the power realities of the time did not allow the Caliph to exercise his temporal
control as before, it was conceded that the immediate reconciliation on the part of the
Caliph with the new situation would not bring matters to a constitutional crisis. 93
 al-
89 AzTz al-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, P.170.
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Mãwardi qualified the further continuation of the Amir in the same capacity provided his
motives and actions were in accordance with the requirements of religion.94
In other words, in return for legitimizing the AmIr he was seeking the continued
enforcement of the right order, and also to forestall the humiliation of the Caliph, as
Rosenthal observed.95
In an irreversible situation this looked to be a good attainable solution according to al-
Mãwardi. Failure to ensure this continuity would result, as observed by al-Mãwardi, in
disorder and disturbance.96
To prevent any break in the continued application of the right order, al-Mãwardi insisted
on the re-adjusted power roles of the different persons within the Caliphal set-up. His
following points are worthy of note with regard to both the Caliph and the Amir in power
sharing:
The Status of the Caliph
He saw no impediment in the way of the constitutional status of the Caliph if he
remained content with his real position in temporal affairs.97
Since the Caliph no longer exercised authority as ideally his office demanded but was
still recognized as the legitimate head of the Muslim community, it was suggested to him to
acquire the services of one who could assist him in the performance of his authority in
temporal affairs. This would not be unconstitutional provided the person assisting the
Caliph was not guilty of violating the right order based on religion and justice. The Caliph
was nevertheless required to demand the different persons to submit to legal requirements
Ibid.
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210
and acquire those powers through delegation. The effective wielder of the authority had
formally to accept the Caliph as the legitimate head of the Muslim community. The Caliph
was also made responsible for seeing whether the administration was carried out in the right
way. If he noticed any serious breach on the part of the effective authorities, he was
authorized to summon and acquire the services of some other powerful dynast who would
perform the same job for the Caliph in a right and more effective way.98
The Status of the Amir
With the weakening of the 'Abbãsid authorities, different persons rose to the position of
exercising authority on behalf of the Caliph. In the first place it was the Turkish soldiers
who dominated the Caliph. In a highly uncertain period that followed, this position began to
be occupied by Ibn Rai'q (d.333/944), the military Generals like Tuzün and Bajkam
(d.329/940) and provincial dynasts like Jbn Baridi ( 333/944) and Nair al-Dawla. The
Buwayhids successful occupation of Baghdad now gave them a similar role hitherto played
by the different persons in the capacity of Aniir al-Umara'. al-Mãwardi's choice of the
word is broad enough to encompass all the categories including the Buwayhid Amfr when
he had occupied this post.99
The term was equally applicable to the coming era when the Buwayhids themselves
faced the prospects of being overthrown at the hands of some newly emerging dynast, like
Malmfld of Ghazna or Tughril Beg (d.455/1063). Dealing with the role they had to play in
the existing set-up, al-Mãwardi assigned to them certain responsibilities, the
accomplishment of which would give them a legitimate status.
96 
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The Responsibilities of the Amir
The irregular situation consequent upon the act of usurpation could be regularized
provided the usurper undertook to fulfil certain conditions under two broad categories: (1)
recognizing the constitutional status of the Caliph and, (2) the enforcement of the right
order based on religion and justice.'°°
The first category also included several other legal requirements most of which we have
already discussed. The emphasis was made in general terms like the immediate and direct
submission to the Caliph or showing no act of defiance or opposition. The AmIr's exercise
of authority that belonged to the Caliph through delegation would then be legitimate but
subject to fulfillment of requirements as stipulated in the second category.
The second category stipulated that the Amir should continue the right order in an
uninterrupted manner and upon the fulfillment of this requirement depended the onward
legitimacy of his rule.'°'
al-Mãwardi made it thoroughly clear that the Amir, by virtue of his effective position,
would perform the administrative functions on behalf of the Caliph and not in defiance to
his authority, and the Caliph in turn would recognize his status as legitimate. A survey of
al-Mawardi's text in the al-Ahkãm makes it clear that the temporary reconciliation on his
part with the changed roles of both the Caliph and the Aniir was in fact an effective way of
securing the right order to which the Caliphal office owed legitimacy. The reason behind
the whole scheme, according to Aziz al-Azmeh, was to delegate the absolutism of the
98 Ibid.
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Caliphate.' 02 The office was certainly above the person of the Caliph.' 03 The Caliphate
owed legitimacy to the proper enforcement of the right order. At the period of the weakness
of the Caliph when he was still regarded as the source of legitimate authority but lacked the
resources to enforce the right order properly, he was required to be content with the
exercise of nominal control and authorize the Amir on his behalf to exercise the authority
for the same purpose.
Such a formulation which sought to reconcile the theory of the Caliphate with the
existing practices also offered a solution to the problem of the Shfite-Sunnite co-operation
on official level. The fact that al-Mãwardi won the favours of both the Caliph and the
Buwayhids and was entrusted by both suggest that there was a fundamental agreement over
the principles of al-Abkãm. The Buwayhids were the Shfites. Their quest for a long rule
over the population that was predominantly Sunni brought them close to the path of
compromise. They willingly chose to continue the SunniCaliphate they had inherited from
the conquered people. al-Mãwardi in acknowledgement of their positive treatment towards
the Caliphate and the Sunnite institutions recognized them as legitimate. But to be
legitimate in the eyes of their co-religionists they had to justify their political behaviour,
which seemed contrary to the basic requirements of their religion. Being Shfites they were
required to render allegiance to an Imän who believed that authority in fact belonged to
their Imãn and would be returned to him on his reappearance.'° 4
 As the 'Abbffsid Caliph
failed to satisfy these requirements, the early Im.ni jurists, following the period of great
occultation, not only considered the 'Abbasid Caliphs illegitimate but strictly disallowed
AzIz aI-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, P.170.
'° Ibid, P.176.
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any co-operation with them. The later Imãni jurists, however, redefined the relationship
with actual authorities during the period of occultation (ghayba). The beginning of their
reliance on the reasoned argument (Kalam) paved the way for the development of their
05 The 'Abbasid Caliph, according to them, might not be strictly a legitimate, the
daily affairs could lawfully be carried out under his rule as long as he tolerated Shi'ism.
Accordingly, they had to rely on the support of the uiilI 'ulamff' who undertook the task of
reinterpretation of the Shfitefiqh.
The 'Abbãid- Buwayhid Concordat:
The recourse of the UFU1Is to the rationalist method, following the Mu 'tazilites of their
age, enabled them to justify the existence of the Sunnite institutions as well as the co-
operation with the Sunnite authorities. Before examining some of the details of those
religious and political reinterpretations it seems necessary to take an overview of those
practical measures they took to promote co-operation with the Sunni authorities and the
institutions.
In the context of explaining the relation of the Caliph with the Buwayhids the writers
have often highlighted the differences that existed between both. Focussing their attention
upon the small periods in which their mutual relationship was strained, and, consequently,
the Caliphs were deposed, they tend to forget the long periods of cordial relationship that
existed between them. Indeed in maintaining the smooth relationship on a permanent basis
both the Buwayhid and the Caliph had to agree over the terms and conditions without which
it would have been difficult for both to co-exist for more than a century. If we omit the
104 Madelung, "Authority in twelver Shiism in the absence of the Imãm" Religious Schools and Sects
in Medieval Islam, P.170
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occasional harsh treatment to which the Caliph was subjected, or when due to
misunderstanding and power tussle the mutual relations of the Amir and the Caliph were
strained, we see the positive and willing initiative on the part of both parties to build up a
happy and cordial relationship. The Caliph, realizing his position over the past years, was
reconciled to limit his role to the enforcement of religion and patronizing the 'ulamã' in
interpreting the law. As the effective representatives of the authority, he acknowledged the
Buwayhids for carrying out the old system in a satisfactory manner. To this arrangement the
Buway/zids had no objection. The power thus acquired by them was exercised vigorously
and as time went on they tried to consolidate and strengthen their relationship with the
Caliph. They cherished the desire, says the Encyclopaedia of Islam, to be treated as the fifth
school of the Sunnijurisprudence.'°6 By a brief survey we can note the examples on the part
of the Buwayhids to bridge the gap between them and the Caliph both by practical measures
and through the efforts of the 'ulamã'. The over-all impression we get from their reign of
more than a century is that their treatment of the Caliph was not bad. Mu'izz al-Dawla
deposed and blinded al-MustakfI when the former was sure that the feast arranged by him
in honour of military officers was an intrigue by the Caliph for his deposition.'° 1 It was then
impossible for him to allow somebody to continue at his own expense. After this we find
one more example of deposition but without blinding. Bahä' al-Dawla deposed the Caliph
Tai' but treated him with consideration after his deposition. After that we also see the long
reigns of Qadir bi Allah (d.442/1031) and Qa'im bi Amr Allah (d.467/1074) when the
105 Heinz HaIm, Shiism, P.51
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mutual friendship and confidence increased. In support of the impression of the improved
relationship, some more practical measures were taken which are quoted below.
To strengthen the relationship with the Caliph the Buwayhids gave their daughters in
marriage to the Caliphs. In fact the tradition started as early as the reign of Bakhtiyar, the
second Buwayhid ruler who gave his daughter to Tai'(d.39311002). It was then 'Aud who
carried out the same practice during his reign)° 8 The Khufba of the marriage was read by
the Sunni Qaç/fAbu 'All Uasan b. 'All al-TankhI (d.342/953). Explaining the purpose of
the marriage, MafIzullah, on the authority of Miskawaihi, says that 'Aud's hope was that
should a son be born to her, he would have him declared as the Caliph's successor, so that
the Caliphate and the Emirate might be united in the same dynasty.'°9 It clarified the
Buwayhid's desire to see the unification of the temporal and spiritual authority within the
same person. The other purpose obviously could be to win more support of the masses and
their recognition as legitimate rulers of the Muslims. The measure also confirmed their
liberal attitude towards the Sunni creed. The purpose was to a large extent achieved by
showing them as being on very intimate terms with the Caliph.
By their mutual understanding and good will the Buwayhids sometimes performed the
issue of the deed of investiture to the various princes of the provinces. But for getting the
same deed of the investiture from the Caliph they missed no occasion to observe the legal
procedure and its requirements for demonstrating the importance of the office and to win
popular sympathies through it.°
'° Muflzullah Kabir, The Buwa yhid Dynasty of Baghdad, P.57.
'° Ibid.
lb A.H SiddiquL, The Cali phate and the Kingship in Medieval Persia, P.33.
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After the reign of Mu'izz al-Dawla it was realized by the Buwayhids that to be able to
rule effectively the Buwayhids had to base their policies on fairness and justice without
prejudice towards any section of the community they governed. Their main problem was
the restoration of law and order. It was told to 'Aud al-Dawla that the main hurdle in way
of this restoration was the Shfa-Sunni riots, which were spread by preachers of both
communities." He imposed a ban on sermons and tale telling by the preachers of both
communities and prevented them from inquiring about the name of any Companion. People
were advised instead to stick to the Qur'an." 2
 Adoption of such a measure was an
important step forward to minimize and lessen the tension between both communities.
It was during the same age that for the first time, on the request of the Amir 'Ajud al-
Dawla, the Caliph agreed to include his name in the khufba of the Friday prayer after his
own name." 3 This Innovation by 'Aud al-Dawla and its continuation throughout the
remaining Buwayhid period indicated the importance which the Buwayhids attached to the
recognition by the Caliph. Through the person of the Caliph the Buwayhids made sure that
the same practice was adopted by the provincial dynasts so as to confirm their legitimate
status throughout the Muslim world. Such measures clearly indicated that the Buwayhids
wanted to reduce the religious gap between both communities and sought reconciliation
through being mentioned in the same khufba and in the same mosque.
The other practical measure which they took to identify their cause with the religious
practices of Sunnf Islam, was their sharing of the right of drum-beating at the time of the
prayer. 'Aud al-Dawla, again the pioneer of this custom, succeeded in getting permission
1 MatIzullah Kabir., The Buwavhid Dynasty of Baghdad, P.67.
" Ibn Kathir, jja, vol. 11, p. 246.
" Ibid, P.248.
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of the Caliph to share the right of the drum-beating three times a day during the prayer
times. SultAn al-Dawla and. JalAl al-Dawla, however, shared the same right with the
Caliph during all the five prayer.' 15 The increasing tendency of patronizing the Sunnite
religious practices on the part of the Buwayhids clearly indicated their desire to minimize
the gap with Sunnites on religious grounds.
The efforts of 'Aud al-Dawla to provide patronage to the 'ulamif'- of all schools sects
also testify to his unprejudiced treatment of all schools. He made the routes safe to Mecca
for the safe performance of the Ijajj.
Funds were provided for the renovation of mosques without any special regard to both
the Shfite and the Sunnite communities. Similarly the salaries of the Imains of the mosques,
jurists and MuhaddithUn were enhanced and regularized regardless of their affiliations to
any community." 6 'Aclud al-Dawla has been constantly referred to as having summoned
the preachers of both communities and to have listened to their sermons with great care.
Apart from the above-mentioned practical measures, they also adopted the means and
measures to reduce the gap between both communities. They patronized Shi'ite scholars,
who justified co-operation with Sunnite authorities. The government encouraged the efforts
on the part of these 'ularna'. It was in the late Buwayhid age that al-Murtaçla (d.436/1044)
showed the consistency of this viewpoint with the principles of Shfitefiqh.
From the time of enunciation of their doctrines they had regarded, in the absence of the
Imain 's rule, all the governmental authority as illegitimate. Ideally suitable for a male heir
of 'All from the line of F4ima, the office could later on be taken by any Shfite member of
" A.H Siddiqu!, The Cali phate and Kingship in Medieval Persia, P.36.
Ibid, P.38.
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the Muslim community. As long as the Imains were alive, the existence of any other Imain
was illegitimate, hence all the 'Abbãsid authority had been illegitimate." 1 But even after
the period of the Imains was over, the minimum criteria for the legitimacy of the Imãinate
was that the ruler was required to believe that all the authority belonged to the Imain. In
other words no Sunnite was qualified to hold the legitimate authority as a ruler. The best
solution that the Imainic found to deal with the problem was to adopt the method of the
Mu 'tazilite. The incorporation of the rationalistic arguments, therefore, now began to form
a regular part of their 	 18
Luckily for them, this synchronized with the need of the Buwayhid rulers. The
Buwayhids provided all the patronage to the Imänf scholars whose books later on began to
be regarded as the text for the Imänireligion.
al-Mufid (d.413/1022) was the first famous jurist to reinterpret some of the Shi'ite views
according to the rational method. Unlike his predecessors Kulayni (d.328/939) and Suduq
(d.38 1/991-92) who confined themselves to revealed texts as interpreted by the Imãins, he
relied both on the religious as well as the rational interpretations in explaining the
fundamental concepts like the Imänate and occultation." 9 He was officially encouraged in
his views. 'Aud al-Dawla, is said to have paid personal visits to his home. After him, his
pupil, a1-Murtaã carried the same principle to its logical conclusion. Being a high
favourite of the official authorities, he altogether relied on rational method and preferred to
ii6 Ibn Miskawaihi, The Experiences Of The Nations, vol. II, P.443; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidãya vol. 11,
pp.251-252
Madelung Wilferd, "Authority in twelver Shiism in the absence of the Imam"; Religious Sects And
School In Medieval Islam, P.170.
Ibid, P.167.
" A. J. Newman, The Development and Political Significance of the Rationalist (usflll) and
Traditionalist (Akhbärl) Schools in ImAm! Shi'I Histor y from the Third/Ninth to the TenthlSixteenth
century A.D., P.S.
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apply it even where it conflicted with the Shfite Fiqh principles. Whereas his predecessors
Kulayni and al-$uduq did not allow any kind of association with non-Shi'ite authorities,
both al-Murtaã and his teacher al-Mufid redefined the nature of illegitimate authority and
permitted much greater accommodation with secular authority.' 20 Again with the
authorities, such a stand was consistent with the mode of their policies. The formation of
cordial relations with the Sunnite population as well as with the Caliph was their choice.
The rational interpretation of religious principles therefore suited their purposes best. Their
quest for a better relationship with the Sunnites can be judged by the following remarks in
the Encyclopaedia of/slam: "it is said that at this moment when the four schools remaining
to the Sunnites were to be defined by them as exclusively orthodox, they would have
wished that their form of Shfism might be recognized at the heart of umma as the fifth
authorized school." 2 ' al-Murtaa along with his brother RãjI was, therefore, asked to play
the role of intermediary between the Caliph and them on the one hand and between the
population and themselves on the other.'22
We can judge from this gradual shift from the age of Kulayni to the age of al-Murtaã
that the rational reinterpretation of fiqh principles by the us'UlJs, afforded the
accommodation to the Sunnite political institutions as they worked under the Caliphal set-
up. The Buwayhid rulers did not confine their patronage to the scholars of the Shfite circle,
they patronized the Sunni scholars as well. Abü-I3akr al-Baqilani, an orthodox Sunnite
scholar, was appointed as the tutor of 'Aud's son.23 The highly distinctive place that al-
MAwardi enjoyed at the court of Jalãl 'al-Dawla cannot be over-emphasized. The post of
'20Jbjd
' 21 CL.Cahen, art. "Buwayhids or Buyids", Enc yclopaedia of Islam, vol. 1, R1352.
'221b1d
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the wiz irate was not confined to the Shfites alone but the orthodox Sunnites were also
raised to the post and shared the responsibilities of administration with the Amir. For
instance in the reign of Bahã' al-Dawla, 'Amid al-Juyush was raised to the post of wizãrate.
By his neutral and just policies, he was able to restore peace to the dynasty. He disallowed
the Shfites from celebrating their ceremonies on the eve of Muiarram and completely
wiped out the Bandits and 'AyyãrUn. In the post 'Aud period we also see a continued
cooperation of the authorities in preventing the followers of both communities from
celebrating their festivals publicly. In the year 393/1002,124 during the reign of Bahã'al-
Dawla, both the Shfites and the Sunnites were disallowed to perform different rituals on the
eve of Muixirram. In the same way, in 398/1007, when the Shi'ites Sunnite riots erupted,
the Caliph Qadir bi Allah, on the one hand ousted the Shfite jurist, Jbn Mu'allim, and on
the other hand disallowed the Sunnite story tellers to earn money by taking the name of
Abü Bakr and 'Umar.' 25 Pursuing neutral policies thus restored peace. The Caliph was
equally generous in giving patronage to the Shi'ite 'ulama'. In the face of the common
danger of the Fipnid attack, the 'ulami' of both communities were summoned to put the
signatures on the resolution declaring their genealogy to be spurious. The Caliph Qadir bi
Allah alongwith Bahã'al-Dawla secured the signature of Sharif brothers as important.'26
The Shi'ite 'ulamã' took these favours by the Caliph positively. Accordingly we see the
composition of a famous poem by al-Murtaçlä on the accession of the Caliph Qa'im bi Amr
Allah.' 27 In the post-'Aud period when the disputes arose between the Buwayhids and the
123 J.L.Kraemer, The Humanism In The Renaissance Of Islam, P.43.
124 Ibn al-Athlr, al-Kmil, vol.9, P.178
125 iba Kathir, al-BidAya, vol.11, P.290
126 I-leinz Haim, Shiism, P.53
121 Ibn KaLhIr, al-Bidäya, vol. 12, P.29.
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Turkish soldiery the Caliph was accepted as a mediator to put an end to these disputes. The
fact that his decision was accepted and carried out reflects the existence of a good
understanding between both.'28
When the army rose in rebellion against the Buwayhid Amir, Jal1 al-Dawla, due to a
delay in payment of salary, it was again the Caliph who came to his rescue and eventually
succeeded in persuading them to depart from there on good terms with the Amir. 129 On
another occasion when Jalãl al-Dawla was forced to evacuate the capital city again due to
an army rebellion, he took shelter in the palace of al-Qã'im.' 3° Differences indeed arose on
different occasions but were ultimately resolved. Services of the 'ulamã' of both the
communities were acquired to resolve the differences. al-Mãwardi also played an important
role in bringing both parties together. He mediated on behalf of the Caliph and persuaded
the Buwayhid Amir Jalãl al-Dawla to accept the demands of the Caliph.' 3 ' Because he was
equally trusted by the Buwayhids, they acquired his services when differences arose
between themselves.' 32
 The Caliph also acquired al-Mãwardi's services and sent him as an
ambassador to Tughril Beg.'33
As mentioned earlier, the Caliphate recovered some of its authority during the later half
of the Buwayhid rule. The rise of powerful dynasties was a strong factor, which led to the
development of this situation. The constant profession of loyalties by the provincial dynasts
and their request for the titles and legitimacy added more prestige to the Caliphal dignity.
However, despite their professions of loyalties to the Caliph, their assumption of authority
I2 Maflzullah Kabir, The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad, P.200.
129 Ibn al-Athir, al-KAmil, vol.9, P.446
130 Mafizullah Kabir, The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad, P.104.
I3 jbn al-Jawzl, al-Muntazam, vol.15, PP.285-286
132 Ibn Kathir, al-BidAya, vol. 12, P.36 ; Ibn al-Athir, al-KAmil, vol.9, P.455
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was illegal because they were guilty of violating the principle of obedience to the Caliph
and assumed control without his prior consent. So the jurists were faced with the problem
of their legitimacy: Was it legitimate on their part to exercise authority without prior
permission of the Caliph and afterwards making a request for legitimacy? Was it not a
deviation from the regular and formal appointment by the ruler? al-Mãwardi deals with this
problem under the heading of Emirate by force ( Imarat Istila), which we shall examine
now.
Emirate by Force ( Imâat Istlâ)
To form a correct estimate of al-MAwardi's views on the 'Emirate by Force', we may
begin with the qualifications of the Caliph as given in the al-Ahkam and deemed necessary
for his office. The following are those qualifications:
Justice together with all its conditions;
Knowledge which equips him for ijtihad in unforeseen matters and for arriving at
relevant judgements;
Good health in their faculties of hearing, sight and speech such that they may arrive at a
sound assessment of whatever they perceive;
Sound in limb, free of any deficiency which might prevent them from normal
movement;
A judgement capable of organising the people and managing the offices of
administration;
Courage and bravery enabling them to defend the territory of Islam and mount jihãl
against the enemy;
' Ibn aI-Jawzl, al-Muntazam, vol.15, P.289
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Of the family of the Quraysh, because of the text (of a Prophetic 4jadffh) on the matter
and by virtue of consensus.'34
The portfolio of wizãrat al-Tafwrz is of paramount importance next only to that of the
Caliph himself.' 35
 al-Mãwardi thought it necessary for the holder of the portfolio to possess
qualifications similar to those of the Caliph. Although, he was exempted from the condition
of the lineage of the Quraysh;' 36 in view of the importance of the office, two extra
responsibilities were entrusted to him. al-Mãwardi says that he ought to be capable in two
matters with which he is to be entrusted: war and kharaj.'37
The scope of these responsibilities is by no means exhausted as we find that al-Mãwardi
has reiterated their importance and considered them necessary both for Amir IstIiã and
Amir Istikfa".' 38 It is necessary to define both emirates as stated by al-MãwarclT in the third
chapter of the al-Ahkãm. The Amir Istikfã is one appointed by the choice of the Caliph in
the areas still under his contro1.' The Amir IstU on the other hand, is one who has
imposed his rule without prior consent of the Caliph.' 40
 al-Mãwardi required both of them
to possess all the above qualifications, which he mentioned in the context of both the
Caliph and wazir. In the former case no one was thought eligible to hold the office unless
he possessed the required conditions, and the Caliph was bound to exercise his choice
among the qualified candidates. In the latter case the task of the Caliph was facilitated if the
usurper already possessed the required qualifications.
al-MAwardl, A.S, P.12
'Ibid, P.37.
136 Ibid.
Ibid.
' Ibid, PP.48-49.
' Ibid, P.48.
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al-Mawardi thus proposed to recognize the provincial dynast as a legitimate ruler of the
province where he usurped the authority without approval of the Caliph. From
recommendation of granting legitimacy to the usurper as a full-fledged ruler of Muslim
lands subject to the fulfillment of conditions of pact, that we shall deal with shortly, follow
some important consequences.
The usurper was required to enforce the right order through fulfillment of the conditions
of the pact under the direct supervision of the Caliph.
It was necessary to trust the usurper in the application of the right order if he was
qualified to enforce it, i.e.; if he possessed all the qualifications stated by al-MawardL'4'
If he lacked those qualifications, he could still be regularized provided he accepted the
representative from the Caliph for assisting him in carrying out the business of the province
according to the requirements of religion and justice.'42
Usurpation continued to be an unlawful means of acquiring authority. Even after
regularizing the usurper, al-MAwardi did not consider the situation to be a substitute for the
regular one when authority was acquired through lawful means. 143 It was therefore tolerated
under the law of necessity.
The idea behind this legitimization was to deal with the irregular situation, consequent
upon the act of usurpation, in the best possible way if it was impossible to rectify it
according to ideal requirements. With the weakening of the 'Abbasid Caliphate the
tendencies to assume autonomy in the outlying regions increased. However, the rulers in
such areas, as a matter of policy, bound themselves to render allegiance to the Caliph who
' Ibid, PP.54-55.
142 Ibid, P.55
'43Ibid.
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was considered as the lawful occupant of authority throughout the Muslim lands. al-
Mawardi, in the opinion of Gibb, was the first thinker who subjected it to a thorough
treatment by rationalizing not only what had happened in the past but also by regularizing
contemporary and future practices.'
Some dynasts had become so powerful that taking possession of the Central Provinces
was not a difficult task for them. But out of reverence for the Caliph, who was recognized
as the supreme legitimate leader in the eyes of the Muslims 145, they rendered allegiance to
him and avoided such a step. al-Mawardi, therefore, thought it necessary to regulate the
mutual relationship between the Caliph and the Amfr. But he had to be careful that granting
them concessions should be perfectly in accordance with the juristic theory of the Caliphate
which he had propounded in the al-Ahkãm.' 46 We have seen earlier that in the Central
Provinces he proposed arrangements according to which a working relationship was
established between the Caliph and the Buwayhid rulers. The Caliph was urged to reconcile
with the exercise of his nominal control and delegate all the powers to the Buwayhids in
administrative affairs. The Buwayhids, in turn, were required to accept the leadership of the
Caliph in religious affairs and were also obligated to refrain from showing any act of
disobedience to the Caliph. These two acts, however, were insufficient for the acquisition
of their legitimacy unless they enforced the right order based on religion and justice.'47
This was the pivotal point on which al-MAwardi's theory of the Caliphate was based.
The purpose of all the arrangements, as he went on to explain, was to prevent any break in
the continued application of the commandments of the right order based on religion and
' H.A.R.Gibb, "MAwardi's theory of Caliphate"; Studies on Civilisation of Islam, P.162.
' Hanna Mikhail, Politics and Revelation, P.43
146 H.A.R. Gibb, "MAwardi's theory of the Caliphate", Studies on Civilisation of Islam, P. 162.
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justice.' 48 The vast concessions granted to the Amir were actually in recognition of his
overwhelming power, which, though sometimes exercised arbitrarily against the Caliph,
were never exercised to the detriment of the system of the Caliphate. al-Mãwardi's
formulation, therefore, overlooked the occasional lapses of the Buwayhids, and
acknowledged their services of continuing the old system, which did not suffer any break at
their hands.
As the head of the Muslim community, the Caliph was required to call upon a provincial
dynast if he found the Amir wanting in the enforcement of just order. The authority
entrusted to the Amir was, therefore, a great responsibility, which was to be withdrawn if
the purpose remained unfulfilled.' 49 In the same manner al-Mãwardi worked out a
compromise between the Caliph and the provincial dynast to ensure the enforcement of the
right order. If the dynast did not fulfil the object, the Caliph was required to withdraw
legitimacy from him.'5°
Both situations had occurred in the distant past and had persisted up to al-Mãwardi's
own time. The only difference was that in the Central Provinces the Caliph willingly
delegated his powers to the Amir, whereas the dynast in the outlying province assumed
authority without prior consent of the Caliph. He ousted the appointee of the Caliph and
replaced the Caliph's rule with his own rule. al-Mãwardi avoided calling the situation at the
centre an irregular one because the Caliph had willingly transferred his authority to the
141 al-MAwardi, A.S., P.54
118 Ibid, PP.53-54
149 Ibid, P.34.
150 Gibb, MAwardi's theory of the Cali phate, P.162, Gibb argued that Mãwardi proposed two different
sets of arrangements for the Central Provinces and the outlying provinces. Mãwardi gave vast concessions
to provincial dynast (granting legitimacy even if he is guilty of neglect of enforcement of right order).
Whereas no such concessions were given to the Amir in central province. It is clarified that both the Amir
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Amir through delegation, as we have previously seen in the case of Ibn Ra'iq. In the case
of the outlying regions the developments began in an opposite manner. Here the principle
of the delegation was made to work after the assumption of power by the dynast. In the
former case the Amir assisted the weak Caliph in implementing the policies of the
government and the Caliph's acceptance of his assistance authorized the Amir to lawfully
carry out the administration of the government. In the latter case, no prior permission of the
Caliph was sought and the delegation of the Caliph was requested after the establishment of
the rule. Delegation, therefore, without imposing certain conditions, which should clearly
have reflected subordination on the part of governors would have been ridiculous. al-
Mãwardi, therefore, imposed seven conditions on the provincial governor, the fulfillment of
which would legitimize his rule. The Following are those conditions as stated by al-
Mãwardi in the al-Abkam:
. Protection of the office of Imainate, which is the successor of Prophethood, and the
organisation of religious affairs, so that this obligatory institution of the shari 'a is
maintained and all rights and duties issuing from it are preserved;
• A manifest obedience to the deen which negates all possibility of rebellious or fractious
behaviour on the part of the Amir;
• Unanimity in friendship and mutual help such that the authority of the Muslims may be
above all other peoples;
• Contracts issuing from governmental authority which are connected to the deen should
be concluded, and the rulings and judgement pertaining to them should be executed; they
should also not be invalidated by mere imperfections in such contracts, or annulled by
and the provincial dynast were equally responsible for the enforcement of right order for acquisition of
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mistakes in such contracts, or annulled by mistakes in the obligations ensuing from such
contracts;
The receipt of money for something due in accordance with the shari'a must be paid in
such a way that the person acquits himself of what is owing and the person receiving it acts
licitly;
. The iadd-punishment should be executed correctly and should be applied to those who
deserve them as the body of the believers inviolable except from the rights of Allah and
His punishments;
• The Amir must be scrupulous in protecting the religion from the things prohibited by
Allah, must command the obligations of the religion if it is being obeyed and call to its
obedience if it is being disobeyed.'5'
Although al-MAwardi regarded the enforcement of these laws to be a shared
responsibility of both the Caliph and the Amir, the latter had heavier responsibilities due to
his real commanding position. Indicating the purpose of these laws, al-Mãwrdi clearly
stated that they were meant to comprehensively cover the right order based on religion and
justice.' 52
 In the Central Provinces, al-Mawardi required both Caliph and Amir to carry out
the same obligations where his purpose was the same. In the context of ten duties, which al-
Mãwardi assigned to the Imän, the required conditions were mostly included. One
obligation which belonged to the Amir and therefore was omitted in respect of the Caliph
was mentioned in the context of 'curtailment of liberty' where the Amir was required not to
show disobedience to the Caliph. In both cases it was the joint responsibility of both the
legitimacy.
'' al-Mãwardl,	 P.54.
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Caliph and his Amir (in the case of the Central Provinces) and the Caliph and AmIr (in the
case of an outlying region) to fulfil the duties that originally belonged to the Caliph. al-
Mãwardi did not assign the Amir at the Central Provinces a complete role in the fulfillment
of obligations, which he conceded to the Amir in the outlying Provinces. It was because of
the presence of the Caliph who supervised the whole business carried out in his name. The
Buwayhids were required to assist the Caliph in the execution of their responsibilities. The
same treatment was accorded to the Amfrs at a provincial level who lacked the quality of
the Mujtahid. They were strictly forbidden to exercise authority unless the Caliph appointed
a delegate for assisting them in this task. al-Mawardi clearly warned that till such a time as
this condition was met, the rulings of the Amir would remain suspended) 53 In both cases
strict measures were to be applied if the concerned authorities showed laxity in running
public affairs under the Caliphal authority. In the Central Provinces, the Ami was required
to show manifest obedience to the Caliph and act strictly according to the requirements of
religion and justice. If he failed to achieve these objectives in a desired manner, the Caliph
was then required to summon someone who would rid the Caliph and his subjects of Amir's
rule.'54
No such method was available at the disposal of al-Mãwardi to punish the provincial
dynast. He, therefore, sought an alternative method of proposing to withhold legitimacy
from him until he accepted a delegate from the Caliph for his assistance in the enforcement
of the right order based on religion and justice.' 55 al-Mãwardl, however, did not consider
the presence of the Caliph's representative necessary if the provincial dynast possessed the
153 Ibid, P.55
'	 Ibid.
Ibid.
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required qualifications. In that case, he was qualified to carry out the required conditions of
the pact as mentioned before. If he did not possess those qualifications, he was bound to
seek guidance of the Caliphal representative whose presence was necessary to make sure
that all the conditions of the pact were carried out.' 56 Under both arrangements it was a
carefully worked-out compromise between the Caliph and the holders of actual power for
continuing the right order based on religion and justice in an uninterrupted manner.
In formulating the conditions of both the pacts, al-Mawadi was influenced by the
circumstances of the past and his own time. At no stage in the Central Provinces did any
ruler exercising temporal authority refuse to acknowledge the authority of the Caliph. The
role of the Caliph in matters of law and religion also remained unchallenged. Moreover, all
the temporal authorities regarded the Caliph as the main authority in whose name all
official business was carried out. No act was lawful —no appointment valid unless it was
carried out in the name of the Caliph. Hence al-Mãwardl did not regard the situation as
irregular. By declaring the continuation of the right order based on religion and justice as a
shared responsibility of both the Caliph and the Amir, al-Mawardi overcame the problems.
But at the level of the outlying regions, al-Mãwardi, even after fulfillment of strict
conditions, called the situation an irregular one.' al-Mãwardl's purpose in doing so was to
reinforce the importance of Caliphal control over the people of the whole of the Muslim
world. The Fãpnk/s had established a rival Caliphate in North Africa and Egypt. In Spain
the universal claims of the 'Abbäsid Caliphs were not accepted any longer. Hence it stood
in further danger of being treated as an institution whose days were now over.'58
156 Ibid.
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Moreover, there were tendencies on the part of some provincial dynasts to overlook its
authority and had these been allowed to persist, the consequent destruction of the Caliphate
would have brought in its wake the loss of the bond of unity between them owing to
allegiance to the Caliph) 59
 al-Mäwardi, therefore, maintained it to be a necessary
institution. Even in the time of its weakness the irregularities consequent upon its weakness
could be met partially by temporary arrangements out of necessity. The same theme recurs
through the text of al-Mawardi under the heading of Imãrat Istila. Sometimes the
concessions to the AmIr are justified to transform the irregular situation into a regular
one) 6° Sometimes it is called a departure in its laws and condition, only allowed to save the
continued application of sharta.' 6 ' Sometimes these concessions are defended as being
permissible only in conquest and under compelling circumstances.162
By thus declaring the situation an irregular one even after fulfilling all the requirements
of the pact by the provincial dynast, al-Mãwardi wanted to put an end to the misuse of
aggression in the future. By the same token he also legitimized the Buwayhid's demand of
submission from the provincial dynasts. In the case of failure on their part to comply, the
Buwayhid's annexation of their lands could be legitimate.
The irregular situation consequent upon the act of the usurper could be brought back to
normal in one of two ways: Either the Caliph should have forced the usurper into obedience
because he was both religiously and legally bound to obey the Caliph even if he was bad.
This was obviously impossible due to the overwhelming position of the dynast. An
alternative method was to induce him to submit to the authority of the Caliph. Although it
Ibid
° al-MAward!, A.S., P.54.
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too could not be fully realized, it was not altogether without prospects. Even in its partial
fulfillment al-Mãwardi perceived the possibility of compromise that could be acceptable to
both parties. The following factors went in support of the pact:
(1) Whereas it was the strong desire on the part of the dynasts to exercise authority, they
had no aversion to submission to the control of the Caliph in religious affairs. Gibb says
that at no stage during his career did Ma1müd ever show disobedience to the Caliph or to
any of his governors.' 63 Hence it was not impossible to press them for more in favour of the
Caliph in return for the legitimacy they so restlessly desired.
(2) In the eyes of both the Amir who exercised the power, and the subjects whom they
governed, the Caliph was the supreme legitimate leader of the Muslim world.' It was
impossible to disregard the sentiments of the governed subjects, if the Amir ever
contemplated a long-term rule.
The provincial governors were therefore required to submit to the conditions of the pact
and to the authority of the Caliph. The Caliph on his part was required to recognize their
rule as the legitimate one if they carried out those obligations and were not guilty of
violating the sharf a. Due to lack of an alternative to regulate the situation in a proper
manner this was regarded as the best available method to deal with the situation, but still
was regarded as falling short of standard procedure under normal conditions.
The legitimate government thus coming into being was in defiance of the recognized
constitutional principles. We have seen previously that in addition to recognizing the
methods of accession to authority during the RashidUn period, al-Mawardi also legitimized
162 Ibid, P.54.
163 H.A.R.Gibb, Ibid, P.162.
' Hanna Mikhail, Politics and Revelation, P.43
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the methods of choosing the Caliph during the periods of the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids
on the authority of the 'ulamã' of the contemporary period. Now when he was faced with
the problem of legitimizing the Emirate by force, it amounted to a breach of those
principles on which the Caliphate was based. With the recognition of the usurper as a
legitimate holder of authority, not only did the breach of moral and legal principles go
unnoticed but the person guilty of this breach was also legitimized.
As for the violation of the constitutional principle, it was clear that after the seizure of
authority by the dynast, its immediate restoration was not possible. Hence, it was necessary
to ensure the enforcement of the sharf a in an uninterrupted manner. 165 The dynast's act of
rebellion continued to be unlawful because al-Mawardi did not treat the situation as a
regular one.
	
On the contrary its holder after being forced into certain conditions was
legitimized only to continue the right order in an uninterrupted manner. Similarly the
deviation from the principle of obedience to the Caliph was still regarded as illegitimate.
But once the deviation occurred in consequence of which the deviating person succeeded in
establishing his control, he was conditionally legitimized so as to safeguard the rest of the
shar! a. 167 Conquest and usurpation continued to be illegitimate means of acquiring
authority but the usurper and the conqueror were legitimized subject to enforcement of the
right order based on religion and justice.
The principles thus applied on the political circumstances of his day were derived from
al-Mãwardi's religious thought. According to the rules of the Sharf a, it is necessary for
165 al-MAwardi, A.S., P.54
' Ibid, P.53
167 Ibid, PP. 53-54
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man to survive by eating lawful things.' 68 But if survival itself is jeopardized due to scarcity
of lawful food, one is allowed to eat unlawful food.' 69 The scarcity of lawful food has
relaxed the condition for survival, which is the more important of the two. Similarly, if
recourse to lawful means was impossible due to incapacity of punishing the rebel, the main
purpose of enforcement of the right order could not be surrendered in any case. Both
relaxations were justified under compelling circumstances so as to put an end to their
misuse in the future.
The above argument was reinforced by another one when al-Mãwardi stressed the
relaxation still further. He justified relaxation under the principle of public interest. al-
MAwardi said: "if it is feared that matters of general interest will be harmed, the conditions
may be less rigorous than those relative to a particular or individual interest."170
In the former case the principle of necessity was invoked and relaxation was allowed
without differentiating between individual and collective necessity. In the latter one, further
relaxation has been granted with reference to public interest.
The jurists argued that if it was impossible to simultaneously act upon two rulings of the
sharf a, the one involving the lesser harm should be adopted. The jurists consequently
relaxed conditions, which were impossible to achieve for safeguarding public interest. The
violation of constitutional rule regarding the accession to authority was tolerated to avoid
bloodshed and outbreak of anarchy. al-Ghazä1i (d.505/1 111) justified the rule of the usurper
under the principel of necessity. He said: "necessity makes the restricted things lawful. We
168 aI .-Our'n, 2-172.
' 69 a1-Our'An, 2-173.
'7° al-Mãwardi, Ibid, P.55.
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know that eating carrion is unlawful. But death is more severe than it." 17 ' al-Ghazãli
further explained that rejecting authority of the ruler was not a wise course when it was
impossible to change it. Even if it fell short of the full requirements, it should be considered
as valid under the law of necessity. From this viewpoint we understand that al-Ghazãli
regarded usurpation unlawful except under necessity, just as carrion was made lawful for a
starving man. 172
Jmãn al-Juwayni (d.478/1085), who belonged to the same Shafi'f school of
jurisprudence as al-Mãwardi, expressed similar views on the law of necessity and relaxation
of conditions in the context of public interest. He said that the law of necessity governing
the individual person was less flexible compared with the same law applying to the whole
body of Muslims. In the case of the individual person, the relaxation of eating the unlawful
food was suspended as soon as he was out of danger of death. But the same concession was
to be granted still further if the Muslims as a body faced a problem in their collective
capacity. In his book al-Ghiyathi, he discussed the problem when the Muslims as a body
were caught in some problem. His viewpoint was that just as under individual necessity
unlawful becomes lawful, the same conditions apply to the Muslims in their collective
capacity in a more pressing manner. He says: "some people think that if Allah's creation is
involved in unlawful earning, the same law would apply to it which applied to a man who is
forced to eat the dead. But this is not right. Because if the people as a whole continue to
wait until they reach the stage of necessity, the energies will exhaust, ... physical strength
will vanish, especially if one is repeatedly forced into such a condition. In that case the men
171 aI-GhazAII, al-Igtisad ft al-PtigAd, P.121.
172 Ibid
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of skill and industry will not be able to continue their professions. Agriculture and other
means on which people depend for their livelihood will become extinct. This will result in
wholesale mass killing, including those soldiers who are energetic and have fighting
capabilities and protect the borders."73
Jrnän al-Juwayni clearly expressed that where Muslims in their collective capacity faced
some problem, they were allowed more relaxation than in the case of an individual person.
al-Mäwardi applied the same law to the political circumstances of his time. According to
him, the continued enforcement of the right order was the main public interest. Violation of
constitutional rule regarding accession to authority by the rebel could be overlooked under
compelling circumstances, provided he continued to enforce the right order based on
religion and justice under the supervision of the Caliph.
Summary & Conclusion
The Turkish soldiers, recruited by the 'Abbasids for the benefits of the empire,
eventually assumed the role of Caliph maker and the attempts on the part of the Caliphs to
reassert their authority set both parties at war which in the long run proved detrimental to
the Caliphate. In the tenth century, the precarious position of Baghdad treasury, restless
desire of dynasts to exercise authority on behalf of the Caliph and the rise of powerful
dynasties in the outlying regions reduced the control of the Caliphate to Baghdad and its
surrounding regions. Despite its reduced role, the Caliph continued to be treated as a main
legitimizing authority. Before the advent of the Buwayhid many dynasts of equal strength
wanted to consolidate their authority but the Turkish soldiers retained the initiative. After
' 73 a1-Juwaynr, aI-Ghi yähl,: Ghi yath al-Umam if al-Tiyãth al-Zulam, P.218.
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the death of TuzUn, a Turkish military chief, Ibn Shirzãd succeeded him, for whom the task
of handling the administration proved to be a difficult one. It gave Mu'izz al-Dawla a good
opportunity to invade Baghdad and to consolidate his rule there.
The Sunn ire Caliphate did not suffer abolition at the hands of those who did not believe
in its legitimacy. Several practical considerations prevented Mu'izz al-Dawla from taking
this hasty step. He was told that the replacement of the Sunnite by the Shfite Imain would
mean the virtual transfer of authority from Mu'izz al-Dawla to the Shf ire Imãin and it
would make the Shf ire lmain as the source of all authority for his co-religionists. Due
regard for the Sunnire population, who were in the majority, as well as the absorbed Turkish
soldiers in the army who were also Sunnites, exerted powerful constraints to go on with the
old system.
But the Sunn ire Caliphate was also faced with some problems of legitimacy. al-Mãwardl
defended the Sunn ire Caliph of the Buwayhid period on account of performing several
functions that gave him a legitimate status. Religion, law and the judiciary continued to
remain within the jurisdiction of the Caliph. The establishment of religious obligations
continued to be performed through the person of the Caliph. The Caliph was still allowed a
free hand to combat the innovations introduced into religion by the heretics. On many
occasions the Caliph executed heretics, stopped innovations, and imposed some religious
doctrines of faith thus allowing little scope for interference by innovations into the Sunnite
faith.
Although the authority was transferred to the effective holder of power, he always met
al-Mawardi's criterion of meeting the minimum requirement for recognizing the
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constitutional supremacy of the Caliph. The Buwayhids strictly adhered to all the
procedural requirements for the legal validity of their rule.
It was the principle of delegation that saved the Caliphate from extinction. Without
being obligated to part with the Caliphate, al-Mãwardi accommodated the real holder of
power (Amir) within the framework of the Caliphate. By constant emphasis on the
importance of delegation by al-Mäwardi, it necessarily followed on the one hand that the
person of the Caliph was not an end in himself who was required to exercise authority
regardless of time and circumstance. On the other hand, he was considered as a means to
realize the end of enforcing the right order based on the religion and justice, but still a
necessary means to sanction and supervise all the authority according to the religious
requirements. For that end he was required to be content with the exercise of nominal
control over the temporal affairs and delegate all the authority to the one who could
exercise it effectively. But while exercising nominal control in temporal affairs, he was
nevertheless made responsible for exercising supervision over the effective holder of
power. Therefore his role was not altogether reduced to insignificance in temporal affairs.
Similarly, the Amir of the Caliph whose dominant role in power sharing was acknowledged
because of his effective position to exercise the authority was obligated to submit to the
requirements of religion and justice. Power acquired through illegitimate means was thus
subjected to religion and justice and its onward exercise could be legitimate only with
reference to the continued application of religion and justice.
The Buwayhid period has been characterized as a famous one for a Shfite-Sunnite
concord on the official level. The instances of the co-operation between the Caliph and the
Amir outnumbered the instances of the strained relationship between the Caliph and Amir
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or when the Caliph faced humiliation. Throughout the Buwayhid rule of one hundred and
ten years only five Caliphs were installed to exercise authority. Promotion of good will
between the Caliph and Buwayhid Amir was the result of practical measures as well as the
interpretation of the principles of the Sh!ite Jlqh in response to new developments. The
efforts of the prominent jurists from both sides in bringing about reconciliation are worthy
of note.
The problem of legitimacy during this period of time was not confined to the lands
under the Buwayhids control. In outlying regions of the Islamic lands some powerful
dynasties had come into being whose rulers professed constant loyalties to the Caliph but at
the same time wanted to exercise their authority in an independent way. Assuming control
without prior consent of the Caliph was an act of usurpation and doing away with a
procedural requirements of the appointment. Recourse to the ideally best method of
punishing the usurper was impossible due to the more powerful status of such a usurper.
The best solution, therefore, according to al-Mãwardl, was to force him into establishing
the right order based on religion and justice as well as to undertake the procedural
requirements in a strictly legal manner. In doing so al-Mawardi legitimized the rebel,
without condoning the aggression which continued to be an illegitimate act under the
principle of obedience to the Caliph. Legitimization of the dynast was directly related to the
fulfillment of the above-mentioned conditions and his act of aggression, although still
condemned, was allowed to go unpunished due to the overwhelming status of the dynast.
Although it could not be a substitute for the ideally best form, it was still the best one under
the constraints of the circumstances. Relaxations in respect of these arrangements were
conceded under the law of necessity and public interest.
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al-Mãwardi required the persons holding the key posts in the administration to possess
qualifications similar to those of the Caliph. It reflects his devotion to the continuation of
the order, based on religion and justice, through different persons for which the Caliph was
just one functionary. He did not insist on the exercise of all the powers that he attributed to
the Caliph by the Caliph himself but in the changed circumstances he was quite content
with the exercise of nominal control by him. Through the principle of delegation he saw no
impediment in the way of the constitutional position of the Caliph if his Amir exercised
those powers on his behalf. Similarly al-MAwardi was quite content with the independent
exercise of power by the provincial dynast if he too possessed the qualifications similar to
those of the Caliph. In this case legitimacy too depended on the enforcement and
observance of the right order based on religion and justice.
al-Mãwardi's recognition of the monarch as playing an important role for assisting the
Caliph in the discharge of his functions made him a legitimate figure throughout the
Muslim lands in exercising power in an effective manner. The necessity of the Caliphate at
this time symbolized the need of the preservation of unity among the Muslims as well as
indicated, as Rosenthal observes, the religio-political unity of all the functions of the
government, which had to be ultimately carried out through the lawful occupant of
authority. Though divested of his erstwhile authority, the Caliph had still to exercise
supervision over the monarchs and the then existing Sultans to confirm whether they were
exercising their authority properly. The business of the Caliph was supervision and it was
the responsibility of the Monarch through delegation to exercise authority attributed to the
Caliph. The functions exercised by the monarch were to be carried out in the name of the
Caliph, hence called by al-Mawardi the Caliphal functions. al-Mãwardi's insistence on the
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delegation of authority to the Amir by the Caliph indicates the importance of the Amir in
the administration of public affairs.
Moreover dealing with the question of legitimacy al-Mãwardi in the context of his time
not only sought the basis of legitimacy for the Caliph but also of his Amir who had
assumed the effective control. How was he required to manage the public affairs? What
should be the limits of his authority? al-Mãwardi dealt with these questions at great lengths
in his books.
We have seen that Imãin 's legitimacy of authority largely depended upon enforcement
of the right order based on religion and justice. If he carried out his responsibility in a right
manner, he was entitled to command the loyalties of the subjects. But what was to be done
if the ruler ceased to carry out his responsibilities in a proper manner? Under what
circumstances did al-Mãwardi allow the subjects to strive for change? Were all the
individuals responsible in the same manner to bring about the reform in the society? Or did
their roles differ depending upon their place in the society? Did the 'Ulamã' have some
special role and functions to perform? The proper answers to these issues will form the
subject matter of our next chapter.
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Chapter Six
al-Mawardi's Concept of Political Change
Ruler and his Responsibilities
We have seen in our previous study that al-Mãwardi did not consider the Imãin merely
an executor of law. He considered him a religious leader who was responsible for the
establishment of religious obligations. He had to defend the faith, lead the Muslims in
prayer, establish Zakal, the fasting and facilitate IEIajj obligation. He was also a moral
reformer and was required to be equipped with thorough religious understanding and
knowledge.' Throughout his writings there was a constant emphasis on the point that
instead of directly imposing religious commandments on the deviants, the ruler was
required to bring them back to the right path through discussion and persuasion. He had to
bring about harmony among members of society through mediation and exhortation. He had
to protect the rights of widows, look after the slaves, and prevent unjust treatment of the
masters towards their animals. 2 The ruler was at once a religious leader, a social reformer,
and a head of state. To effect reform in the society he had initially to act in the capacity of a
religious and a social reformer and was justified to use force as a last resort or where it was
absolutely indispensable. To save the subject from the rigours of the law he had to find
excuses on their behalf, avoid unnecessary probing into their affairs, and was required to
remain careful not to violate any human rights in the process of implementing the laws. 3 He
had to patrol the streets, remove the sufferings of a needy person, and guide the deviant to
'aI-Mäwardl, A.S., P.11.
2 Ibid, P.346.
Ibid, P.347.
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the right path in the light of his religious knowledge. In short he was responsible to bring
reform at the level of individual, society, and state. He had to utilise all the means with the
right method and through different stages in order to accomplish the reform in a desired
manner.
From above analyses it is obvious that al-Mãwardi considered the ruler the most
effective person for bringing about religious, social and political reform. He was responsible
for carrying out this obligation on behalf of all the Muslims in the community. al-Mãwardi
regards the obligation of reform as incumbent on all Muslims as a far Kifaya. 4 Some
people performing it on the behalf of all the Muslims would absolve all the Muslims from
its performance. This was against the extreme views of the Khai-ijJs and the Zaydis who
considered the performance of this obligation to be necessary on all occasions. 5
 The famous
Shafi'i jurist, Imãm al-Ghazãli, shared al-Mãwardi's view and maintained it to be afarci
Kzfffya 6 Both drew their conclusions from the same Qur'anic verse in which Allah says:
let there be a party among you who would call towards good and prohibit evil and they will
be successful."7
Reasons for the Ruler's Responsibility to undertake the Obligation
In the light of the above verse both were agreed that it should be the ruler of the Islamic
government in the first instance who should undertake this responsibility in order to absolve
the rest of Umma from this duty. Although al-Mãwardli did not exclude the private citizen
from performing this function, 8 he considered it one of the basic responsibilities of the
' Ibid, P.337.
Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, P.3 10.
6 GhazAll, Ihy ' 'U1m, vol. 2, P.404.
7a1-Our'An, 3:104.
8 Ibid, P.337.
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government on account of several reasons. The following is a brief account of those
reasons:
Resources:
The people doing wrong to others are generally susceptible to the authority of the
government. The subjects, therefore, naturally look towards this institution to redress the
wrongs. It is an agency which restores their rights and protects them from injustices. It can
force the culprits to obedience by use of force. Although government acts through other
institutions like the judiciary and the Maãlim to restore the rights of people, it is only
through Mu1ztasib that it is legally entitled to take preventive measures to do away with evil.
Commenting upon the relative strength of the friba over the judiciary al-Mãwardi says: "the
Mu.!ztasib may investigate those matters in which he is conmianding concerning the good or
forbidding evil, even if the litigant seeking his help is not present - whereas the Qiçff may
not involve himself like this unless the litigant is present from whom he may then hear his
claim; if, however, the Qaçlidoes involve himself, then he excludes himself from the post to
which he has been appointed, and infringes the basis of his authority; second, the Mulitasib
has to exercise the sovereignty of a government official, and so he may have recourse to the
haughtiness and arrogance of the forces of order when dealing with reprehensible matters,
whereas the judiciary may not: iisba involves enforcement and any excessive behaviour on
behalf of the Muitasib when exercising his sovereignty and severity is not regarded as an
injustice or undue harshness; the QãçLI however, is there to establish justice and should
rather act with gentleness and gravity - and so any departure from this, such that he assumes
the imperviousness of the jisba, represents an outrage and an excess.. ." Similarly its realm
is different from that of the maä!im. He listens to those cases because of incapacity of the
Ibid, P.340.
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Qaçii whereas the Muljtasib deals with those cases where the Qaçlfhas been prevented from
interfering. In short the department of Ilitisab is endowed with the resources that entitles it
to achieve the obligation in a better way than its realisation through other means. al-Ghazali
also shows his preference to assign the job to those people who are strong and powerful. In
case they are not equipped with these resources, they should be content with merely treating
it as bad. A Government endowed with the power and strength qualifies to be the fittest
organ for achieving this objective.'0
Financial Reasons
Private persons committed to do this obligation on their own are also involved in daily
earnings. They can not, therefore, do it in an equally good and effective manner like a man
officially designated for doing this job. Being paid by the authorities for this task, the
officially designated person would be free from financial worries and is more able to
concentrate on his work with singular attention and devotion. Hence in the course of Islamic
history whenever the Muitasib was given an effective role, he received a handsome
salary."
Religious Knowledge
The job by its nature was a difficult one and needed people with thorough knowledge
and a comprehensive understanding of religion. Only qualified people thoroughly learned in
religious affairs could perform it properly.' 2 al-Mãwardli stressed the requirement that had
always been thought necessary for the Mujitasib. Pointing to this necessary qualification of
the Muitasib the Encyclopaedia of Islam says: "the Mufrasib had to be a man known for
his moral integrity and for his competence in the matters concerning the law; he was
'° al-Ghazl1, lbyA' 'Ulfim, vol. 2, P.188.
Basmee Ansrl, art, "Uisba", Encyclopaedia, vol. III, P. 492, quotes an example of Indian Sub-continent
where under the rule of Suln Tughlaq, the Multasib was an officer of great dignity and drew the monthly
salary of 8,000 tankas.
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therefore, usually afaqlh---.	 Privately quite a few people were equipped with such a vast
learning. Consequently they were unable to undertake this job effectively, no matter how
committed they might be in carrying it out. Stressing this aspect of the obligation Ghazãli
went on to say that without religious knowledge, one could not distinguish between good
and wrong) 4 The task could therefore be properly transferred to government authorities to
choose the men with proper experience and the required religious knowledge.
Wider Recognition
An isolated person has a limited circle of acquaintance and is relatively less identified
among the people. People were therefore quite naturally expected to turn towards the man
officially appointed for this job for redressing the wrong. The famous iIanblf scholar, Jbn
Taymiyya, highlighting the same fact, attributed the performance of this obligation to the
official authorities. He said: " men in authority have more ability to perform it compared to
others. Hence the obligation is incumbent on them more than anybody else. The basis of
obligation is ability. It is therefore obligatory on the man to the extent of his ability." 5 In
the case of an official appointment, it was naturally expected that people would look
towards him for solving their problems in the light of his religious knowledge.
On account of the above reasons the most qualified persons for carrying out this task
were those appointed by the governmental authorities. They were endowed with the
resources, knowledge, and power that other citizens could hardly possess in their private
capacity. If they performed this responsibility in a right manner, other citizens would be
absolved of it. The subjects could indeed share this responsibility with the government but
could not play an effective role similar to theirs.
12 al-MAwardi, AS., P.362.
CL.Cahen and M.TaIbI, art. 'Ilisba', Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 3, P.490.
GhazAlI, JbyA' 'Ulfim, vol. 2, P.421.
IS Ibn Taymiyya, al-HisbA ii al-Islam, P.37.
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Nature of the Task
Contrary to general assumptions, the task entrusted to the governmental authorities was
much more complicated. At first impression it looks quite simple that the government could
implement injunctions in an official capacity and curb evil by force. But a close
examination of al-Mãwardi's writing on the subject reveals that the task was to be carried
out with great care through various stages and with great precision if the Islamic injunctions
were not to be violated. There were inviolable human rights which prevented the Mu4itasib
from arbitrary exercise of the power and direct enforcement of all the commandments. The
Muslim population was also to be conceived as consisting of various religious schools and
there was a greater scope for the difference of opinion for each one of them.' 6 Consequently
the government was not allowed to impose injunctions pertaining to any creed under official
tutelage. Similarly, in forcing the citizens to observe religious obligations the Mulitasib had
to proceed very cautiously. He had to employ various means and tact; he had to bring the
subjects to the right path through moral persuasion and threats of the hereafter and if all
other means failed, the use of force was justified.' 7 He had to perform his task in a way that
neither any individual was allowed to endanger the integrity of religion and the Muslim
society, nor was the society to be allowed to disregard the individuality of a person. By
examining the responsibilities of the Muitasib with regard to performance of this task we
can carefully examine what it involved and how it was to be carried out.
Dual Responsibility
It was a responsibility of the Muljtasib which was to be performed both at the level of an
individual person and at the level of a group of persons. With regard to the fulfilment of
16 aI-Mãwardl, A.S., P.338.
Ibid, P.349.
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Allah's obligations, the subjects were to be identified as belonging to different categories.
Thus if a man in association with other men gave up the prayer, the establishment of which
was, according to al-MãwardI, the highest good (maraf), he was to be treated as a member
of a group and the ruling applicable upon him were to be the same as over the rest of the
people belonging to the same group. If as a group, the people of a given locality gave up
congregational prayers, the Mujtasib had a right to force them with regard to its
establishment.' 8 In the case of the individual person, great latitude was to be given and care
was to be taken regarding his punctuality. Personal excuses exonerated him from
recommended obligations. But a man in the habit of missing the prayers was to be
reprimanded so as to save society from the evil effects of his habits. In short, a distinction
was to be made between the habitual and the ordinary persons and due regard was to be
given to individual constraints.19
Respectful Attitude towards Different Schools
This condition was incumbent on the Mufrasib both in the case of establishing the limits
of Allah and the rights of individual over another. No man could be forced to act upon
teachings which were contrary to his own school of jurisprudence. For instance, regarding
the duty of the Muitasib to establish prayer, al-MAwrdi says: "no objection is to be made
against someone who delays it, but is still within the time, as there is a difference of opinion
amongst the fuqaha' as to the benefit in delaying it."2°
Realising the importance of the same principle with regard to mutual affairs of the
people, al-Mäwardi reiterates the same responsibility of the ruler. He says: "As for those
transactions about which the fuquha' differ, as to whether they are prohibited or not, then
the Mulitasib should not get involved unless the arguments against their being prohibited
18 Ibid, P.342.
19 Ibid. P.343.
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are weak, and are only employed as a means to something which all are agreed is
prohibited. ."' Imn al-Ghazãli was also of the same opinion in this regard. According to
him, for an evil to be regarded as evil, there must be a broad consensus.22
Respect for Individuality
The Mujtasib involved in this task was required to give full regard to the individuality of
a person.
It was incumbent upon him to find an excuse on behalf of the person responsible for the
omission of an obligation. He was to be trusted for what he said and bringing him to task
merely on the basis of suspicion was sheer ignorance. al-Mawardi cites an example: " it is
narrated that a Muitasib asked a man going into a mosque wearing his sandals whether he
also used them when he went to the lavatory; when the man denied this, the Muitasib
wanted him to swear on oath: this ignorance on his part, and an overstepping of the realm of
I)isba- his bad opinion of the other had got the better of him."23
From this it clearly followed how much a man was to be treated as trustworthy within the
realm of his actions. Every man's statement was to be trusted and his excuses accepted and
the Muitasib was bound to act accordingly. Unjust interference in his affairs and holding
him accountable on the basis of mere suspicion adversely affected his circumstances. Here
al-Mawardi's viewpoint seems to be based on the following tradition of the Holy Prophet:"
it is narrated from Miqdam b. Ma'dikarb and Abü-Imãma that the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H)
said that when an Amfr seeks excuses for the faults of the people he corrupts them."24
lb id
21 Ibid, P.354.
22 
aI-GhazAlI, fliyA' 'Ulfim ,vol. 2, P.4 19.
23a1-MAwardl, A.S., P.347.
24 AlIama Abi Tayyib, 'Bab ft al-Nahi 'An Tajassus'., 'Awn aI-Ma'bild ft Sharab Sunan Abi Daud, vol. 7.
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Right to Private Property
It was considered among the duties of the Mulitasib to take care of the needy and the
travelers, restore the irrigation system, and reconstruct the mosques from the funds of the
public ex-chequer. 25 These responsibilities were generally associated with his office
throughout the course of Islamic history. According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam: " he
was responsible for the cleansing of the streets and, if necessary, for the repair of the city
walls, for ensuring the supply and regular distribution of water, etc.. •,,26 But al-Mãwardi
considered it necessary subject to availability of funds and provided that their expenditure
did not bring any burden upon the Muslims. 27 As al-Mãwardi proceeds with the argument it
followed that private property was considered the most sacred right of the individual, which
even under the most critical conditions could not be jeopardised. If people of an area were
caught in a critical situation due to shortage of funds, the people with sufficient means were
responsible for rectifying this situation. But their responsibility was moral and not a legal
one. The Muljtasib could not force them to contribute to the well being of the poor. He
could, however, pursuade the rich people to temporarily contribute if the large-scale
migration of the masses encouraged the enemy to attack the city. It was then the
responsibility of the SultAn to make permanent arrangements for bringing the city out of this
critical situation. In the absence of the enemy's attack, the residents of the area were to be
given the choice either to migrate somewhere else or spend on the area to make it worthy of
habitation.28 It is then quite obvious that under most difficult circumstances the help of the
poor as well as the restoration of the city was considered to be the responsibility of the
government, which was not entitled to transfer the wealth from one class to another class.
al-MAwardi. A.S., P.344.
26 CL. Cahen and M. Ta1b, art, flisa, Enc yclopaedia of Islam, vol. 3, P.488.
al-MwardI, A.S., P.344.
28 Ibid, P.345.
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Principle of Enforcement through Degrees and Stages
In enjoining virtue and preventing evil the Muitasib was required to distinguish between
habitual criminals who committed it openly and intentionally and those who committed
crimes secretly and unintentionally. In the former case, he was required to promptly stop the
criminals lest they should become a threat to religion and society. In the latter case he was
required to proceed very carefully and was required to avoid applying legal means as much
as possible. His attitude towards them was to be based on sympathy. He was required to
threaten them with Divine wrath. He was also required to convince them through moral
preaching. Unless the offence of the culprit was not made public, the Muitasib was required
to continue with the same strategy. al-Mawardl says: "Likewise, if he thinks that a man is
omitting to do a ghusl, after being in a state of major impurity, or that a man is not doing the
prayer or fasting, then he should not punish him on the basis of suspicion, nor subject him to
reprimand; he may, however, on the basis of suspicion, admonish him and warn him of the
torment of Allah for those who do not fulfil His rights." 29 The Mufrasib was required to
bear with people and restrict himself to moral preaching unless they were found guilty of
open violation or became a threat to the foundations of religion and society. Similar attitude
was recommended regarding the beggar who was apparently rich. The Muljtasib could
merely exhort him because he could be a poor man. But if a strong man was found begging,
the Mulitasib was responsible to stop and order him to work. Here aI-Mawardi shows an
added concern to cure the greed and idleness of this person and justifies the interference of
the authorities in his case. If he did not desist from begging his wealth was to be forcibly
spent on him. If he was short of money but was strong enough to earn, then he was to be
forced to work and his money was to be spent on him.3°
29 Ibid, P.347.
° Ibid, P.348.
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Restoration of the Rights of the Weak
Three things were considered necessary for the Muitasib which included both the rights
of people and the rights of Allah.
Protection of Widows
This was rather a moral duty and made the Muijiasib bound to morally exhort the patrons
of the widows. The patrons on their part were free to accept or reject his advice. The
Mufrasib was not entitled to admonish them in case of their non-compliance.3'
The protection of the rights of Slaves
The Muljtasib was legally entitled to restore the rights of the slaves. If a master behaved
unjustly towards his slave, the Mufrasib could hold the master accountable and prevent him
from putting an additional burden on the latter.32
The protection of the Rights of Animals
Likewise he was entitled to restore the rights of animals. If the owner of animals did not
feed them properly or burdened them beyond their capacity, the Muitasib could interfere
and prevent the owner from doing so.33
Preventing Abuse of the Right to Privacy
We have examined previously how sensitive al-Mawardi was in his suggestions with
regard to the reform of the evildoers. He recommends different measures to guarantee the
right to privacy and the sanctity of the individuality of a person. Probing into the affairs of
a person was considered strictly forbidden. In the case of the evils being committed
privately, al-Mawardi prescribed the scope of the Muc'itasib 's responsibilities in the light of
Ibid, P.346.
32 Ibid, P.360.
Ibid, P.360.
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a prophetic tradition. The text of the tradition goes: "Whoever commits an ugly act, then let
him veil himself with Allah's veil; whoever divulges such an action openly, then we impose
the Iadd-punishment of Allah on him." 34 It is quite evident that the tradition takes into
account the evil effects of sin on society if it is being committed openly and aims at doing
away with it through such commandment. As for evil being committed privately, it was to
be taken as a matter between Allah and man. But this concession regarding the privacy of a
person was not to be considered to provide an unlimited excuse to habitual wrongdoers for
practising various kinds of concealed evils. al-MAwardi formulated this principle from the
behaviour of Caliph 'Umar. Hence the Mujtasib was empowered to prevent major evils like
fornication or killing of somebody which could not be rectified later on. In the time of
Caliph 'Umar a few people spied and prevented such evil and the Caliph did not disapprove
of their action. 35 From this precedent al-Mãwardl drew two principles: (1) a person could be
officially appointed to conduct a probe like that; (2) an individual person in a private
capacity was legally justified to do away with evil. However, this kind of probing was
limited to extreme cases. If the evil was not of a serious nature, spying was unlawful. The
rule was derived from the precedent of Caliph 'Umar. al-Mãwardl says: "it is narrated that
'Umar, may Allah be pleased with him, went in amongst a group of people sitting together
drinking wine in a place specially lit for the purpose, and said: " I have forbidden you to
drink wine, and you sit and drink; I have forbidden you to light up these places, and you
light them up;" to which they replied, "0 AmIr of the believers, Allah has forbidden you to
spy, and you have spied; and He has forbidden you to enter a house without first asking
permission, and you have entered;" then 'Umar, may Allah be pleased with him, said,
"These two( reproaches of yours)for those two( of mine)," and he went away without
' Ibid, P.353.
Ibid, P.353.
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getting involved any further." On the basis of this incident al-Mãwardi drew the conclusion
thus: " Thus anyone who hears the sound of forbidden instruments coming from a house,
and the people are making their music clearly heard, then he should denounce them from
outside the house: but he is not to impose himself upon them by entering, since what counts
as abhorrent is what is manifest, and he is not to deliberately reveal anything else of this
kind which is concealed."36
Function of Mediation
The Mufrasib had a right to mediate between two persons provided both of them agreed
upon the person for the settlement of an issue. The Mufrasib 's interference was unjustified
unless both parties willingly brought the case before him. In order to be qualified to settle
the case it was considered necessary for both parties to agree over their mutual rights. He
was then empowered to restore the right of the wronged party and could admonish the
offender. But in the case of denial of mutual rights the case was to be referred to the ruler
or the judge.37
Some other Responsibilities
The Mufrasib could settle the mutual injustices of the labourer and employer provided
the points of dispute were agreed otherwise the matter was to be referred to the judge. 38 In
the matters pertaining to health and education, his interference was justified. Levy on the
authority of MaqrizI referred to this function of the Muitasib that schools had to be visited
by him for making sure that the pupils were not punished severely. 39 Maqrizi indicated just
one aspect to be all-inclusive whereas al-Mawardi considered this responsibility of the
Mu4itasib to cover three things:
36 Ibid, PP.353-354.
' al-MAwardi, AS., P.357.
38 Ibid, P.358.
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1. To inspect the methods which they employ to bring up children.
2. To ensure that their methods of teaching were good.
3. To ensure that they possessed sufficient knowledge.4°
This was because in the case of negligence in health affairs life was endangered, whereas
negligence on the part of teachers could corrupt the morals of the subjects.4'
The overall control of different persons in the market with various professions fell within
the realm of his responsibilities. For example, different professions involving honesty or
dishonesty like colormaker or goldsmith, as well as checking the weights and
measurements, required the supervision of the Mujtasib. 42 Referring to his responsibilities
in this context, the Encyclopaedia of Islam says: " more generally he had to watch for and
combat all the types of shortcomings and dishonesty which could arise both in the
manufacture and in the sale of commodities... '' He could hold the craftsman responsible
to pay a fine in the case of the loss of things. Such a ruling was again precedent-guided.
Abü Zahra states this principle under the concept of Macä1ii Mursala and traces its origins
to the Caliph 'All. He held the craftsmen responsible for the payment of money in case of
the loss of a commodity out of negligence. To save the people from this loss there was no
way short of curing the negligence of the craftsmen except to hold them responsible for
making a payment for the loss.45
In short, he was responsible for contributing to every good and for promoting it as well
as to suppressing all evils. He had to patrol streets and prevent people from peeping into
Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, P.336; Maqrizl, Khitat, 1, P. 464.
40 al-Mãwardl, A.S., P.358.
' al-MAwardi, A.S., P.35 8.
42 Ibid, P.358.
CL.Cahen and M.TalbI, art. ' Uisba", Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 3, P.487.
al-MAwardi, AS., P.35 8.
Abil Zahra Imäm Màlik, P.235.
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other's houses.46 If an Iinän prolonged the prayer, he was to be prevented from putting an
extra burden on the people praying behind among whom there were weak and old people.47
He could reprimand the officials if they were slow in their work.48 His duties also included
the supervision of public morality. al-Mãwardi regarded the expounding of the Shari' a to be
exclusively the work of a faqih or a man qualified in religious learning. Consequently he
suggested imposing a ban on unqualified people so as to save the people from their
misleading interpretations. The principle was derived from the precedent of the Caliph 'All.
(d.40/661) al-Mãwardi says: " 'All b. AbI Tãlib on one occasion passed Ilasan al-Barl
while he was talking to the people and he put him to a test, saying, "what is the pillar of the
deen?" to which he replied, " scrupulousness." Then he asked, " And what is it which
blights it?" to which he replied, "Greed". 'All then responded, "Now you may talk to the
people if you wish."49
Both professional sportsmanship as well as foretelling was proposed to be strictly
banned. 5° This seems to be al-Mawardi's reaction to the existing Buwayhid practices. Ibn
Kathir states that under the patronage of Mu'izz al-Dawla professional sportsmanship was
highly encouraged. In order to win awards people could run thirty miles in a day. In the
same period the people also began to show interest in wrestling, boxing and swimming.5'
If the ideal pattern mentioned above did not exist and the ruler did not carry out his job
properly, some of his responsibilities were to be performed by the subjects which were not
beyond their capacity. As for the responsibilities which could be fulfilled only through the
government, al-MAwardi made the subjects responsible to explain and remind the ruler
46 al-MAwardi, A.S., P.359.
Ibid, P.359.
48 Ibid, P.360.
Ibid, P.349, Hasan aJ-Barl (21/642-1101728) must have attained proficiency in religious sciences at an
early age because if the above event took place shortly before the martyrdom of the Caliph 'All, the former
would be nineteen years old.
50 Ibid, P.362.
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about his duties. If he did not show compliance and adhered to a course of action contrary to
the demands of religion and justice, what then did al-Mãwardi recommend for the subjects?
This we shall examine in the next section of our study.
Deposition of the Ruler and Revolt against Authority
Highlighting the purpose of the Caliphate, al-Mäwardi says: " Ima,nate is prescribed to
succeed Prophethood as a means of protecting the religion and of managing the affairs of
this world."52 The Caliph, the most central figure of this arrangement, was naturally
required to direct his efforts to the achievement of this goal both through his acts and
policies. al-Mãwardi was, therefore, quite naturally led to the conclusion that if " he
commits forbidden acts, pursues evil, is ruled by his lust and is subject to his passions; this
counts as a moral deviation which excludes him from taking up the Imãinate or from
carrying on with it. Thus if such behaviour befalls someone who has become the Imãm, he
is disqualified."53
al-Mãwardi followed Imän al-Shãfi'i is viewpoint who justified it on the ground that 'a
person unable to act upon the rulings of Shari' a could not force others to act upon them.'
Consequently both a sinful (faiq) Qäçfiand a sinful (fäiq) ruler could neither aspire for the
office nor could continue in the office. Later Shafi'i jurists, Nawawi, Qurtubi, and Taftäzãni
(d.792/1389) retained this condition for the Qffffbut allowed the ruler to continue his rule if
he turned sinful (fffsiq) after his installation. They maintained that although the ruler was
worthy of deposition after he turned sinful, he was not to be removed if he was fully
established in his rule. The fact that al-Mawardi did not ignore this viewpoint either is clear
when a little further in the same text al-Mäwardi brings under discussion the prospects of
Ibn Kathir, al-Bidava, vol. 11, P.179.
52 al-MAwardi,	 P.10.
Ibid, P.30.
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repentance on the part of the ruler and the renewal of his pledge. al-Mãwardi says: "if he
recovers his decency he may not return to the Imifinate except by way of a new contract;
some of the MutakallimUn, however, have said that he may return to the hnainate on his
return to probity- without a renewal of his contract and without the oath of allegiance-
because of his overall authority in governance and the difficulty involved in renewing his
oath of allegiance." 54 In other words, it is clearly an acknowledgement that in principle his
disqualification was right but practically this was related to the ability of subjects under
existing circumstances. This points to al-Mãwardi's realistic estimate of the actual situation
that in case he was powerful enough to continue his rule, it was more likely that under such
circumstances he would not be willing to part with his authority. In that case his authority
would, therefore, be legitimate under the law of necessity.
Under such circumstances, it can be deduced from the text of al-Mãwardi that the right
of popular revolt was clearly disapproved. al-Mãwardl implied that in recognition of his
strength the right of a sinful (ffisiq) to continue his rule was to be approved as legitimate
under the law of necessity. al-Mãwardi's text in the al-Alikãm clearly lacked any indication
for popular revolt. Nor was there any suggestion given to immediately install a new Caliph
after the disqualification of a sinful (faiq) from the Caliphate. On the other hand, both these
possibilities were ruled out when al-Mãwardl took into consideration the alternative opinion
according to which the same person was required to turn repentant and renew his oath of
allegiance. The fact that al-Mãwardl aims at consolidation of the rule of the same person
subject to mending of his ways is confirmed when he is willing to weigh the second opinion
that acknowledges him as a legitimate ruler even without the renewal of an oath of
allegiance if circumstances so dictate. 55 It was quite obvious that till such a time when he
Ibid, P.30.
Ibid, P.30.
259
turned repentant, the people were asked to bear with his rule. This question raised a
considerable debate among the writers on al-Mãwardi. H.A.R.Gibb assesses al-Mãwardi's
overall stand on this issue to be "intermediate between the positive Khãrjfte doctrine of the
duty of insurrection and the negative Sunni doctrine of the duty of submission." 56 Can we
then exactly determine, in the light of these remarks by Gibb, al-Mãwardi's stand on this
issue and his suggestions to subjects if they faced such a situation? Gibb responds to this by
saying that alMãwardi is " prudently content to leave this too with these rather vague
indications."57
Qamaruddin khan, however, differs from Gibb in interpreting al-Mãwardi's stance on
this point. He quotes al-Mawardi as clearly advocating revolt "when the Imãin either falls an
open prey to sensual passions or becomes sceptic of the basic creed of Islam."58
Qamruddin khan certainly simplified aI-Mãwardi's position without providing evidence
from his text because nowhere in al-Mawardli's formulation do we come to know his
alluding to such a course of action. Qamaruddin khan might have referred to al-Mãwardi's
viewpoint in his own writing where he quotes al-Mãwardi as saying that he authorised the
subjects to refuse to obey the hnän in case he orders something wrong. 59 But we cannot
assume from this that it in any sense amounts to an appeal to the masses to rise in revolt. On
the contrary two traditions quoted by him in two different places adhere to the mainstream
of Sunni political thought. At the outset of the al-Abkäm he quoted the tradition on the
authority of Abu-Hurayra which inculcates reverence and submission to the ruler even if he
is bad. The tradition goes thus: "after me the governors will rule over you and those who
are upright will rule you with their uprightness and those who are corrupt will rule you by
their corruptness: listen to them and obey them in everything which is compatible with
56 H.A.R.Gibb, "aI-Mãwardl's theory of the Caliphate"; Studies on Islamic Civilisation, P.161.
Ibid, P.161.
58 Qamaruddln Khan, Mãwardl's Theory of State, P.47.
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truth- if they are correct in their dealings then it will be your benefit and theirs, and if they
act incorrectly then that will be still to your benefit but will be held against them."6°
The above tradition clearly states two principles:
1. people are asked to obey the ruler only when he orders right things;
2. Without violating the above principle, they have not to rise in revolt against him even if
he is bad.
In his exegeses the same viewpoint of al-Mãwardi is confirmed where he quotes the
tradition from Nãfi' b. 'Abd Allah with the similar import: " obedience to the ruler is
obligatory regardless of individual likes and dislikes with the only exception when orders
are contrary to the shari 'a. In such case obedience is not binding."6'
The criterion for the obedience was clearly laid down. While Muslims were urged not to
obey any rule of the authority in disobedience to Allah and his Prophet (P.B.U.H), they
were at the same time urged to bear with the bad authorities. They were required to obey the
rulers without following their reprehensible practices.
Two things are quite obvious up to this point:
(1) al-Mawardi disqualifies the Irnän from linifinate if he falls prey to sensual pleasures,
commits prohibited acts, or pursues evil or does something of an innovative nature in
matters of religion.
(2) He expounds the viewpoint that people were required to continue to obey the ruler even
if he was corrupt without following his reprehensible acts. There could be no obedience to
the ruler in disobedience of Allah and his Prophet (P.B.U.H).
Apparently both viewpoints seem to be mutually inconsistent. On the one hand
disqualification of ruler due to his involvement in evil and immoral practices is obvious and
Ibid, P.48.
60 a1-Mward, AS., P.11, Tabar, 8-502.
61 al-Mäward, Tafslr, vol. 1, 4-59; "Kitãb al-Imra" Sabib Muslim.
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clearly stated by al-Mãwardi. On the other hand, in the light of Ijadlth literature, there is a
constant emphasis on obedience to the ruler even if he is bad. Further analyses and study of
al-Mãwardi's viewpoint may clarify this contradiction.
Although in first instance, he disqualified the corrupt Caliph from the Caliphate, a
careful study of the text makes it clear that this disqualification was not to be necessarily
followed by deposition in all circumstances. In principle, the dissolute (fäsiq) did not qualify
to be a legitimate Caliph under normal circumstances, but could nevertheless be recognised
as legitimate under the law of necessity in case he was established in authority. This is clear
from his own text where al-MAwardi did not exclude the possibility that in case such a man
returned to the correct behaviour he would again be restored as a legitimate Caliph after
renewal of his oath of allegiance or even without it if the circumstances so dictated.62
The lack of approval to rise in revolt was, however, related to the lack of ability on the
part of the governed to do so in a successful and organised manner. The emphasis on the
obedience to a bad ruler was a concession to the frailties of the subjects. If the means and
resources were available, it was considered as a collective responsibility of the Umma to
replace the rule of the sinful (fäviq) with the rightful one. The Qur'än puts emphasis on
returning the trust to their rightful owners. 63 Interpreting this verse of Qur'an, al-Mãwardi
clearly means by returning the trust to their right owners as returning the government to
those rightfully deserving it.M Consequently the subjects were made responsible for
returning the trust or authority to its most deserving person provided they were able to do
so. Hence in the al-Ahkãm, al-Mäwardi outrightly says that "people of power and influence
cannot depose the ruler unless his state changes." 65 In other words he authorises them to
62a1-Mäwardl, AS., P.30.
63 aI-Mäwardl, Tafslr, 4-58.
64 al-Our'an, 4-58.
65a1-MAwardl, A.S., P.20.
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depose him if he turned from the state of good behaviour to the state of sin (fisq). But as we
have seen the principle was not absolutely binding and was linked to the ability of the
subjects. In case, the subjects who were morally upright, but were governed by a bad ruler,
Mãwardi did not exclude the possibility of revolt. al-Mãwardi takes this possibility into
account in Task!! a1-Nazar and did not disapprove such a course of action. But here too he
approves reform rather than revolt as a preferred course. However, in case constant
exhortation failed to induce him to a desired reform, forcible deposition was justified as a
last measure.66 Changed circumstances needed changed rulings.
Imãm al-Juwayni who agreed with al-Mäwardi on many points openly sanctioned revolt
if the situation was likely to change for better and seemed to pose fewer problems than the
existing one. Like al-Mãwrdi and other shafi'i jurists, he strongly disapproved the
installation of a sinful (fsiq) ruler because he considered sin (fisq) and the Caliphate to be
naturally incompatible with each other. However, since the Caliph was not infallible, his
temporary sins were to be condoned owing to his involvement in the wide variety of his
official tasks. But a deviant ruler who persisted in major sins and despite exhortation and
reform did not mend his ways was to be deposed by the people of power and influence. If it
was impossible due to overwhelming position of the ruler, then careful calculations were to
be made by the subjects. If direct revolt against the ruler was likely to lead to a worse
situation than the existing one, the subjects were required to remain patient with the rule of
sinful (fsiq) ruler. But revolt was justified if it was likely to change the existing situation
for the better one.67 al-Mãwardi relied upon some alternative revolutionary means for
bringing political change but justified revolt under favourable conditions when the ruler was
weak. But he did not sanction taking risks under a strong ruler, as did al-Juwayni.
al-MAwardi, TashlI, P.253.
67 
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In the following study we shall attempt to prove that al-Mãwardi approved both peaceful
and revolutionary means provided they were applied with all necessary preconditions and
wisdom. He was strictly opposed to revolutionary means if they caused the outbreak of
anarchy (fitna) without bringing in a good alternative leadership and if there was a danger of
some greater evil. If conditions were favourable, he was quite willing to accept every means
to effect a change at political level, provided it could be applied effectively.
(1) During the Buwayhid period when both the Caliph and his AmIr exercised authority
within their respective spheres, al-Mawardi put repeated emphasis on the effective
enforcement of the system based on religion and justice. In case the Amir was guilty of the
omission of this enforcement, he made the Caliph responsible to liberate the Caliphate from
the bondage of the unscrupulous ruler. 68 This was a revolutionary suggestion involving
prospects of direct confrontation between the provincial dynast and the ruler in Central
Provinces. At the same time it was a very risky step for the Caliph because before the actual
take-over by the provincial dynast, the Aniir could depose and execute the Caliph. On the
other hand, if some military General or the masses had come to the Caliph's rescue, it
would have precipitated a civil war. al-Mãwardi himself remained stuck to these principles
and did not approve what he considered a deviation on the part of Amir. In spite of having
good relationship with the Buwayhid Amir Jalãl al-Dawla, he refused to endorse the title of
Mälik al-Mulük which the latter submitted for the approval of fuqaha'. Ibn
Kathlr(d.774/1373) quotes al-MAwardl, as saying that it was impossible to grant such a title.
Ibn Kathir says that he had done all this in the light of iIadfth injunctions. The theme of the
.Iadh is that whosoever assumed the title of king of kings, Allah would humiliate him on
the day ofjudgement.69
68 al-MwardI, A.S., P.34.
69 Ibn Kathir, al-BidAya, vol. 12, P.39; Ibn Athir, al-Kämil, vol.9, P.459 Ibn Athir says that unlike most of
contemporary jurists MAwardi gave fatwaagainst this title.
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(2) He persuaded the Caliph to effectively utilise the weapon of legitimacy and force the
provincial dynast to properly enforce a system based on religion and justice. If they failed to
effect change in the areas under their control, legitimacy was to be withheld from them.7°
This would have adversely affected their moral status both in the Islamic world and in the
eyes of their subjects.7'
(3) He required provincial dynasts to use their power as a tool of enforcing the right order
based on religion and justice in the areas under their control. Acquisition of legitimacy after
fulfilment of certain conditions would link them as part of the Islamic world without at the
same time compromising their authority.72
(4) If the ruler neglects his duties and there develops in consequence a party of evildoers
whom the ruler fails or neglects to punish, al-MãwardI then recognises the existence of
forming an organised group as legitimate to deal with such group. Assumption of this
principle was precedent-guided.73
(5) At an individual level, he also accepted the carrying out of this responsibility and did not
regard it as a parallel exercise of governmental authority by him. Indeed under exceptional
circumstances he went as far as to allow him to proceed to examine and denounce the evil.74
But while allowing to deal with evil both at individual and collective level quite
independent of government, his motives were religious and not political.
From the above study it is clear that al-MAwardi sanctioned revolutionary means only to
ensure the enforcement of the right order based on religion and justice under the supervision
of the Caliph. If the ruler pursued this object, al-Mawardi legitimised and supported his rule
even if he was not necessarily the best. He also persuaded all the classes to lend full support
al-MAwardi, A.S., P.
' al-MAwardi, AS., P.54-55.
72 Ibid.
' al-MAwardi,	 P.103.
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265
to such a ruler. The purpose was obviously to put an end to the power struggle and minimise
the tension between different sects and religious schools of the community. Under the same
considerations the 'U/ama' were required not to aspire to the political leadership but to
restrict themselves to advice and reform. According to aI-Mãwardi, the 'ulamã' were a
permanent source of advice and guidance. All the sections of society had to seek their
guidance because of their thorough acquaintance with religion and their responsibilities for
conveying it properly to every one. The rulers were no exception and special emphasis was
laid on the need to seek their advice regarding political affairs. Hence apart from knowing
religion through religious books the rulers were required to see the 'u/ama' on a permanent
basis.75
 The 'ulamã' on their part were required to be very honest and free from any greed
or fear. Their responsibilities included reform of all sections of society.
An 'Aiim was required to acquaint all the members of society with the demands of
religion. He had to clarify how everybody was religiously responsible for performing his
duties. 76
 Consequently al-Mãwardi considered it a right job for those people who were
averse to the luxuries of life and did not have any lust for material reward. 77 The 'ulamff'
were required to produce Mujtahids who could apply religious injunctions to newly arising
situations. They were required to train the judges with full competence for running the
judicial system in a satisfactory manner. 78 They had to advise the rulers about the best
course for them.79 They had to criticise the rulers for their omissions. They had to expound
the religion in full. They had to answer different queries of people regarding the daily
al-MAward!, Nal1at, P.223.
76 al-MAwardi, Adab, P.87.
al-Mawardi, Adab, P.92.
78 al-MAwardi, A.S., P. 100. The tough criterion for becoming a qualified person for judicial post obviously
required him to study Shari' a under the tutelage of an 'A7im.
al-MAwardi, Adab, P.91.
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problems of life in the light of their religious knowledge. 8° Not once throughout his writings
is there a clue to a politically ambitious career for them. The rulers and the 'ulamã' were
required to work in unison towards the achievement of a single goal but both of them were
assigned different spheres of action and responsibilities.
Mode of Behaviour towards Corrupt Authorities
As we have mentioned earlier, all the revolutionary means suggested for bringing about a
change depended on the available means and conditions. But if such conditions were
lacking, what was then a proper course of action for the people? For instance, if a sinful
ruler was fully established in authority, what was to be done by his subjects? Here al-
Mäwardi seems to have based his views on the pattern and the methods of the Salaf We
have enough evidence to support this viewpoint in the light of his following statements.
1. He gave advice to the rulers 'to protect the religion as it was established in the original
form and about which the first generations of umma are agreed'.8'
2. He regarded the Jjmã' (consensus) of the Companions of the Prophet (P.B.U.H) as a final
authority and binding on the subsequent generations.82
3. He maintained it as one of the pre-requisites of the Mujtahid to know how the first
generation interpreted and acted upon the Qur'an. This condition naturally exerted
influence on his views regarding the proper attitude of people towards corrupt authorities.83
4. He maintained the pious 'ulamã' of every period as one of the authentic sources in
matters of religion84
80 Ibid, P.87.
81 a1-MwardI, A.S., P.27-28.
82 Ibid, P.12; P.101.
Ibid, P.100.
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What was the viewpoint of the above mentioned authorities with regard to the right
behaviour of the subjects towards the authorities and the limits of their obedience and
disobedience towards them?
The companions whom Mãwardi believed to have understood and acted upon the
religion better than anybody else had lived to see the early Umayyad period.
Abu-Hurayra used to call for the prayer in Masjid NabvL He used to pray behind
Marwãn and criticised him for not allowing him enough time at the end of sUra ratiha (the
opening surah of the Qur'an) to say Anfli. However, despite this criticism he continued to
pray behind him.85
During the reign of 'Abd al-Malik, (d.86/705) Ijajj was performed according to the
instructions of 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar but under the leadership of Hajjãj. 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar
recognised his Imffrat.86
The succeeding generations of sunnI 'ulamã' based their course of conduct on their
pattern regarding this aspect. Their course of action was based on the following points:
Dissolute (Fasiq), who is able to maintain his rule by force, was to be recognised under
the law of necessity. His deposition was justified and risks could be taken only when
prospects of success were high as well as better alternative leadership was available, a!-
Mãwardi conformed to this viewpoint as we have seen in the previous analysis. Regarding
the deposition of the ruler under favourable conditions we need to turn towards Tashli al-
Na.ar where he maintains that either the subjects would reform him with strength and
determination or replace him with someone else in case the unjust ruler is ruling the just
population.87
Within the limits of their obedience the ruler was to be followed only in right actions.
Aba aI-Kaläm, Masla KhilAfat, P.95.
86 ImAm MAlik, Muwatta, PP.320-321.
87 al-MAwardi, TashlI, P.253.
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(1) The rulers were not to be obeyed in wrong matters. al-MAwardi clearly laid down the
principle that obedience to the ruler was necessary only in right matters and they were to be
disobeyed if they ordered something wrong . In the same way, he prevented the 'ulama'
from following the ruler in that what was inconsistent with religion and what was
contradictory with the truth. 88 It was through accumulated pressure of this kind that ruler
was ultimately to be forced to reform himself. In Tashil al-Mawardi clearly lays down that
upright subjects, by their strength and resolution, would continue to reform the unjust ruler
until he mends his way. 89 Subjects and 'u/ama' were not made responsible for bringing
about any sudden change in an abrupt manner but they were required to stick to
disobedience and non-co-operation over unjust policies.
In the Adab, al-Mãwardi clearly stated that the ruler not fulfilling his responsibilities
properly was to be punished and held accountable by the people. 9° The subjects, however,
were not required to immediately react but had to wait for the opportunities until the ruler
became weak due to his unjust policies. 9 ' He firmly believed that unjust policies of the ruler
over a period of time would render him weak and he was ultimately bound to be caught in
calamities. That would be a proper time for the subjects to express their hatred by deposing
him and installing a new ruler in his place. 92 Prior to reaching such a stage the subjects were
asked to remain patient. This can be verified by two traditions which he quotes in the Adab:
"it is narrated from the Holy Prophet ( P.B.U.H): "the unjust Imäm is better than fitna (
anarchy) and in both there is no good and in some tyranny there is a preference."93
'Abd Allah b. Masüd said: "although the king spreads fasãd and whatever Allah reforms
by him is better. If he behaves justly then for him is the reward and upon you is
88 al-MAwardi, Adab, P.91.
89 a1-Mwardf, TashIl, P.253.
9° Ibid, P.139.
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thanksgiving. And if he behaves unjustly, then upon him is the burden and upon you is the
patience,"94
According to al-Mãwardi, the rulers were to be criticised for their unjust policies.
Although al-Mawardi allowed avoiding criticism if it involved dangers, he nevertheless
considered it a better course of action for the person who was qualified to undertake it with
all necessary conditions.95
Legitimacy of Government Service
Here an interesting question arises which sheds light on the issue of a legitimate
government and the extent of co-operation which al-Mãwardi was willing to allow to
individual under it: whether or not he maintained the government service as justified under
such rule. We can know al-Mãwardi's viewpoint quite clearly from his text.
al-Mãwardi expounds his viewpoint which at once accommodated the legitimacy of
accepting the government office with some conditions as well as accepting the unjust ruler
under whom public affairs could be regulated lawfully under the law of necessity. Unlike
the khffrjites he did not make the legitimacy of government service conditional upon the
soundness of the whole system or upon sound character of the ruler. On the contrary, the
legitimacy of accepting the government office depended upon the nature of legitimate or
illegitimate commands of the ruler. he considered two requirements to be pre-requisites for
the legitimacy of the government service. (1) The office itself should be of the right nature.
He strictly disallowed a person from carrying out the wrong policies of the ruler like killing
somebody, usurping wealth, imprisoning, or inflicting unjust punishment on someone.
However, as for example, killing of the ruler. On the contrary, the legitimacy of accepting
the government office depended upon the nature of the legitimate or illegitimate commands
Ibid.
Ibid.
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of the ruler. He considered two requirements to be pre-requisites for the legitimacy of
government service. (1) The office itself should be of a right nature. He strictly disallowed a
person from carrying out the wrong policies of the ruler like killing somebody, usurping
wealth, imprisoning, or inflicting unjust punishment on someone. However, Judicial posts,
iisba, mathematics and algebra were considered right.96
(2) Such posts were considered legitimate as long as the ruler did not order something
unjust. In the case of unjust commands, it was necessary to disobey the unjust
commandments. It reinforced the conclusion that instead of taking rash actions, which were
beyond one's capacity, the unjust ruler was to be resisted through non-compliance with
unjust commandments.97
al-Mãwardi also mentioned the opposite viewpoint according to which it was altogether
illegitimate to accept the public office. Power, according to them, was a trust and the
Qur'an explicitly denies the Divine pledge to the unjust. How could it be legitimate then to
assist and accompany such unjust rulers?98
In answer to this, al-Mawardi sticks to his viewpoint and says that man could accept
government service on his own terms and conditions. It was right to accept the office if the
ruler did not order wrong actions but instead ordered to carry out the recommended
(Mubai). However it was recommended to accept the service if it could be a means of
preventing the wrong and injustice.99
In support of his viewpoint al-Mawardi cited the example of the Prophet Joseph who
despite being a Prophet accepted the employment of a non-Muslim king. It is therefore
legitimate and if reform and improvement were expected through such a course then it was
Ibid, P.102.
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obligatory. al-Mãwardi considered it a highly preferred course if the person adopted ways to
effect reform through it. He quotes the tradition of the Holy Prophet ( P.B.U.H): "No wazfr
is more deserving of reward than one who enjoins virtue upon the king with reference to
Finally al-MAwardi repeated two necessary conditions for the acceptance of the public
office under an unjust ruler. The first condition was that the person undertaking the
responsibility was justified if he had right intentions. Secondly, he was justified if he carried
out only just commandments. 101
In the Adab aI-Mawardi stated an incident which not only clarifies his own viewpoint
about government service but also highlights the attitude of the 'Ulamã' of the Ummayyad
and the 'AbbAsid period about this issue.
Mãwardi says: "it is narrated from Abü-Fardah that Tariq was the commander over the
military troops of KhAlid 'Abd Allah b. Qasri. The troops passed by Ibn Shubrama rarIq
was along with the troops. Ibn Shubramã read the verse: "I see her, but even if she demands
admiration, she is like a summer cloud that quickly disappears."(Ibn Shabramah continued):
"0 Allah, for me, my religion and for them is their world." After this incident Ibn Shubrama
was appointed as a judge. Abu-Bakr, his son asked him: "do you remember what you said
on that day when raiiq with his retinue passed by you." To this he replied: "0 my son, they
seek a man like your father and your father does not seek the people like them. Indeed your
father ate from their delicacies and was consequently abased in their caprices."
al-Mãwardi throws his own reflections on this incident in these words: "do not you see
how this honourable exponent of religion is punished by self-reproach and repaid by
censuring, from one closest to him and perhaps the most pious of his sons. What then shall
'°° Ibid, P.529.
'°' Ibid.
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our outcome be, and yet compared to him, when the eyes of the critics look upon us or the
tongues of the antagonists make mention of us, we are most susceptible to losing control of
the reins and we have more troubled hearts. Do we have anything other than the aid of Allah
as our protection and His perfection as our refuge?'°2
Here al-Mãwardi acknowledges both his own weaknesses and at the same time the high
demands of religion. Despite these two factors he sees the way with extra-ordinary care
(capacity bestowed upon by Allah) to undertake the official responsibility in a legitimate
manner.
If the government was tyrannous and the means of organised revolt were lacking, the
rebellion was not a legitimate course of action. al-Mãwardi suggested compromise on many
points. For instance, he maintained it legitimate to give up saying the congregational prayer
under the rule of dissolute (Fasiq).'°3 He also regarded the officially appointed Ima,n as
legitimate even if they were not necessarily the best qualified.104
But he also suggested some measures that could lead to the accumulated public hatred
against authorities if they were corrupt and unjust. For instance, he made it incumbent upon
the citizens to pay the zakãi twice if the person concerned was unjust in distribution.' 05 He
did not specifically suggest anything revolutionary, but the consequences of double
payment by the well-to-do class over a period of time can be well imagined.
In our study thus far, we have examined that al-Mãwarcli accommodated both viewpoints
regarding the deposition of the sinful (Jsiq) ruler. Although he considered such a ruler
worthy of deposition, his actual deposition was related to the ability of the subjects to
undertake this responsibility in a successful manner. If the tyrant was fully established in his
102 al-MAwardi, Adab, P.40.
103 al-MAwardi, A.S., P.159.
104 Ibid, P.150.
105 Jbid, P.179.
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rule, people were asked to bear and co-operate with him. al-Mäwardl linked the
performance of every obligation with the ability of the believers. Under the tyrannical rule
of a tyrant, the subjects were considered to lack the ability and were therefore absolved of
the responsibility of bringing about the change in an abrupt manner. al-MAwardi not only
recommended patience with their unjust policies but also persuaded the subjects to co-
operate with the authorities and fully participate in public affairs notwithstanding certain
restrictions.
From the above recommendation one is tempted to conclude that under the despotic rule
of a tyrant, al-Mawardi did not favour any idea of political change and demanded a
complete submission on the part of the subjects. In fact al-Mãwardi did not teach a complete
submission to the despotic rule but proposed to bring about a gradual change through
religious transformation of society.
In al-Mãwardi's opinion the unjust rulers were imposed on the unjust subjects as a
Divine punishment. He interprets a verse in the An.rn.. on the authority of Ibn 'Abbãs, that
punishment of Allah from above is unjust rulers)°6
 Although the subjects were not
considered responsible for their immediate removal if they lacked ability, they were made
responsible not to comply with their unjust commandments without confronting them.
But a mere non co-operation over the unjust policies of the authorities was not enough
and did not guarantee the whole change, including political change. At best such measures
could provide checks and limitations on the unjust behaviour of the ruler. To change the
unjust rulers with just rulers, al-Mãwardi wanted a complete religious transformation of
society. Good rulers are the products of a good society; hence any desired political change
could begin with over all religious change throughout society. This change will not occur
only through political means but al-Mawadi anticipates it, in the light of Prophetic traditIon,
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when every man takes up his responsibilities in a responsible manner. In the words of the
tradition quoted by him in the al-A1kãm: " every one of you is a shepherd and is
responsible for his flock."07
So it was a concern of every man for every man that over all religious change could
occur which could then be a prelude to a real political change. Good rulers can be installed
and continue their rule in a good society. aI-Mãwardi says: " there is no survival of one of
them without the other."°8 Stressing the mutual necessity of one for the other al-Mãwardi
continues: " the need of a ruler for the subjects is no less than the need of the subjects
towards the ruler."°9 Highlighting the reform of the masses as prior to the reform of the
ruler al-Mãwardi remarks: "indeed if the subjects died, the shepherd would die too. When
masses go corrupt, the ruler also goes corrupt. Whenever a defect appear in the subjects, in
their wealth and their blood, it is bound to effect the ruler."°
His reliance upon the iIadfth literature also confirmed his viewpoint over these
principles. The earlier jurists who also suggested and adopted reform as a right course of
action also influenced his viewpoint. The real prospects of change, therefore, lay in
religious transformation of society that will be a prelude to any real political change. To
achieve the goal in a desired manner, al-Mãwardi stressed the importance of enjoining
virtue and preventing evil to be established in a right manner. According to al-Mãwardi, it
was in fact the lack of proper observance of this obligation which paved the way for the rule
of unjust rulers. He quotes a Prophetic tradition in this regard. In the words of tradition:
"You would enjoin virtue and prevent evil, or Allah will impose on you the mischievous
' °6a1 .MAward!, Tafs!r, 6-165.
101 al-MAwardi, A.S., P.29.
'°aI.MAwardI, Na11at, P.356.
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among you..	 The real and permanent solution to the problem of ridding of unjust rulers
could come through genuine restoration of this obligation. al-Mãwardi, therefore, dealt with
the method of performing it at length and described it in the following way.
Enjoining Good and Preventing Evil
Although al-Mãwardl thinks the obligation of enjoining good to be an obligatory one, it
is considered obligatory only for the compulsory commandments. Similarly preventing from
evil is obligatory only if the unlawful (xirãin) is being committed. 112
 It can easily be
deduced from this that a man was not considered responsible to enjoin the recommended
acts or to prevent MakrEilz The famous Ilanaffte scholar, Mulla 'All Qrl (d.1014/1606),
shares the similar viewpoint. In his words: " if the Munkar is unlawful, its prevention is
obligatory but if it is Makrii& its prevention is recommended. Similarly the enjoining of
good would be obligatory if the religious injunctions are obligatory."3
Necessity of the Obligation
al-Mãwardl believed it to be a source of strength for the religion of Allah. Faith and good
deeds, the foundations of a good society, could be acquired and strengthened through
mutual exhortation of friends and the intimates as well as through mutual prevention of evil.
Youthful passions and sensual desires, however, come as hurdles in the way of achieving
these objectives. The best way to remove these hurdles is the mutual exhortation of
intimates and relatives and their mutual prevention from evil. These methods are most
effective to prevent evil."4
" al-MAwardi, Naflat, PP.335-336.
I2 al-MAwardi, Adab, P.101.
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Method of Performing the Obligation
Great care is required to perform the method properly. al-Mãwardi classified the
evildoers into two categories: (1) in their individual capacity; (2) in the capacity of
organised groups."5
al-Mãwardi, in first instance, lays down the procedure to deal with the evildoers in their
individual capacity. The proper way of dealing with them depends upon the personal ability
of the man performing the job. Here the word ability, as the subsequent analyses show and
as the fuqaha' of that period have maintained, has not been confined to mere physical
strength. It rather implies that knowledge and understanding is necessary to qualify any
person to undertake the job properly.
Rationale of the Obligation
According to al-Mãwardi, the best way of parting with evil was to prevent others from
doing it. al-MAwardi's treatment of this problem clearly showed that every bad act had
inevitable social consequences. Hence it was not enough to avoid evil at a personal level.
Effort was required to combat evils at social level to escape its consequences in the society.
To vindicate his viewpoint, al-Mãwardi quoted the following tradition from the Holy
Prophet (P.B.U.H) on the authority of 'Ahd Allah b. Mubärak: "a group of people boarded
the boat. By drawing lots each one of them occupied his place. One of them began to make
a hole in the boat within his allotted place with an axe. People asked him: "what are you
doing". He replied: "This is my place. I will do what I want." Then they did not grasp his
hand and both he as well as they perished."6
'	 Ibid.
'	 Ibid.
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Exponents of Reason Vs Shar!a
al-Mäwardi quoted the arguments of the exponents of both schools who despite agreeing
on the necessity of this obligation justified it by their own arguments. al-Mãwardi first
alluded towards the viewpoint of the exponents of reason who thought it possible to fully
comprehend and explain this obligation on rational grounds. This seemed to be a typical
Mu 'tazilite stance who used to trust reason in explaining various obligations of religion. The
exponents of shari' a, however, maintained that Shari' a encompassed all what reason
regarded necessary and included more than what was beyond the comprehension of reason.
al-Mãwardi agreed with the Mu 'tazilites that the necessity of the obligation could be proved
by reason but preferred to rely upon the viewpoint of the exponents of Shari' a. His
argument was that whereas the reason demanded compensation for every loss, the Shari' a
fully accommodated this viewpoint but went further in allowing to suffer the loss for
exalting the religion of Allah. The Reason was, therefore, limited in comprehending the
scope of this obligation. It was religion which fully comprehended this obligation."7
Fear of Loss
al-Mãwardi held a middle position between two extreme viewpoints regarding this issue.
He did not follow the viewpoint of Ahi Iladfth wa al Athãr who thought that an individual
was only responsible for saving himself and his family members from evil. Nor did he
favour the delaying of this obligation to the advent of Mandi. But he did not consider either
performance of this obligation to be absolutely binding on every individual in all
circumstances. He linked the necessity of performing this obligation with certain conditions
and circumstances. Its performance was considered indispensable for eradicating corruption
but it could be suspended if there was some fear of loss, in which case a man was absolved
Ibid, P.102.
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of the necessity of performing the obligation."8 The famous Shafi'ijurist, Imãm al-Ghazali
stressed a similar viewpoint thus: " this obligation is not exhausted with mere
incompetence. If there were a danger of harm to the man performing it, this too would be
regarded as incompetence."9
Up to this point we can find al-Mãwardi's emphasis on showing harmony between
reason and shari' a. Whereas reason prevents from undertaking any action which has no
compensation, religion also allows escaping evil consequences of any action and
performing it to the extent of one's ability. In support of his viewpoint, al-Mawardi quoted
the following IIadRh of Holy Prophet on the authority of Abu Saeed Khudrhi: "prevent evil
by hand, if you are unable to do so, then prevent it by your tongue, and if you lack the
ability to do it as well, then treat it bad from your heart. And this is the lowest degree of the
fajth."2°
The above tradition covers a wide range of responsibilities and specifies the role
assigned to every person according to his capacity and place in a society. What al-Mãwarcli
meant by lack of ability was an as anticipated loss. The anticipated danger furnishes
legitimate basis to stop performing the obligation.' 2 ' Although it was government which
was made responsible for exercising this right as a sovereign body, there were exceptional
circumstances when an individual person was allowed to perform it by hand. Some scholars
interpreted the Ijadfth as demanding different things from different people according to
their rank, position, and ability to undertake this obligation. The famous jurist, 'Allãma al-
Qurtubi has summarised the views of the 'Ulama' regarding this Ijadlh in this way:
"Ibid
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enjoining good by hand belonged to the authorities, by tongue belonged to scholars and by
heart is a responsibility of the people."22
Having thus proved the complete concord of reason and sharI' a, al-Mãwardi goes on to
prove the superiority of religion over the reason. Although religion permitted giving up
preaching for fear of loss, the obligation could still be performed in anticipation of good
results for the religion. There was an agreement between religion and reason that there
should be a clear compensation for every loss but religion went beyond that point in
allowing the religious cause to be advanced at the great peril of suffering personal loss.
Allowing to give up preaching in anticipation of loss was an exemption to an individual
and stated the minimum requirements of religion. al-Mãwardi quoted a Iladfth to support
this viewpoint. According to the text of IIadfth: "the best jihãl is to speak the word of truth
before a tyrant king." But even for such a man al-Mãwardi laid down two conditions.
Firstly, that a man should be well acquainted with when and how to prevent from evil.
Secondly, he should be sure that his sacrifice would exalt the religion of Allah.'23
Lesser Evil and Greater Evil
Great care and precision was required to perform this obligation. al-Mãwardi observes
that a man performing an obligation should take care and judge well that the intended evil
he was going to suppress would not beget a greater evil. Otherwise, it was considered better
to withhold oneself from committing any action. 124 Imän al-GhazJi's viewpoint on this
issue was the same. According to him it is not right for a man to suppress evil in such a way
122 'AllämA Qurtubi, al-Jãmi' Ii AlikAm al-Our'än, vol.4, P.49; JalAl al-Din 'Umrl, Ma'riif wa Munkar, P.326
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that another evil comes into being... if a man determined to eradicate an evil brings another
evil into being, he can differentiate between both and can take the step accordingly.'25
Psychological Factor
In common with the other jurists al-Mãwardi highlighted another factor of fundamental
importance: to what extent the person being invited to restrain from evil is prepared to listen
to advice. Some people are averse to advice, and exhortation only increases their
stubbornness.' 26 In that case it was not necessary to continue with this responsibility. But
some jurists maintained a different approach, if not quite opposite. For instance 'All.ma
Taftãzãni (d.792/1389), in Sharali Maqad says: "one of the conditions to order Ma'rUf
and prevent evil whose eradication is intended is that it should not give birth to an equal and
greater evil. But this is true of its obligatory character and does not affect the sound status of
this obligation. 'Ulamä' have gone to the extent that a man performing the job, thinks that
he will be slain without influencing the evildoer, would be justified although he was
permitted to keep silent."27
al-Mãwardi held it as a job (in the matters requiring ijtihãJ) belonging to those few
experts who are endowed with wisdom and knowledge. Mere devotion and enthusiasm were
not considered to be enough. Persons endowed with such qualities but lacking necessary
qualifications were required to desist from performing this job. Their involvement instead of
bringing any benefit to religion or to themselves could bring harm to the cause of
religion.' 28
 al-Ghazãli puts it in a slightly different way. He restricts the ordinary man to
performing those matters which are obvious and well known.' 29 In the matters requiring
ijtih&-J he clarifies their position in these words: " it is no secret that a helpless man is
125 aI-GhazAlI, RiyA' 'Ulfim, vol. 2, P.421.
126 al-Mäwardl, Adab, P.103.
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128 al-MwardI, Ak P.103.
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responsible to consider it bad." It is a task that is commensurate with people of knowledge,
with all its conditions. The ordinary man should perform it according to his capacity and
knowledge.' 3° Highlighting the same aspect Imifin al-JuwAyni remarks that responsibility
should equally be shared by both the learned and those without learning, but if the
injunction by its very nature was such that it could be known through Ijtihad, then only a
Mujtahid was qualified to prevent evil."3'
Having discussed the matter at great length al-Mawardi turned towards another aspect of
the matter and took into consideration many point of views. This problem could arise when
an organised group in the community committed an evil. What were the responsibilities of
Muslims? Were they allowed to form groups to resist the group of the evildoers? Dealing
with the question al-Mãwardi first of all quotes the opinion of Ahl-IIadfth Wa al-Athffr.
Their viewpoint was that it was enough for a man to merely prevent himself and his family
members from doing evil and there was no further obligation on the man. They favoured
absolute submission and undertaking no activities beyond one's own limited family
circle.' 32 Their attitude towards the corrupt authorities was the same. Imãin al-Ash'ari says:
"they hold revolt to be absolutely false even if their children and wives are enslaved and the
masses are killed. Whether an Imän is just or unjust, none should be anxious towards his
deposition."33
Second approach was that of Imäniyya who defer this question until the advent of Mandi
under whose assistance they would fight the group of rebels.'
Thirdly, al-Mãwardi quotes Athãm who considered it essential to have a Just Imãin with
whom believers should join hands to curb the evildoers.'35
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Finally al-Mãwardi quotes the opinion of the majority of the 'ulamff' regarding this issue.
According to them it was essential to prevent evil but with all the conditions and
requirements necessary for performing this obligation. Again he insisted that until a group
was formed for performing this obligation, an individual person was required to desist from
rash action.136
Several things are clear from these approaches:
The first approach teaches a quietist attitude in an unqualified manner and does not
recommend the idea of forming any group at a collective level to deal with the party of evil
doers or for the restoration of their rights if they are usurped.
The second approach defers this action to the advent of Mandi. In other words they
prefer to remain politically uncommitted.
The third approach justified to deal with such a group under the leadership of a just
Irnân. In other words, they did not allow an individual person to perform this job, nor
allowed the formation of a group to deal with the group of evildoers. Finally al-Mawardi
quoted the fourth approach and favoured it which indicated that he belonged to the majority
group of ahi-Sunna. Indicating their approach in this case, he favoured the idea of forming a
group but sanctioned an action with all-necessary conditions and qualifications. Formation
of a group was considered legitimate to deal with the group of evildoer if government fell
short of its responsibility.
Irnãn al-GhazAli says that preventing an evil is mostly an individual affair but under
necessity man can form a party and fight the evildoers to eradicate the evil. Such an
' al-MAwardi, Adab, P.103.
135 Ibid.
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exceptional situation exists when " man is unable to change the evil and needs the armed
assistance of his supporters."37
Summary & Conclusion
The right of enjoining the good and preventing evil was in the first instance the most
basic responsibility of the Islamic government. If it carried out its job properly, the rest of
the people in society were to be absolved of this responsibility. In view of the delicate
nature of the job it was not merely the application of force that enabled the government to
exercise this function in a proper way. Being the most effective and resourceful organisation
it had to skilfully manage this responsibility by making use of force as a last measure or
where its application was indispensable. The Muitasib, appointed especially for
undertaking the job, had to use a variety of means such as persuasion, mediation, patrolling,
and any other means available to him to abolish evil and remove strained relationship
among the members of the community. He had to find excuses on behalf of individuals and
save them from the rigours of the law. There were inviolable human rights which could not
be infringed at any cost, a fact that the Muitasib had to keep in mind. But in case the
government failed to perform its responsibility in a desired way, al-Mãwardi suggested that
apart from becoming responsible for performing the job, the subjects would be responsible
to bring about political change to the extent of their ability. Without ruling out the
possibility of direct deposition, the subjects were asked to bear with the ruler if they lacked
ability for his removal. The only justified ground for rebellion was the commitment of open
kufr by the authorities. Before such a stage was reached people were required to remain
patient and be content with criticism and reform. Such an attitude was based on the pattern
of the Companions, the Tãbi'.ñz, and those 'ulamã' who were pious. The 'Ulama had an
'' aI-GhazAII, Iliy' 'Ulfim, vol. 2, P.425.
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assigned task of explaining religion to every section of society including the rulers. al-
Mãwardi's open sanction to take the government office under an unjust ruler validated
legitimacy of his rule in a clear-cut manner. But it was to be taken with the motives of
promoting justice as well as exhorting the ruler to reform.
Other recommendations of al-Mãwardi with regard to an unjust ruler confirmed the same
viewpoint. Not only unjust rule was to be tolerated but also co-operation in right affairs was
considered desirable.
To bring about a permanent change on the political level, complete religious
transformation of society was required through the obligation of enjoining virtue and
preventing evil. It was the moral character of society as a whole which was a true
measurement of the character of ruler. In order to bring about change mutual reform was the
best course which was to be performed skilifully. Both internal and external reforms of
individuals were considered necessary to bring a permanent change in a society. Internal
reform was possible by purifying the individual from within through the threats of the
hereafter. External reform depended upon maintaining the establishment of the
commandments of Allah. Although it was possible to comprehend this obligation by reason,
it was shar! a which covered the wide range of this responsibility. Fear of loss justified the
suspension of the obligation but a person determined to perform it in the face of an
anticipated loss was also entitled to perform it provided he was a qualified man for this job
and there were enough prospects for the exaltation of Allah's religion. This obligation was
to be performed with care so that an evil which is meant to be suppressed, should not beget
a greater evil and the person to whom the message was being given was ready to listen to
the message. The formation of a group to deal with the group of evildoers was subjected to
different interpretations. Some people regarded it unnecessary and confined it to a mere
domestic level, while others deferred it to the advent of Mandi others still preferred to
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perform it under a just Imain. But al-Mãwardi himself stood with the majority of the
scholars. He sanctioned the formation of a group to deal with the group of evil doers, but
with all the necessary conditions and requirements. It was only through formation of such
group that a man was advised to undertake this obligation. An individual person was
advised to desist because he had very little prospects of success.
286
CONCLUSION
The term Caliphate, as Mãwardi interpreted it in a broader context, referred to every
individual with a distinct place in society.' al-Mawardi applied the term to an Umma
succeeding the previous Umma, to humanity because of its succession to the previous
creation, and to all the Prophets including the sovereign Prophets. The succession was a
common theme implicit in a variety of its usage. The term was, therefore, applied to a
head of the Islamic community because of his succession to the Prophet (P.B.U.H) in all
the matters of religion including political affairs. However, in its political context, al-
Mãwardi did not rely upon the word Caliph as only the word for a sovereign ruler of the
Islamic community but used it interchangeably with the words Ima,n or the Ainfr al-
Mu'minfiz.2
Apart from studying the meanings of the Caliphate in a broad context, we have arrived
at an understanding that al-Mãwardi considered the existence of Islamic society as a
pre-requisite to the establishment of an Islamic government. Such a society was
established after the believers passed through stages during which the establishment of
every collective obligation was linked to the collective ability of the believers. At no
stage during the process of this gradual reform the followers of the Prophet (P.B.U.H)
were required to hurry the process of reform through the establishment of a government.
Consequently al-Mãwardi's emphases on the revival of the Caliphate is to be considered
relevant with regard to a specific period in the history of Islam. The Muslims of that
period in fact inherited this institution and agreed in principle about the necessity of
continued enforcement of the Islamic injunctions under the supervision of the Caliph.
The reference is to MAwardi's interpretation of the Qur'aiiic verse 6-165
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In absence of the ability for enforcing the injunctions of Islam at a collective level, the
Muslims of any community were not held responsible for bringing about change
through the establishment of the Caliphate. At the same time, al-MãwardI insisted on the
necessity of political organization and considered any kind of authority preferable to its
complete non-existence. The subjects were therefore required not only to bear with the
existing authorities but also to co-operate with them, provided this cooperation was not
inconsistent with the requirements of religion. However, co-operation was considered
necessary and was highly commendable if it could become a means of reform.
Similarly, from the study of his interpretations of the Qur'an, AI)&ifth, and material in
other books, we made an attempt to arrive at an improved understanding of his concept
of political change in a broad context. Within a Muslim society, if the subjects lacked
the ability to bring about political change, they were required to bear with the authorities
and co-operate with them. al-Mãwardi linked political change with the ability of the
subjects, which is bestowed upon them by Allah in consequence of following the
method of the Prophet (P.B.U.H). The process of political change, among other things,
involved exhortation and reform of the ruler and if he refused to mend his ways, he
could justifiably be deposed in the last resort. But forcible deposition was not incumbent
on the subjects because al-Mãwardl justified abstaining from any action which involved
loss. From these principles, one is tempted to conclude that al-MAwardi supported
despotism and was opposed to any political change in the community. Upon closer
analyses it would be obvious that this was not in fact a reconciliation with despotism
but he made the subjects responsible to cooperate with the authorities over the just
matters and not to cooperate with them over unjust matters. Form his interpretation of
Qur'An and Sunna, he was also led to the conclusion that bad rulers are the products of
2 In fact, it is the word Imam which has been used more frequently throughout the Alikam
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bad society and are imposed on the subjects as a Divine punishment. To bring about a
permanent change on political level the reform of the subjects was therefore considered
indispensable which largely depended upon properly carrying out the obligation of
enjoining good and preventing evil. In consequence of carrying out this obligation, the
reformed subjects would naturally deserve better authorities as a Divine favour.
The religious transformation of society was thus considered as a most effective way of
bringing about political change. In this process, al-Mawardi acknowledged the Divine
involvement, and also determined very clearly what role and responsibilities were to be
assigned to the subjects.
The detailed examination of ruler's various responsibilities enabled us to study them in
a particular manner. From the order of his religious, moral, and administrative
responsibilities it is obvious that the ruler was primarily a religious figure, then a moral
reformer, and finally as an executor of law. The religious and moral reforms were thus
considered prior to the enforcement of law at every stage of establishing religion.
In establishing the religion, the ruler was considered responsible to acknowledge the
priority of some acts over the others. After the defence of faith, the ruler was considered
responsible to establish religious obligations and the prayer was considered as most
necessary. Its establishment gave the ruler the right to govern the Muslim community
and entitled the subjects to the membership of the community. After the fulfillment of
religious obligations, the ruler was responsible for carrying out the social and moral
reform. And finally he could act in the capacity of executor of law. Before enforcement
of laws and penalties he was required to reform society according to religious and moral
principles where these laws could justifiably be enforced.
As a guardian of the faith and religion, the ruler could punish any deviation from its
fundamental principles but he was bound to acknowledge the existence of various
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religious schools with their rights of interpreting details (furl') of religion according to
the requirements of their jurisprudence. The ruler could force the adherents of various
schools to keep their differences within limits and to renounce them where they
threatened unity. But he was bound not to develop any prejudice against any religious
school and not to promote the viewpoint of any single school under official patronage.
al-Mawardl thus considered it not only as a ruler's right but also his duty to rely freely
upon the viewpoint of any school. In the light of such a background, it is easy to
understand al-Mawardi's quoting of two or more opinions in the al-Alikãm and leaving
it to the ruler's discretion to adopt anyone of the opinions according to the requirements
of the situation.
in order to perform his religious, moral, and political responsibilities, the ruler was
required not only to possess certain qualifications but he was also required to acquire
the authority in a legitimate manner.
In the absence of proposed fixed principles regarding the acquisition of authority all the
methods were considered legitimate as long as they did not violate the basic principles
of shari' a. The methods adopted during the Rffshidlln period acquired the status of
standard precedents. However, the methods carried out by the Umayyads and the
'Abbãsids were not considered either contradicting the principles of Shari' a or the
precedents of the RffshidUn Caliphs. The Caliphate established within a single family
was considered as meeting the requirements of legitimacy. However, it was thought
necessary to meet other legal requirements in a particular order, like approval by 11a11
wa al- 'Aqd followed by the taking of an oath of allegiance by the subjects.
But a ruler who was able to impose his rule in violation of these requirements was to be
recognized as legitimate under the law of necessity if it was impossible to punish him
for his act of disobedience towards the Caliph. To turn the irregular situation into a
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regular one, such a ruler was to be forced to enforce the right order as well as to submit
to the legal requirements of acquiring authority. If he submitted to the above two
conditions he was to be recognized as a legitimate ruler even if he was a less preferred
(MafJUl) man. In that case, the claims of any person with better qualifications could not
be accepted and the former was to be confirmed in authority. The 'Abbffsids, therefore,
finding no place for their claims to the Caliphate within such a framework claimed the
office of the Caliphate on the bases of their relationship to the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H).
al-Mawardi recognized their rule as legitimate because in actual practice, they reverted
to the traditional Sunni theory of the Caliphate and adhered to the Umayyad practice of
accession to the Caliphate by submitting to the legal requirements.
Submitting to the legal requirements for their accession to authority was the first
requirement of governing the Muslim subjects in a legitimate manner. More important
for the legitimacy of a ruler was to govern the Muslim subjects according to
requirements of a right order based on religion and justice.
The 'Abbisids fell short of upholding the right order in its ideal form, yet they met the
required standards of legitimacy by regulating Islam at public level. They established
religious obligations, enforced Islamic law, maintained a strong judicial system, and left
the 'ulamã' free in the codification of law. Hence they were recognized as legitimate
rulers of the Muslim community. Moreover, al-Mãwardi was conscious of an acute
shortage of such persons who could combine the quality of piety with good
administration. Another difficulty, following the upheavals in the post RashidUn period
was securing the agreement of subjects over the leadership of the best person. al-
Mãwardi, therefore, recognized the less preferred (Mafç'iil) as legitimate if he possessed
the basic qualifications for the Caliphate. He could be chosen even in the presence of a
better-qualified person and once his rule was established claims from even the best
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person to the office could not be legitimate. The legitimacy of the 'Abbffsid rule was
also based on various other juristic principles derived from the teachings of the Qur'an
and the Sunna, like the necessity of a political order, preference of tyranny over
anarchy, the law of necessity, the need of unity among the Muslims, and the preferring
of the lesser of two evils, etc. In the absence of an ideal system due to the changed
circumstances, the utility and application of these principles was vindicated through the
Iladfth literature.
With the passage of time when the Caliph became weak and began to rely on the Amir
for the exercise of his authority, his legitimacy was challenged on the ground that he
ceased to enforce the sharf a by himself and relied on the Amfr for this responsibility.
The Caliph no longer enforced the commandments of the right order to which his office
owed legitimacy. 'Abd a1-Ralimän III of Spain and the rulers of North Africa therefore
claimed the transference of the office to them. The weak Caliph of the Buwayhid's age
was considered legitimate on the ground that he still had a recognized role in
performing the religious, legal and judicial responsibilities. Both his accessions to the
throne as well as that of the Amfr were carried out in a legal manner. Moreover, like the
less preferred (mafcfUl) Caliph, the weak Caliph was also to be recognized legitimate if
the system of the Caliphate was carried out through different persons under his
supervision.
In executing various commandments, he relied on the Amir and was deprived of taking
the initiative; nevertheless al-Mãwardi proposed that under such circumstances he could
be authorized to exercise supervision over the Amir. If the latter was found wanting in
conducting the business of state in a right manner, the Caliph could summon the
provincial dynast to replace the Amir's rule with his own rule. It could become a
practical possibility because of the simultaneous existence of powerful dynasties
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throughout the Buwayhid era whose rulers needed the legitimacy from the Caliph for the
legal validity of their authority. Moreover the Caliph continued to be the religious head
of the community and as such was recognized as a legitimate ruler of the Muslims.
Like the Caliph, the Buwayhids were also faced with the problem of legitimacy. It was
an unprecedented situation in the history of Islam. The Buwayhid performed their
responsibilities under the SunniCaliph who could not be a legitimate Caliph according
to their religious requirements. The Caliph also had to rely upon the Buwayhids for the
enforcement of the right order even though they could not be most suitable persons for
this purpose. al-Mãwardi, like other Sunnijurists recognized them as legitimate because
they did not abolish the Caliphate, nor did they alter the enforcement of the right order
at public level. The judicial and religious system continued to be performed under the
patronage of the Caliph. The 'ulamã' were not deprived of playing their traditional role
in the society. The Shfite 'ulamff' considered the defacro Sunni Caliph as tolerable if he
tolerated the Shiites because after the disappearance of the twelfth Imain, they could
inherit only the religious functions of the Imän. Mutual cooperation of the authorities
and the jurists made it possible both for the Caliph and the Buwayhids to co-exist for
more than a century.
The excersice of authority by the rebel provincial governors could be considered
legitimate only if after the violation of law they submitted to the legal requirements,
acknowledged the existence of the Caliph and ensured the enforcement of right order
based on religion and justice. Their legitimacy was now directly related to the
enforcement of Sharf a. they were also required to make submission to the Caliph as
well as fulfil the various legal requirements. They were required to pay Kharãj to the
Caliph, take his name in the Friday Prayer, put the name of the Caliph on the coins and
renew the pledge on the installation and the deposition or death of every Caliph and the
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AmIr. Even after completing all these legal requirements they were to be recognised
legitimate under the law of necessity and the situation was still regarded as irregular.
Through such arrangements Mãwardi sought to put an end to the misuse of the power in
the future. His object was to reiterate the importance of the central authority under the
Caliphate as well as the enforcement of right order based on religion and justice
throughout the Islamic world. It gave the Buwayhids the right to annex any province
even when the provincial dynast was carrying out his rule in a right manner. But the
Buwayhids were also made responsible to enforce the right order for continuation of
their rule. After fulfilling this responsibility they could continue to exercise authority on
behalf of the Caliph. In the case of permenant deviation on their part the Caliph was
entitled to summon the provincial dynast to replace them and enforce the right order
based on religion and justice. Hence despite his weakness, the Caliph was still
considered a legitimate and necessary figure of governmental authority who was to be
entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the right order based on religion and
justice.
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